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Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays, presented as chapters, on corporate governance.
The first chapter examines the internal corporate governance channels that focus on
CEO compensation structure and the board of directors. The following two chapters
study corporate governance mechanisms from an external perspective.
The first chapter uses the employment history of over 17,000 directors of non-
financial firms. It finds that boards with directors with executive experience in
commercial banks compensate CEOs with higher inside debt. This finding is con-
sistent with arguments that professional experience shapes decision making. The
experience effect dominates the potential conflict of interest effect. These results
are robust to several specifications addressing potential endogeneity. The increase
in inside debt associated with banker-directors shifts CEOs’ incentives closer to the
optimum, at which point the agency costs of outside debt are minimised to benefit
shareholders.
The second chapter seeks to understand how freedom of the press affects corporate
misconduct. The paper shows that managers engage more in accrual-based earnings
management when their firms have a higher percentage of sales in countries with
low media freedom. This effect is stronger when foreign product markets are further
away from firm headquarters, when English is not the national language of the for-
eign partners, or when the fraction of institutional investors is low. This chapter also
shows that the insiders of these firms tend to be involved in opportunistic insider
trading through buy and sell transactions. The chapter offers novel insights into the
economic impact of media freedom on corporations.
The third chapter explores how political uncertainty affects private loan contracts
by exploiting the U.S. gubernatorial elections as a source of variation in uncertainty.
This chapter shows that lenders are more likely to impose financial covenants and
state-contingent pricing grids on borrowers headquartered in the states in election
years, compared with off-election years. The effects are stronger when the winning
voting margins are small, supporting the notion that political uncertainty manifests
itself in loan contracting outcomes. Additionally, the effect of elections is more
pronounced among the borrowers with greater information asymmetry. The evidence
of this chapter suggests that gubernatorial elections increase transitory uncertainty,
yielding significant impacts on private debt contracts.
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In the last twenty years, governance practices have changed significantly in response
to the financial crisis of 2008 and corporate scandals (Goergen and Tonks, 2019;
Zalewska, 2014). However, recent dynamics in political and economic issues, such as
concerns about the Chinese economy in late 2015 or the Brexit referendum in June
2016, have shifted uncertainty to unprecedented levels (Davis, 2016). Therefore,
questions have arisen around the changes in corporate governance structures and
the impact of these changes on corporate outcomes under uncertain or different
institutional environments. In this thesis, I attempt to answer these questions from
various perspectives.
The key themes in this thesis are (i) how internal corporate governance ap-
proaches, i.e. boards of directors and executive compensation structure, relate to
the agency theory and (ii) whether external corporate governance mechanisms are
driven by the institutional environment or political factors. Both themes influence
firm outcomes and the design of effective governance structures adapted to the grow-
ing socio-economic risks and unprecedented long-term trends.
Regarding the first theme, Jensen and Meckling (1976) document that share-
holders ultimately bear the agency costs associated with agency conflict between
debtholders and shareholders and should create incentives for the manager to han-
dle the firm in a way that respects the interests of both types of stakeholders. This
dynamic can be achieved when the manager is compensated with debt-like instru-
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ments in addition to equity. Jensen and Meckling (1976) also suggest that CEOs
with higher personal debt-to-equity ratios will manage firms more conservatively and
reduce overall risk. Empirical studies on executive compensation structure have sup-
ported the theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976), finding that firms whose CEOs
have insider debt holdings have less risky financial and investment policies, such
as diversified firm structure and higher asset liquidity (Cassell et al., 2012), lower
loan spreads, and fewer restrictive covenants (Anantharaman et al., 2014). There-
fore executive compensation, inside debt, plays a vital role as an internal corporate
governance channel in reducing risks for firms and encouraging firms to focus on
long-term corporate performance.
In terms of the second theme, in addition to the mechanisms that emanate
from within firms, many corporate governance factors originate from outside the
boundaries of firms (Walsh and Seward, 1990). Existing literature on corporate
governance has suggested that institutional factors matter for corporate governance
and that firms must adapt to the institutional environment in which firms oper-
ate (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). Therefore, uncertainty surrounding the economic
environment or legal factors due to changes in government policies or political lead-
ership leads to varied corporate outcomes and decisions (Bernanke, 1983; Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994). Moreover, there has been increasing attention afforded to the role
of analysts and the media in improving the information environment, reducing cor-
porate fraud, and enhancing internal governance structures (Chen et al., 2015; Irani
and Oesch, 2016; Miller, 2006; You et al., 2018). Therefore, together with internal
corporate governance mechanisms, such as boards of directors or executive com-
pensation contracts, external factors driven by a firm’s institutional environment or
2
economic factors affect firm activities.
The objective of this thesis is to examine how internal and external corpo-
rate mechanisms affect managers’ risk-taking incentives and firm outcomes. The
rest of the thesis consists of three self-contained chapters, followed by a concluding
chapter that draws together the contributions and limitations of the thesis and sug-
gests directions for future research. Chapter 2 presents the internal corporate gover-
nance mechanism by linking board characteristics and CEO compensation structure.
Chapters 3 and 4 study external corporate governance mechanisms, with Chapter
3 looking at the monitoring roles of the business press based on the differences in
institutional environments, and Chapter 4 studying the monitoring roles of private
lenders during political uncertainty. The content of each chapter is presented in
greater details below.
Chapter summary
Chapter 2: Banker-directors and CEO inside debt
This chapter, joint work with Piotr Korczak and Mariano Scapin, investigates how
the presence of directors with executive experience in a commercial bank (banker
directors) affects CEO inside debt. Directors on boards have both advice and mon-
itoring roles (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Adams et al., 2010). Therefore, board of
director members with banking experience are expected to improve the information
flow between firms and credit institutions and provide valuable industry-specific
financial expertise to the board (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001). However, board
members with existing or past links to credit institutions may have incentives to
support decisions that benefit debtholders but are potentially harmful to sharehold-
3
ers. The underlying reasons may be the conflicts of interest that emerge when firms
have bankers on the board (Güner et al., 2008; Hilscher and Şişli-Ciamarra, 2013)
or these individuals’ past experiences (Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009; MacCrimmon
and Wehrung, 1990; Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001). Arguably, banker directors
may design debtor-friendly compensation policies for CEOs (the conflict of interest
effect), which inherently involve the use of inside debt. Similarly, bankers on boards
may also push for debtholder-friendly compensation structures due to personal links
to the credit sector (the experience effect). Chapter 3 aims to test this assertion.
CEO inside debt is positively related to the presence of a banker director on a
firm’s board after controlling for firm and CEO characteristics found to determine
inside debt in existing research (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Liu et al., 2014).
We find that not only current bankers but also directors who left their positions in
a bank make the CEO incentives more creditor friendly. This finding is consistent
with the cognitive bias argument. Additional tests of the credit relationship be-
tween banks and firms show that the positive link between inside debt and banker
directors is independent from the credit relationship with the firm, suggesting also
that the second explanation dominates. These results are robust to the Heckman
two-stage regressions using the number of banks in the firm’s state as an instrument
and controlling for confounding observable factors and locally exogenous variations
in appointing new banker directors after covenant violations. These results are also
robust to alternative measures of CEO inside debt and alternative specifications.
Additionally, our supplementary test shows that the increase in inside debt associ-
ated with banker directors shifts CEO incentives closer to the optimum, at which
point the agency costs of outside debt are minimised to benefit shareholders. Fi-
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nally, the cross-sectional tests indicate that bankers on boards provide additional
monitoring that is beneficial to shareholders. This chapter contributes to literature
on the determinants of inside debt and to literature on how directors’ experience
affects firm decisions and CEO incentives.
Chapter 3: Freedom of the press and corporate misconduct
The third chapter studies whether and how freedom of the press matters by ex-
amining corporate outcomes linked to the exposure to foreign product partners in
countries with low media freedom. A growing body of literature has shown that
the media monitors firm activities and disseminates information to capital markets
(Miller, 2006; Bushee et al., 2010; Dyck et al., 2010). However, the information in
the media can still be biased if the media is controlled or influenced by other parties
(Burgess, 2010; El Ghoul et al., 2019). Additionally, existing literature on media
freedom and firm activities (e.g., Kanagaretnam et al., 2018) has focused on cross-
sectional country-level data instead of on the firm-level data. This chapter aims to
fill this research gap by using the exposure to countries with low media freedom as
a proxy for the freedom of the press.
I find that firms are more likely to engage in accrual-based earnings manage-
ment when they have a high percentage of sales in countries with low media freedom.
The effect is economically substantial. Additionally, media freedom in terms of eco-
nomic, political, and legal factors is important, and these three aspects together
have an impact on earnings management. This finding is consistent with the hy-
pothesis that firms take advantage of media restriction to engage in accrual-based
earnings management.
5
Additional tests show that under the high costs of being scrutinised by high
audit quality and being detected due to low accounting flexibility, accrual-based
earnings management still appears in this type of firm, which suggests that it is
easier to manage earnings by taking advantage of the non-transparent environment
created by media restriction. Notably, I find that media restriction increases op-
portunities for insiders to trade on non-public information. Insiders of these firms
benefit from not only their insider purchases but also their sales transactions. Over-
all, these results show that corporate misconduct can be in part explained by a
spillover effect of media freedom of export markets.
Chapter 4: Political uncertainty and private debt contracting: Evidence
from the U.S. gubernatorial elections
The fourth chapter, jointly with Kirak Kim, examines how private lenders design
debt contracts to deal with uncertainty periods. The effect of political frictions
on capital market and firm outcomes has intrigued social scientists over the last
twenty years. A growing body of literature in economics and finance has studied
the link between political uncertainty and corporate outcomes or capital markets
(Çolak et al., 2017, 2018; Gulen and Ion, 2016; Julio and Yook, 2012; Pástor and
Veronesi, 2012, 2013). However, the ways in which private lenders access and arrange
debt contracts against uncertainty has remained largely unexplored. This chapter
attempts to fill this research gap.
We use gubernatorial election as an exogenous source of variation in politi-
cal uncertainty and find that gubernatorial elections have a significant impact on
lenders’ monitoring demand and on lenders’ demand for state-contingent loan pric-
6
ing. These findings have important implications for firms’ costs of capital associated
with private loans. Specifically, we find that, in response to potential changes in po-
litical uncertainty, lenders increase monitoring intensity by increasing the number
of financial covenants and performance pricing provisions during the political un-
certainty periods. Our findings therefore indicate that gubernatorial elections have
a significant pricing implication for private loan contracts. This is the first study





Banker-directors and CEO Inside Debt
Abstract
Using employment history of over 17,000 directors of non-financial firms, we find
that boards with directors who have executive experience in a commercial bank
compensate CEOs with higher inside debt. This result is consistent with arguments
that professional experience shapes decision-making. The experience effect domi-
nates the potential conflict of interest effect. In line with the experience argument,
the result holds for both current and past bank executives and for directors from
both banks which are and banks which are not the firm’s creditors. These results
are robust to several specifications addressing potential endogeneity. The increase
in inside debt associated with banker-directors moves the CEO’s incentives closer
to the optimum in which agency costs of outside debt are minimized to benefit
shareholders. In line with the monitoring role of bankers, we also find that the link
between inside debt and banker-directors is stronger in firms with weaker corporate
governance standards.
Keywords: inside debt; banker-directors; experience; compensation.
JEL classification: D81, G34, M1.
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2.1 Introduction
A conflict of interest arises when a company is financed with debt, as managers
tend to make decisions that benefit shareholders at the expense of debtholders.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that shareholders ultimately bear the agency
costs associated with this conflict, so they should create incentives for the manager
to manage the firm in a way that respects the interests of both types of stakeholders.
This can be achieved when the manager, in addition to equity, is compensated with
debt-like instruments. These debt-like instruments are commonly defined as ‘inside
debt’. While several studies document that inside debt leads to less risky financial
and investment policies that benefit debtholders (Cassell et al., 2012; Dang and
Phan, 2016; Eisdorfer et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2014; Phan, 2014), little is known
about why and under which circumstances boards grant CEOs higher levels of inside
debt relative to equity. Our paper aims to fill this gap by investigating the relation
between CEO inside debt and board characteristics. In particular, we test how
the presence of directors with executive experience in a commercial bank (‘banker-
directors’) impacts on CEO inside debt.
Individuals serving on company boards are obliged to act in the interest of
equity-holders, providing advice and monitoring the management team of the firm.
In particular, board members with banking experience are expected to improve
the information flow between the firm and credit institutions, and also to provide
valuable industry-specific financial expertise to the board (Kroszner and Strahan,
2001). However, board members with current or past links with credit institu-
tions can have incentives to support decisions that benefit debtholders but can be
potentially harmful to shareholders. Previous evidence shows that such conflict of
10
interest leads firms with bankers on the board to take debtholder-friendly strategies.
Hilscher and Şişli-Ciamarra (2013) document that firms with creditor-directors are
more likely to undertake acquisitions that benefit debtholders, such as diversifying
and equity-financed acquisitions. Güner et al. (2008) find that commercial bankers
on the board lead to an increase in borrowing but only in financially unconstrained
firms which suggests that they may not benefit shareholders but rather boost bank
profits. Morck and Nakamura (1999) find that a board appointment of a banker
from outside of the industrial grouping leads to stock price underperformance in
Japan.
In a similar way, the alignment of banker-directors with debtholders could be
linked to the evidence that individuals’ previous experiences affect their decision-
making in corporations (Benmelech and Frydman, 2015; Bernile et al., 2017; Bertrand
and Schoar, 2003; Dittmar and Duchin, 2015; Malmendier and Tate, 2005). The
finding is explained by cognitive psychology arguments that personal and profes-
sional experiences shape decisions (Hertwig et al., 2004; Nisbett and Ross., 1980).
In the board context, Kor and Sundaramurthy (2009) argue that human capital in
the form of experience, together with expertise, knowledge and skills that outside
directors bring to the board, affect the board’s thinking and decisions. The upper
echelons theory of Hambrick and Mason (1984) claims that individual experiences
and personal traits impact on interpretations in strategic decision-making and hence
influence the firm’s choices. In an extension of the upper echelons theory, Westphal
and Fredrickson (2001) show that outside directors who hold, or held in the past,
executive positions in another company, facing incomplete or ambiguous informa-
tion and limited time, base their decisions, intentionally or not, on experiences from
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the other company. Moreover, there is evidence that bankers are more conservative
than the rest of executives. MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1990) study more than
500 top-level executives and show that executives from banks exhibit a higher level
of risk aversion compared to the rest of the sample.
Based on the above arguments, we expect that banker-directors are likely to
design debtor-friendly compensation policies for CEOs, involving a greater use of
inside debt. Bankers on boards could represent creditors’ interests, pushing for
compensation structures that reduce risk for debtholders (the conflict of interest
effect). Similarly, bankers’ decisions can be affected by preferences shaped through
their working experience at commercial banks. In this sense, bankers on boards are
likely to push for debtholder-friendly compensation structures due to their personal
links to the credit sector (the experience effect). These two mechanisms are not
mutually exclusive though.
The impact of banker-directors on CEO inside debt remains an open empir-
ical question and our testing strategy aims to disentangle the different mechanism
through which the relation works. To test this relation, we track employment histo-
ries of 17,525 directors of non-financial S&P 1500 firms in the period 2006 to 2014.
We define banker-directors as directors with a current or past executive position in a
commercial bank. Following the previous literature (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007;
Wei and Yermack, 2011), we use the sum of the CEO’s pension plans and deferred
compensation to estimate our two proxies to capture CEO inside debt compensation:
relative executive leverage and relative executive incentive.1 Our baseline regression
1Executives’ pension plans typically include tax-qualified plans and supplemental executive
retirement plans (SERPs) (Anantharaman et al., 2014). The executive pension under SERPs
does not have to be protected or funded when firm is insolvent; hence, this plan is more closely
similar to unsecured corporate debt and has more debt-like compensation characteristics. Second, a
deferred compensation plan, which is another form of executive debt-like compensation, is designed
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results suggest that, in line with our expectations, CEO inside debt is positively
related to the presence of a banker-director on the firm’s board, after controlling
for firm and CEO characteristics found to determine inside debt in previous studies
(Liu et al., 2014; Sundaram and Yermack, 2007).
We test our two explanations for the relation between bankers on the board
and CEO inside debt by separating banker-directors into current and past bank
executives. We also identify directors from banks with a current credit relationship
with the firm. If the relation is driven by the first explanation – a potential conflict
of interest – we should find a stronger link between inside debt and banker-directors
who are current executives in a commercial bank, and the link should also be stronger
for executives from banks which are current creditors of the firm as the lending
relationship leads to a direct incentive to act in the interest of the firm’s debtholders.
However, if the relation between CEO inside debt and banker-directors is driven by
the cognitive bias argument, we should not see any difference in the relation across
the subgroups. Our results indicate that even though we are not able to rule out
the conflict of interest explanation, we find that not only current bankers but also
directors who left their position in a bank make the CEO’s incentives more creditor-
friendly, consistent with the cognitive bias argument. We also find that the positive
link between inside debt and banker-directors holds independently of the credit
relationship with the firm, suggesting also that the second explanation dominates.
The allocation of banker-directors to boards is not random, raising potential
endogeneity concerns (Booth and Deli, 1999; Kroszner and Strahan, 2001). The
for employees to make discretionary investment decisions by involving them lending money back
to their firms from their cash compensation at certain interest rates (Wei and Yermack, 2011).
Deferred compensation is similar to SERPs as deferred compensation is unprotected, although
these assets may or may not funded.
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firm’s compensation policy may attract specific types of directors to its board. To
address this concern, we perform three tests. First, we use a Heckman two-stage pro-
cedure to mitigate the problem that our results could be driven by banker-directors
self-selecting into firms with high CEO inside debt. To that end, we use the number
of banks in the firm’s state as an instrument, based on the assumption that geo-
graphic proximity of banks increases the probability of having a banker on the board
because of a larger supply of potential directors who have banking experience. Our
exclusion restriction is that banks in the proximity do not affect CEO compensa-
tion. Second, to control for the confounding observable factors that could be linked
with both the presence of banker-directors and CEO incentives, we repeat the anal-
ysis using propensity-score matching. The results from these models controlling for
endogeneity remain unchanged compared to the baseline OLS results.
Our third approach to the endogeneity issue is to explore changes in the level
of CEO inside debt after a banker’s appointment to the board. If our main argument
that bankers on boards lead to higher levels of inside debt is correct, we expect that,
ceteris paribus, the appointment of a banker to a board is positively correlated with
an increase in CEO inside debt after the appointment, and not with higher levels of
inside debt at the time of the appointment. We provide two different tests. In the
first one we identify bankers’ appointments in firms without banker-directors for the
previous five years and measure the level of inside debt post-appointment compared
to the pre-appointment period. In our second test we build on Ferreira et al. (2018)
who use locally exogenous variations in loan covenant violations to show that after
a covenant violation firms increase the number of independent directors who are
mainly linked with creditors. We develop a difference-in-difference test to compare
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changes in the level of CEO inside debt before and after a covenant violation in
firms with and without a new appointment of a banker to the board. Consistent
with our expectations, we find that both tests exploiting the time variation in board
composition confirm that following a new banker-director appointment the level of
CEO inside debt increases, in line with our OLS baseline results.
If bankers on boards lead to higher CEO inside debt – which is expected
to benefit debtholders – a question arises if such behavior is detrimental to equity-
holder interests (Wei and Yermack, 2011). As discussed above, Jensen and Meckling
(1976) argue that equity-holders should incentivize managers to respect debtholders’
interests to reduce agency costs. To analyze whether the increase in inside debt as-
sociated with banker-directors leads to an optimal compensation structure from the
shareholders’ perspective, we base on the empirical setup of Campbell et al. (2016).
Campbell et al. (2016) build on theoretical insights from Edmans and Liu (2010)
to estimate the optimal CEO’s inside debt-to-equity ratio. We replicate their result
and show that firms grant inside debt to move CEO incentives up or down closer
to the optimum. But, more importantly, we also show that a banker on the board
increases the speed of convergence to the optimum. We conclude that the positive
effect of banker-directors on inside debt we document leads to improvements in the
structure of executive incentives which is ultimately beneficial for shareholders. In
a further supplementary test to confirm these potential benefits, we show that the
impact of banker-directors on CEO inside debt is particularly strong in companies
with entrenched managers and with weak external corporate governance – in firms
with many antitakeover provisions and in firms with low institutional ownership.
The result corroborates the argument that bankers on boards provide additional
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monitoring that is beneficial to equityholders (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001).
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we add to the
literature on the determinants of inside debt. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) and
Liu et al. (2014) explore firm and executive characteristics that are related to CEO
inside debt. In this sense, our paper extends the results of Kang and Kim (2017) who
focus on a sample of bank executives and their impact on executive compensation.
Although they also provide evidence that bankers on boards have a positive effect
on the level of inside debt, our study extends and provides more robust evidence
of this relationship. We also document the consequence of such effect on the firm’s
optimal compensation structure.2
We also contribute to this literature by identifying specific characteristics of
board members that affect CEO inside debt. Further, we contribute to the liter-
ature on how directors’ experience impacts on firm decisions and CEO incentives.
Previous research finds evidence of the relation between firm policies and director
industry experience (Dass et al., 2013; Faleye et al., 2018; Nanda and Onal, 2016).
Our findings suggest that professional experience of executives of commercial banks
impacts on current decisions when they become directors of non-financial firms,
even after they have left the position in a bank. Finally, we contribute to studies
that investigate the effects of banker-directors on firm outcomes. A large body of
research has found evidence that current bank executives serving on the board of
directors impact on corporate decisions (Erkens et al., 2014; Ghosh, 2016; Huang
2Kang and Kim (2017) use data from 2006-2007, whereas our sample period is 2006-2014 which
allows us to explore time variation in board composition; we focus on several alternative measures
of inside debt, relative to inside equity and the firm’s leverage, in the spirit of Jensen and Meckling
(1976), whereas Kang and Kim only focus on the level of inside debt; we provide alternative
approaches to address endogeneity concerns; finally, we provide evidence that bankers on the
board leading to more inside debt could be beneficial not only for creditors but also shareholders.
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et al., 2014; Kang and Kim, 2017; Sisli-Ciamarra, 2012). However, we are unaware of
any published research that looks at the presence of independent directors who are
former executives of commercial banks. Our evidence complements this literature
by showing that not only current bank executives but also former bank executives
serving on the board of directors impact on CEOs’ compensation.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2, we discuss literature review.
Followed this section, we describe our data, construction of variables and empirical
methodology in Section 2.3. Then, we provide our empirical results in Section 2.4,
2.5 and 2.6. Section 2.7 presents robustness tests and Section 2.8 concludes the
paper.
2.2 Literature review
2.2.1 CEO inside debt
Jensen and Meckling (1976) theorise that an executive’s compensation in the
form of inside debt represents a potential method to mitigate the firm’s agency costs
of debt. To counteract this, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that the optimal
incentive structure should align the manager’s personal debt-to-equity ratio with
the firm’s overall external capital structure. When the executive’s compensation
consists of both debt and equity, their incentives will vary depending on the relative
debt- and equity- based compensation. Jensen and Meckling (1976) indicate that
CEOs with higher levels of inside debt will manage the firm more conservatively and
reduce the overall risk in ways that reduce the potential reallocation of wealth from
debtholders to shareholders. Following these results, Edmans and Liu (2010) develop
a theoretical framework which indicates that excessive inside debt compensation
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could cause the CEO to manage the firm conservatively, and to transfer wealth from
stockholders to debtholders when the probability of bankruptcy is high.
Sundaram and Yermack (2007) define an executive’s inside debt—holdings
which have debt-like payoffs – as constituted of pension plans and other deferred
compensation. When a firm becomes insolvent, executives lose their pensions ben-
efits, as these plans are often unfunded and unsecured, yielding executives’ claims
similar to those of debtholders. Several studies show that special arrangements of
defined benefit pensions and deferred compensation plans have different effects on
the incentive-alignment of the executive (Anantharaman et al., 2014; Eisdorfer et al.,
2015; Liu et al., 2014; Wei and Yermack, 2011).
The elements of an executive’s debt-like compensation have different char-
acteristics. First, executive pension plans typically include tax-qualified plans and
supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs) (Anantharaman et al., 2014). The
amount of executive pensions under SERPs do not have to be protected or funded
when firm is insolvent; hence, this plan is more closely similar to unsecured corpo-
rate debt and have more debt-like compensation characteristics. Second, a deferred
compensation plan, which is another form of executive debt-like compensation, is
designed for employees to make discretionary investment decisions by involving them
lending money back to their firms from their cash compensation at certain interest
rates (Wei and Yermack, 2011). An executive deferred compensation is similar to
SERPs in ways that deferred compensation will be unprotected, although these as-
sets may or may not funded (Wei and Yermack, 2011; Anantharaman et al., 2014).
However, executives will be more flexible in withdrawing deferred compensations as
earlier withdraws are permitted by some firms under certain restricted circumstance
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(Wei and Yermack, 2011; Anantharaman et al., 2014).
Recent studies explore the market implications of CEOs inside debt holdings.
Firms whose CEOs have sizeable debt-like compensation have a positive (negative)
debtholders (shareholders) reaction to firms’ initial reports of CEOs’ inside debt
holdings after the SEC disclosure reform in 2007 (Wei and Yermack, 2011); firms
with higher levels of debt-like compensation have a lower spread and have fewer
restrictive covenants in debt contract (Anantharaman et al., 2014); and are more
likely to reduce stock-crash risk and to have earning misstatement (He, 2015). The
extant research on the role of inside debt holdings and firm policies shows that CEOs
with large inside debt holdings manage firms more conservatively, and pursue less
risky investment and financial policies. Cassell et al. (2012) provide evidence that
firms with CEOs having large holdings of inside debt have lower volatility of future
firm stock returns, R&D expenditures and financial leverage, and are more diversified
and maintain higher asset liquidity. Regarding cash holding policies, Liu et al.
(2014) show that CEO pensions and deferred compensation holdings are associated
with higher levels of cash balances. In particular, inside debt may exacerbate the
agency conflict between shareholders and debtholders as the marginal value of cash
to equity holders is decreasing with the presence of CEO inside debt. In another
aspect of investment policies, Phan (2014) provides evidence that CEO’s inside
debt holdings motivate risk-decreasing M&A activities by increasing diversifying
M&As, decreasing financial leverage and using stocks as a method of payment.
Recent studies provide also evidence that CEOs inside debt holdings are associated
with lower dividend pay-outs (Eisdorfer et al., 2015) and higher short-maturity debt
structure (Dang and Phan, 2016).
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2.2.2 Banker-directors and CEO inside debt
The psychology literature shows that decision-making of individuals is shaped
by experience (Nisbett and Ross., 1980). In addition, the management literature and
the upper echelons theory of Hambrick and Mason (1984) state that heterogeneity
of individuals will impact on personal choices and their interpretation of strategic
decision-making. In addition, Hertwig et al. (2004) suggest that individuals facing
risky choices will base their decisions on previous personal experiences. Therefore,
the professional experience from financial institutions of banker-directors can af-
fect their current decision-makings when siting on the board of non-financial firms.
Consistent with these arguments, a growing empirical evidence about professional
experiences (or career skills) suggests that professional, or work-related, experiences
of directors and managers will impact on their risk preferences and, hence, firm poli-
cies. The literature looks at time-invariant managerial styles (Bertrand and Schoar,
2003), life experience (Bernile et al., 2017), career experience (Dittmar and Duchin,
2015; Schoar and Zuo, 2017) or military experience (Benmelech and Frydman, 2015).
According to this, we predict that banker-directors act in line with their executive
experience. Thus, firms with banker-directors will design CEOs’ compensation con-
tracts that are more likely to be aligned with debtholders and hence use debt-like
elements.
Further, the literature on the conflicts of interest between shareholders and
debtholders suggests that creditors on boards do not always add value to share-
holders, as they aim to maximize debtholders wealth. In particular, executives of
commercial banks that provide loans to the firm acting as the firm’s board mem-
bers are more likely to engage in activities that are favourable to debtholders and
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unfavourable to shareholders. Specially, Hilscher and Şişli-Ciamarra (2013) provide
evidence that companies with creditor-directors are more likely to perform acqui-
sitions that benefits creditors and conflicts with the interests of shareholders. In
general, based on the literature on the conflicts of interests on board of directors,
the directors from commercial banks potentially transfer value from shareholders
to debtholders by paying CEOs with more debt-like compensations and increasing
CEOs’ debt incentives.
An alternative possibility is that executive commercial bank expertise on a
corporate board may bring benefits to shareholders by reducing CEOs’ inside debt
holdings. A banker-director on a company’s board monitors, provides strategic ad-
vice for managers and acts on behalf of shareholders. As such, board of directors
will design executive compensation contracts that increase the wealth of sharehold-
ers, make executives increase the volatility and reduce risk-related agency conflicts
(Coles et al., 2006). To the extent that banker-directors add positive value to share-
holders, a growing body of the literature on the role of current creditors on boards
of directors provides evidence suggesting that due to lending relationships current
executive commercial bank directors may obtain private information about the firm,
and therefore allow the lenders to closely monitor the firm and renegotiate whenever
there are signs of adversity (Booth and Deli, 1999; Erkens et al., 2014; Sisli-Ciamarra,
2012). In turn, firm will be more likely to have larger private debt, lower cost of
borrowing, and fewer covenants in debt contracts. Accordingly, under this view,
banker-directors will not increase debt holdings to monitor CEOs.
The following section describes the data we use on this study and present descriptive
statistics.
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2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
2.3.1 Sample construction
Our initial sample consists of an unbalanced panel of all CEO firm-year data
for Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 1500 companies for the period 2006–2014 available
from ExecuComp. Since 2006 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
required listed companies to expand executive compensation disclosure about ex-
ecutive pensions, hence our sample period starts in 2006. Consistent with similar
previous studies, we drop financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6900) from our sample.
We then match the ExecuComp list of non-financial firms with the BoardEx
database to obtain board structures and director biographies. BoardEx provides
information on directors and other senior employees collected from various sources
including SEC filings, company press releases, company websites and news outlets.
We obtain financial data from Compustat and stock prices from the Centre for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The final sample of complete CEO- and firm-
level data is an unbalanced panel of 6110 CEO-firm-years in 1,116 different firms.
2.3.2 Variable measurement
Measurement of Banker-director
We eliminate all banks incorporated outside the United States and classify
a financial institution as a commercial bank in the following way. First, we follow
Hilscher and Şişli-Ciamarra (2013) and classify an institution as a commercial bank if
that institution is listed as a U.S. chartered commercial bank in the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) list.3 Next, to ensure these institutions are com-
3Information about all institutions is retrieved from: https://www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/.
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mercial banks, we use primary four-digit SIC codes between 6011-6082 and 6712
provided in the Reuters/Loan Pricing Corporation’s (LPC) Dealscan database to
classify a lender as a commercial bank (Jiang et al., 2010). In addition, some banks
switch their business activities to bank holding companies at a certain point in time
in our sample although these institutions have an SIC code outside the classified
range for commercial banks. For example, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs are
investment banks before September 2008, and they become bank holding companies
after that date. To increase the precision of our classification, we manually inspect
SIC codes, read business descriptions in 10-K filings from EDGAR searches, and in-
clude the institutions in our commercial banks list only for the period during which
one of their main business activities is related to the traditional banking industry.
Further, we use the Chicago Fed M&A database4 to obtain information on bank
mergers and acquisition and to reclassify the ownership data from Dealscan as in
Erkens et al. (2014).
We define a director as a banker director if she meets one of two criteria. The
first criterion follows Kroszner and Strahan (2001), where a director is identified as
a commercial banker when she is a current executive of a commercial bank (current
executive). The second criterion is whether the director has previous experience
in a commercial bank in an executive position (past executive). An executive po-
sition is defined as a top management position/role based on the classifications of
the BoardEx database including CEO, CFO, COO, Chairman, President, Division
CEO, Division CFO, Division Chairman, Division COO, Division President, Head
of Division, Regional CEO, Regional CFO, and Regional President (Custódio and




We further split the current executive director category in two groups: creditor
banker directors and non-creditor banker directors. We identify a current executive
director as a creditor banker if her bank has at least one loan (as a sole lender or
a lead bank in a syndicate loan) with the company where she is a director during
the fiscal year, and as a non-creditor banker otherwise. We identify this credit rela-
tionship by matching loan information from the Dealscan database with our main
sample using Compustat-Dealscan linkage table from Chava and Roberts (2008).5
Following Ivashina (2009) and Hilscher and Şişli-Ciamarra (2013) we classify a bank
as the lead manager including the following titles: lead arranger, book runner, doc-
umentation agent, administrative agent, syndication agent, senior managing agent,
managing agent, lead manager and co-manager.
Table 2.1 summarises our classification of different types of commercial bankers
on the board of directors for each year from 2006 to 2014. On average, 15.9% of
S&P1500 firms and 24.5% of S&P500 firms have at least one current executive
banker-director. Regarding past executive directors, 28.4% of S&P1500 firms and
38.2% of S&P500 firms have at least one. 35.6% of S&P1500 firms and 45.1% of
S&P500 firms have a banker director (a current or past executive) on the board. The
proportion of S&P500 firms having at least one current executive in our sample is
comparable to the study of Hilscher and Şişli-Ciamarra (2013) with 24.9% and 26.1%
for the year 2006 and 2007. In addition, our findings are also similar to previous
results from Booth and Deli (1999) with 22.2% of non-financial S&P 500 firms having
5Although the linkage table from Chava and Roberts only covers firms up to 2012, we extend it
by manually checking and matching with Dealscan all of the firms with observations which appear
only in 2013 and/or 2014 in our main dataset to prevent missing new loans for firms not previously
covered.
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at least one commercial banker on the board in 1990. Güner et al. (2008) similarly
document that in the period 1988-2001, 21% of firms have unaffiliated bankers and
6% of firms have creditor bankers on their boards. Finally, Sisli-Ciamarra (2012)
reports that 22%-27% non-financial S&P 500 firms for the year 2002-2004 have a
commercial banker on their board. Besides, we find that 2.7% of S&P1500 firms
have banker-directors from banks having a lending relationship with the firm, while
there are 4.3% of S&P500 firms with banker-directors from banks providing loans
to the firm.
[Insert Table 2.1 here]
Measurement of CEO inside debt
We use two different proxies to measure CEO relative inside debt. Our first
measure, relative executive leverage, is constructed as the ratio of the fiscal year-
end CEO inside debt (the sum of the present value of pension benefits and deferred
compensation) to CEO equity holdings (the sum of the value of the stock and option
portfolio) scaled by the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007),
where the firm’s debt is measured as the sum of the current and long-term debt and
the firm’s equity is the market value of equity:
k = (DCEO/DFIRM) ÷ (ECEO/EFIRM)
= (DCEO/ECEO) ÷ (DFIRM/EFIRM)
(2.1)
The limitation of using the relative CEO debt-to-equity (equation 2.1) as the
measure of inside debt is that this ratio is based on levels of the value of debt
and equity rather than changes in these values (Wei and Yermack, 2011; Cassell
et al., 2012). Wei and Yermack (2011) further explain that managers tend to hold
significant amounts of stock options in their portfolios, which have limited life and
convex slopes with respect to the firm value, while shares of the firm’s equity have
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infinite expirations and linear slopes with respect to the firm value. In addition,
inside debt in the CEO portfolio is likely to have different duration compared to the
firm’s debt securities. Hence, to address these shortcomings, we compute relative
executive incentive k* as in Wei and Yermack (2011) that measures the effect of
marginal changes in CEO inside debt and inside equity associated with a unit change
in the firm value:
k∗ = (∆DCEO/∆DFIRM) ÷ (∆ECEO/∆EFIRM) (2.2)
Change in inside equity, ∆ECEO, is measured as the CEO’s total delta calcu-
lated as:
∆ECEO = S +N × ∆N = S +
∑
n=1
Ni × ∆Ni (2.3)
where S is the number of shares held by the CEO, given that the delta of a share of
stock is 1, and Ni is the number of options in tranche i and ∆Ni is the option delta for
tranche i. More specifically, the CEO’s ‘total delta’ includes the ‘total share delta’
S and the ‘total option delta’
∑
n=1Ni × ∆Ni which captures the overall change of
the value of CEO equity holdings per $1.00 change in the stock price. Following Wei
and Yermack (2011), we apply the Black-Scholes option value formula to estimate
∆ECEO. We apply the same procedure to construct ∆EFIRM , and we use data on
the total number of employee stock options outstanding, their average exercise prices
and assumed average remaining life of four years for all options (Wei and Yermack,
2011). In addition, to estimate ∆DCEO and ∆DFIRM , we use the identical method
as Wei and Yermack (2011) by simplifying the ratio of the change in CEO inside
debt to the change in the firm’s debt as the ratio of CEO inside debt to the firm’s
debt, that is:
(∆DCEO/∆DFIRM) ≈ (DCEO/DFIRM) (2.4)
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Thus, the relative executive incentive approximately equals:
k∗ = (DCEO/DFIRM) ÷ (∆ECEO/∆EFIRM) (2.5)
Control variables
Following Sundaram and Yermack (2007) and Liu et al. (2014), we control in
all our models for other documented determinants of CEO inside debt. To control
for firm characteristics we include: leverage – long-term debt over the sum of long-
term book value of debt and stockholders’ equity6, liquidity constraint – an indicator
variable that equals one if the firm has negative operating cash flow and zero oth-
erwise, tax status–an indicator variable for whether the firm has net operating loss
carry-forwards on its balance sheet, firm growth – R&D expenses over total sales,
firm size – the natural logarithm of total assets, and firm age. Further, we also add
a range of governance variables that could influence CEO compensation by includ-
ing the board size, board independence – the percentage of outside directors on the
board, and institutional ownership – the percentage of shares held by institutional
investors. We also control for CEO characteristics and power, such as the CEO
tenure, CEO age, CEO duality – a dummy variable indicating whether the CEO is
also the board chair, and a dummy variable indicating whether the CEO is hired
from outside the firm (external CEO).
Summary statistics of the variables and control variables used in our main
regression analysis are reported in Table 2.2 and definitions of the variables are
summarised in Appendix 2.A.7
[Insert Table 2.2 here]
6As in Sundaram and Yermack (2007), we use the book value of equity to avoid a mechanical
negative relationship between the leverage variable and the market value of CEO equity.
7In Appendix B, we present the correlation matrix between variables used in main regressions.
The pairwise correlations are not large (with the maximum of 0.596 for the firm size – board size
correlation) indicating there are no problems with collinearity in our regression analysis.
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2.3.3 Univariate analysis
In our first test, we compare the mean of the CEO inside debt measures and
all control variables for companies with banker-directors and the rest of the sample.
Table 2.3 presents the results of this analysis. The univariate test shows that, in
line with our expectations, CEOs of firms with a banker-director have a significantly
higher amount of inside debt – higher aligned incentives with debtholders, compared
to firms without banker-directors. The result holds for banker-directors who are
current, as well as past bank executives.
Our data analysis also shows that bankers tend to serve on boards of large
and less financially constrained firms, possibly to alleviate the concern of losing
lender seniority against the bankrupt firms, in line with the results in the previous
literature (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001; Hilscher and Şişli-Ciamarra, 2013).8 In
terms of board characteristics, we observe that boards of firms with banker-directors
are significantly larger. Similarly, the number of outside directors on boards of firms
with banker-directors is significantly higher than those of boards without bankers,
and they have lower levels of institutional ownership. Overall, firms with banker-
directors differ from firms without bankers on the board across several dimensions
we control for in multivariate regressions in the following section.
[Insert Table 2.3 here]
8When directors from banks join the board, banks can be considered as equityholders rather
than debtholders when the firm goes bankrupt. Therefore, it could create the costs of lender
liability. However, according to Kroszner and Strahan (2001) bankers tend to join the board of
large and stable firms with a high fraction of tangible assets and low level of short-term financing
in their capital structure. As a result, the costs of lender liability are likely to be unimportant.
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2.4 The Relation Between Bankers on Boards and CEO Inside Debt
In this section, we study the effect of the presence of a banker on the board
on inside debt holdings of the CEO in a multivariate regression setup. To perform
this analysis, we estimate the following model:
Yi,t = α + βBanker Directori,t +Xi,tγ + aj + bt + εi,j,t (2.6)
The dependent variable (Yi,t) is our proxy for CEO debt incentives (Inside
debt) (interchangeably, relative executive leverage and relative executive incentive).
Banker Directori,t is a dummy variable taking value of one if firm i has a specific
type of banker-director on the board in year t and zero otherwise. Xi,t is a vector
of control variables including firm, CEO and corporate governance characteristics.
All the variables are defined in Appendix 2.A. A positive and significant β implies
that bankers on boards affect positively the levels of the CEO’s debt incentives.
We use a Tobit model-approach for relative executive leverage and relative
executive incentive due to the left-censored dataset at zero and a significant num-
ber of zero-valued observations for CEO inside debt, as in Sundaram and Yermack
(2007). Industry (aj) and year (bt) fixed effects are included to control for industry
characteristics and overall macroeconomic factors changing over time.9 Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level in all regressions.
[Insert Table 2.4 - 2.5 here]
Table 2.4 presents the results of testing the association between the CEO
inside debt and the presence of current or/and past executive commercial bankers
on the board, as specified in model 2.6. In Table 2.4, columns 1 and 2, we find,
9Our method is similar to the empirical studies of the determinants of inside debt by Sundaram
and Yermack (2007) and Liu et al. (2014), who also control for industry and year fixed effects.
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as predicted, that β1 is positive and significant at the 1 percent level. In terms of
the economic significance, the marginal effect on the actual (or observable) value of
inside debt measures reported in panel A of Table 2.5 shows that, on average, if a
firm has at least one board member with executive banking experience, the CEO’s
relative leverage (relative incentive) is 0.249, equivalent to 21.48% with respect to
the sample mean, (0.170 or 14.67% with respect to the sample mean) higher than
those ratios for CEOs of firms without any banker-director, which is equivalent to
15.93% (14.67%) of the sample mean.10 The effect is economically large.
We look at our alternative explanations for the relation between CEO inside
debt and banker-directors in columns 3 to 8 of Table 2.4. First, we decompose the
banker-director dummy into current executive and past executive banker-directors,
and we then analyse separately the effect of having each type of directors on CEO
inside debt. We aim to disentangle whether this relation is driven by a potential
conflict of interest when a person linked with the credit sector is elected to represent
equityholders, or by professional experiences impacting banker-directors’ behaviour.
If the first explanation dominates, we expect a stronger relation between CEO inside
debt and directors who are current bank executives, while the other explanation pre-
dicts no difference between current and past executives. The results show that both
types of directors — current and past executives — have a positive and significant
effect on the level of CEO inside debt (columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.5). Furthermore,
the insignificant results of the F-test reported in panel B of Table 2.5 suggests that
there is no statistical difference in the association between the two types of banker-
directors with our inside debt measures, suggesting that the second explanation –
10As reported in Table 2.2, the overall sample mean of the relative executive leverage (relative
executive incentive) is 1.563 (1.159).
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the impact of experience rather than the conflict of interest dominates.
Next, the split of current bank executives into creditor bankers and non-
creditor bankers yields also positive and statistically significant coefficients for both
types (columns 5 to 8 of Table 2.4). The magnitude of the coefficients on the pres-
ence of a creditor banker is larger than non-creditor banker. Our findings are again
in line with the argument that directors’ decisions on the board are affected by
their work-related experiences. Even when firms do not have any lending relation-
ship with the directors’ banks, the positive association between banker-directors and
CEO inside debt still exists.11
Among control variables, we find that firms with few growth opportunities
and older CEOs pay more friendly debt-like compensation, consistent with previous
studies (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Liu et al., 2014; Campbell et al., 2016). In
particular, we find a positive and statistically significant relationship between CEO
ages and the main dependent variables (relative executive leverage, relative execu-
tive incentives). Moreover, we also observe a negative relationship between R&D
expenditures (growth opportunity) and CEO inside debt measures as in Sundaram
and Yermack (2007) and Liu et al. (2014). Besides, although we do not find a statis-
tically significant relationship between firm size and CEO inside debt, we document
a positive and statistically significant association between board size (board inde-
pendence) and CEO inside debt, suggesting that firms with large board size12 and a
high number of independent directors pay CEOs with more inside debt. We also find
11The rest of controls are in line with previous studies such as Sundaram and Yermack (2007)
and Campbell et al. (2016), except for the firm size (Ln(Total Assets)), which is not significant
in our sample. This is driven by the inclusion of Board Size, which subsumes the firm size effect.
In unreported results, we repeat our tests without Board Size, and the coefficients of Ln(Total
Assets) become positive and significant, in line with previous studies.
12When we drop board size variable, we find a positive and statistically significant relationship
between firm size and CEO inside debt. Therefore, the insignificant results could come from the
relatively high correlation between firm size and board size (0.596).
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a statistically significant and negative relationship between leverage and CEO inside
debt. We explain the reason for this is that we rely on market value of equity for
the main dependent variables. However, based on Sundaram and Yermack (2007),
we use the book value instead of the market value of equity to construct leverage
variable (Leverage), which cause a mechanical negative association (Campbell et al.,
2016).
Finally, considering CEO characteristics, powerful CEOs have a preference for
debt-like compensation, holding all else constant (Liu et al., 2014).13 In line with
Liu et al. (2014) and Campbell et al. (2016), we find that CEO tenure has a neg-
ative relationship with inside debt, suggesting that CEO equity wealth increases
when CEO tenure increases and this part of the compensation dominates pensions
and deferred compensation. However, different from the prior finding (Sundaram
and Yermack, 2007), we find a negative and statistically significant association be-
tween external CEOs and CEO inside debt variables. This could come from the way
we construct our variables. In particular, we scale CEOs’ debt-to-equity by firms’
debt-to-equity. Therefore, although external CEOs can receive higher amount of
pensions and deferred compensations as they are likely to negotiate their employ-
ment contracts (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007), firms still pay external CEOs with
relatively high equity to prevent both moral-hazard and adverse-selection problems
(Palomino and Peyrache, 2013).
13Liu et al. (2014) note that powerful CEOs may also influence their compensation to reduce
undesirable aspects of pensions and deferred compensation. Therefore, the direction of CEO power
is not clear.
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2.5 The Allocation of Bankers to Firm Boards
We show in our tests above that there is a positive relation between direc-
tors with experience as commercial bank executives and CEO inside debt holdings.
However, previous research on banker-directors shows that bankers are not ran-
domly selected into firms’ boards (Booth and Deli, 1999; Kroszner and Strahan,
2001). Hence, it is possible that the firm’s characteristics, such as CEO compen-
sation, lead to an increase of the likelihood of a banker-director appointment. We
perform various tests to address these endogeneity concerns.
For our first test we estimate a Heckman two-step model to control for self-
selection bias. Based on the findings of several studies (Booth and Deli, 1999;
Kroszner and Strahan, 2001; Byrd and Mizruchi, 2005; Santos and Rumble, 2006;
Sisli-Ciamarra, 2012; Hilscher and Şişli-Ciamarra, 2013; Kang and Kim, 2017), we
include in our first step regression controls for firm size, leverage, market-to-book
ratio, stock return volatility, the square of stock return volatility, probability of
bankruptcy, commercial credit rating, a commercial credit rating dummy, tangi-
ble assets, short-term debt, board size, percentage of outsiders on the board and
institutional ownership. Similar to the previous literature, we take a three-year
average of the explanatory variables as the board composition adjusts to changes
in the firm’s environment over a certain period. Furthermore, to reduce the like-
lihood of having a small sample size, we collect our data for the Heckman two-
step approach from 2004.14 We also include in the first stage a variable captur-
ing the number of commercial banks headquartered in the same five-digit ZIP as
14Our sample starts from 2006. Therefore, 2004 is the starting year for us to collect data and
take a three-year average of the explanatory variables used in the Heckman model.
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the firm.1516 We assume that a firm has a higher probability of appointing an
executive director of a commercial bank to its board if it is located close to com-
mercial banks’ headquarters. Our exclusion restriction is that the density of bank
headquarters around the firm’s headquarters is plausibly uncorrelated with CEO
compensations or incentives. The results of the first-stage selection equation re-
ported in Table 2.6 show that the coefficient of the commercial bank headquarter
density is positive and statistically significant, in line with our expectations. Fur-
ther, consistent with previous studies, commercial executive bankers sit on boards
of large and more stable firms with larger boards and lower ratios of short-term to
long-term debt. As such, the analysis confirms that bankers tend to serve on the
boards of firms in which the lender liability is relatively less important to lenders.
[Insert Table 2.6 here]
Table 2.7 presents the results of the second-stage model. The inverse Mill’s
ratio Lambda calculated from the first-stage regression is statistically significant in
all models. Our main variables of interest continue to remain positive and significant
after controlling for potential self-selection bias, indicating that causality goes from
the different types of bankers on boards to CEO inside debt.
[Insert Table 2.7 here]
Our second test to mitigate endogeneity concerns is propensity-score matching
(PSM). PSM ensures that our conclusions are not driven by confounding observable
factors. For each firm-year we estimate the conditional odds of having a banker-
director using a logistic regression model.17 Subsequently, we match firms with
15Due to the relatively constant in the information about firm headquarters, we do not take the
average numbers of this variable
16Descriptive statistics of these variables are reported in Appendix 2.C.
17The AUC test for the area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve of our logistic
regressions on presence of current executive banker-directors and on presence of past executive
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banker-directors to those firms without banker-directors that have closest odds, and
apply a maximum caliper difference of 0.0001, one-to-one nearest neighbour match-
ing without replacement as in Erkens et al. (2014). Table 2.8 presents the results
of the logit model to estimate the probability of having a banker-director for our
propensity-score matching procedure.
[Insert Table 2.8 here]
Table 2.9 presents the results using our original model specification with the
PSM sample. We find that directors with executive banking experience have a
significant effect on the CEO inside debt across all specifications.
[Insert Table 2.9 here]
As a final set of tests for the causal relationship between bankers on boards
and inside debt, we use time-variations in board composition to explore whether
the appointment of a banker to the board is associated with changes in the CEO
compensation structure. For our first test, we hand-collect information on banker
appointments for firms without bankers on boards in the previous five years. We
then compare the levels of CEO’s inside debt before and after the banker appoint-
ment. If these directors have a positive effect, the level of CEO’s inside debt should
increase after the appointment. We present our results in Table 2.10. Univariate
tests reported in panel A of Table 2.10 show that, on average, CEO inside debt is
higher after banker-directors join the board. Panel B shows multivariate regression
tests for the subsample of firms appointing banker directors. We take different time
frames for our regressions including years [-1; 0], [-1; 1], [-2; 2] and [-3; 3] relative
banker-directors are 0.7379 and 0.7469, respectively. These tests exceed the 0.7 cut-off level of dis-
crimination, indicating the accuracy of our logistic regressions for distinguishing between current-
banker firms and non-current-banker firms, and between past-banker firms and non-past-banker
firms (Erkens et al., 2014).
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to the banker appointment year (year 0). Post is a dummy variable indicating the
period after the appointment of the banker director. We find that, on average, CEO
inside debt increases significantly two years after a banker-director joins the board.
Post is statistically significant and positive when comparing two and three years
before and after appointing a banker. We interpret these results as further evidence
that firms with banker directors are more likely to pay higher CEO inside debt after
bankers join the firms.18
[Insert Table 2.10 here]
To further control for the potentially endogeneity of the matching of bankers
on boards and firms with high inside debt we look at a particular case of time-
variation of board composition as inferred from the findings of Ferreira et al. (2018)
in the context of covenant violations. The literature on the impact of covenant
violations on firm policies suggests that if a firm violates a covenant, corporate
control rights shift to creditors (Chava and Roberts, 2008; Nini et al., 2009, 2012).
Further, following the violation, the proportion of independent directors increases,
and these newly appointed directors are likely to be connected to creditors (Ferreira
et al., 2018). Therefore, covenant violation offers a setting to explore whether higher
levels of CEO inside debt holdings are driven by newly appointed banker directors
after covenant violations.
We follow Chava and Roberts (2008) and use loan covenants from the Dealscan
database to identify whether a firm violates a debt covenant in a financial quarter.
In addition, if a firm has multiple loan deals that overlap, we identify a relevant
18A potential issue with this test is that the CEO’s inside debt grows monotonically over time,
irrespective of the appointment of a banker on the board. To control for this we include the CEO’s
tenure as a control in all our tables, and use relative incentives (inside debt relative to inside
equity, and scaled by the firm leverage) as a proxy for inside debt as our main dependent variable
to minimize this concern.
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covenant to be the tightest unless it corresponds to a refinancing deal as in Chava
and Roberts (2008). Further, as covenants apply to all tranches in a package, we
rearrange the time period over which a firm is bound by the earliest loan start
date and the latest loan end date in all of the loans within a package. If the
value of the firm’s accounting variables breaches the covenant thresholds on net
worth, tangible net worth or current ratio, we classify the firm as having a covenant
violation in that period. While the covenant violation indicator is in quarterly data,
CEO compensation is reported on an annual basis. Therefore, we define covenant
violation firms in a fiscal year if the firm records a covenant breach in any quarter
of the year.
We next analyse whether banker-directors newly appointed following covenant
violations impact on CEO inside debt. Following Ferreira et al. (2018), we focus
on a subsample of firms experiencing first covenant violations to avoid overlapping
observations for the same firms. New appointment is a dummy variable indicating
whether a covenant violation firm appoints a new banker-director between year t=0
(the year in which the firm violates a covenant), and year t+2 (two years after the
violation). Furthermore, to identify the real impact of new banker-directors, we only
focus on firms without any bankers on the board before the first covenant violation.
We also create a dummy variable, After, that indicates years t+2 to t+4 after firm
experiences the first violation (t=0 ). We take years t-3, t-2 and t-1 as the period
before the covenant violation and year t+2, t+3 and t+4 as the period after the
covenant violation.
Table 2.11, panel A, presents differences in observable characteristics between
firm-years with newly appointed directors and the rest of the sample in the pre-
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treatment year. Univariate comparisons show no statistically significant differences
between the two groups. Columns 1 and 2 of panel B show the effect of newly
appointed bankers on boards on CEO inside debt following a covenant violation. We
use a similar approach to Ferreira et al. (2018) and control for firm and year fixed
effects and firm size. Consistent with our previous findings, the results suggest that
CEO inside debt increases in years t+2 to t+4 after the first covenant violation in
firms with a new banker-director. We repeat the test using a Tobit model, including
industry and year fixed effects. Columns 3 and 4 of panel B show that CEO debt
incentives increase after the first violation for firms appointing new banker-directors.
[Insert Table 2.11 here]
Overall, our tests consistently show that firms with banker-directors on their
boards pay CEOs with more inside debt.
2.6 Why Shareholders Appoint Banker-Directors?
Our results indicate that bankers on boards lead to compensation structures
that are debtholder-friendly and hence potentially detrimental to shareholders. We
study this tension in two ways. First, we analyse whether bankers on boards lead
to an ‘optimal’ compensation structure that can ultimately benefit shareholders.
Second, we look at the potential monitoring role of bankers on boards through
granting managers inside debt.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that equity-holders ultimately bear the
agency cost of equityholders—debtholders conflicts and it is in equityholders’ in-
terests to incentivize managers to respect debtholders’ interests. They propose that
in the optimum the manager’s debt-to-equity exposure is equal to the firm’s external
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debt-to-equity financing structure. Edmans and Liu (2010) formalize and develop
this argument further to show that aligning the manager’s debt-to-equity incentives
with the firm’s capital structure is usually inefficient and while equity bias is benefi-
cial to induce managerial effort, a higher likelihood of bankruptcy and considerations
regarding the liquidation value make debt bias desirable. Empirical studies by Wei
and Yermack (2011) and Campbell et al. (2016) confirm that shareholders benefit
from an optimal ratio of CEO’s inside debt-to-equity and both too low and too high
inside debt incentives lead to negative stock price reactions. In particular, Campbell
et al. (2016) build on theoretical insights from Edmans and Liu (2010) to empirically
estimate the optimal inside debt-to-equity ratio for each firm and find evidence that
stock prices respond positively to changes in inside debt that move it closer to the
predicted target. This is consistent with the argument that shareholders bear the
agency cost of debt.
To analyse whether the increase in inside debt associated with banker-directors
documented in this paper leads to the optimal compensation structure from the
shareholders’ perspective, we replicate the empirical setup in Campbell et al. (2016)
in Table 2.12. Deviation from optimum is the difference between the predicted
optimal value of CEO inside debt and actual inside debt. Its estimated negative
coefficient indicates that firms grant inside debt to move it up or down closer to the
optimum. In Table 2.13, we interact the deviation variable with a banker-director
indicator used in our earlier tests. The estimated coefficients of the interaction term
are all negative and statistically significant which shows that a banker on the board
increases the speed of convergence to the optimum. We conclude that the positive
effect of banker-directors on inside debt we document leads to improvements in the
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structure of executive incentives which is ultimately expected to benefit sharehold-
ers, as the optimal level of inside debt reduces costs associated with shareholders-
bondholders agency conflicts.
[Insert Table 2.12 - 2.13 here]
Links with the banking industry or cognitive biases may produce incentives for
bankers on boards to act in the interest of debtholders. A consequence of these in-
centives could be a higher level of monitoring of the management of the firm, which
could also benefit shareholders. To analyse this assumption in our context, we in-
vestigate whether the firm’s corporate governance quality influences the relationship
between banker-directors and CEO inside debt.
As a proxy for the monitoring mechanism we use the percentage of shares
held by institutional investors (Institutional Ownership) and the Gompers et al.
(2003) (2003) index (G-Index ). The G-Index19 is based on the number of anti-
takeover provisions included in the firm’s charter. A higher percentage of institu-
tional investors indicates better monitoring by shareholders and better corporate
governance quality. A higher G-index indicates a lower corporate governance qual-
ity and fewer shareholder rights. We split the sample into subsamples based on the
median of each proxy and estimate our models linking banker-directors and CEO
inside debt for each subsample separately. Results of these tests are presented in
Table 2.14. The results show that coefficients of the presence of banker-directors are
positive and statistically significant only for below-median institutional holdings.
In a similar fashion, we find a positive and significant relationship for the above-
median G-Index group. Overall, the findings suggest that banker-directors are more
19We collect the G-Index from the website of the authors
(http://faculty.som.yale.edu/andrewmetrick/data.html). Similar to other papers, we use a
time-invariant G-index based on 2006 data for our tests.
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likely to have a higher impact on CEO inside debt when firms’ governance mecha-
nism are of lower quality, reinforcing the monitoring role of creditors on the board.
[Insert Table 2.14 here]
2.7 Robustness tests
2.7.1 Controlling for Firm Performance and Firm Risk
Our main results presented above suggest that banker-directors impact pos-
itively on CEO inside debt incentives. However, previous evidence suggests that
inside debt holdings are also linked to firm performance and firm risks. To control
for the potential omitted variables, we use ROA and the standard deviation of ROA
to deal with this concern. The results presented in Appendix 2E.1 show that our
main variables of interest are still statistically significant at the 5 percent level or
better.
2.7.2 Using OLS Model
We use Tobit regressions to study the relation between banker-directors and
CEO inside debt. For robustness, we also re-estimate our model 2.6 using an OLS
specification. As shown in Table 2E.2, we find that the results remain unchanged.
2.7.3 Alternative Measure of CEO Inside Debt Incentives
Following Cassell et al. (2012) and Phan (2014), we construct an indicator
variable which takes the value of one if the relative executive leverage (or relative
executive incentive) exceeds one in the spirit of the arguments in Jensen and Meck-
ling (1976), and it takes the value of zero otherwise. The results in Table 2E.3 show
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that our results are robust to using these alternative measures.
2.7.4 An example of the association between the presence of banker-
director and CEO inside debt
In 2008, Norfolk Southern Corporation, one of S&P500 firms, appointed Ms.
Karen N.Horn as an independent director. She had experience in different positions
in banking sectors such as chair and CEO of Bank One, Cleveland, N.A., president
of Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, senior managing director and head of interna-
tional private banking Bankers Trust Company, and vice president of First National
Bank of Boston. We observe that pension funds of the CEO, Charles W. Moorman
IV, has been increased from $5,960.108 thousand in 2007 to $14,184 thousand in
2010, and relative leverage increase from 0.875 to 1.253 in 2010. Although it is clear
that there are many unobservable characteristics that lead to the increase in CEO
inside debt and ours focus on the relation between firms with banker-directors and
CEO’s inside debt holdings, rather than concentrates on how each individual direc-
tor impacts on CEO incentives, this example shows the general association between
the presence of banking experience directors and CEO inside debt.
2.8 Conclusions
CEO inside debt is a potential tool to give firm executives incentives to act in
a way that respects debtholder interests and hence reduces the conflict of interest
between debtholders and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In this paper
we test if the presence of a commercial banker on the firm’s board has an impact
on the level of the CEO’s debt-like compensation. Banker-directors can push for
42
higher CEO inside debt for two reasons. First, even though they are elected by
shareholders, their links with banking can make them act in debtholders’ interest
(the conflict of interest effect). Second, their experience in commercial banking
can shape their decision making and, intentionally or not, can make them act in
a debtholder-friendly way when the board chooses the firm’s compensation policy
(the experience effect). We find that firms with a banker-director compensate their
CEOs with higher inside debt relative to equity. This result is robust to different
specifications and controls for endogeneity. We shed light on the drivers of the
relation and find evidence to support the experience effect as we document that
directors who are current as well as past bank executives, and also directors from
banks which provide loans as well as directors from unrelated banks have a positive
effect on CEO inside debt.
Previous literature documents that higher levels of CEO inside debt lead to
less risky firm policies that benefit debtholders (Cassell et al., 2012; Phan, 2014;
Liu et al., 2014; Eisdorfer et al., 2015; Dang and Phan, 2016). While, as argued by
Jensen and Meckling (1976), shareholders ultimately bear the cost of the conflict of
interest between debtholders and shareholder and can benefit from more debtholder-
friendly policies, an excessive level of inside debt can be detrimental to shareholders’
interests. Based on theoretical insights in Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Edmans
and Liu (2010) we develop a further test to understand whether banker-directors
move CEO inside debt to the level that is optimal for both debtholders and share-
holders. We find that this is indeed the case and we document that the presence of
a commercial-banker on the firm’s board speeds up the level of convergence to the
optimum.
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Overall, our study provides new evidence on the factors that shape CEO inside
debt compensation and helps further our understanding of how not only current but
also previous banking experience of independent directors affects CEO incentives.
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2.9 Tables of Chapter 2
Table 2.1 – The percentage of firms with a banker-director
This table reports the percentage of companies with at least one director with executive
experience in a commercial bank. Current Executive is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm has
at least one board member who is a current executive in a commercial bank. Current Creditor
Banker is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm has at least one board member who is a current
executive in a commercial bank that has at least one loan to the company at the end of the fiscal
year as a sole lender or as a lead arranger in a syndicate. Past Executive is a dummy that equals
1 if the firm has at least one board member who is a former executive in a commercial bank.
Banker Director is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm has at least one board member who is a
current or previous executive in a commercial bank.
S&P 1500 S&P 500
Current Current Past Banker Current Current Past Banker
Executive Creditor Executive Director Executive Creditor Executive Director
2006 0.160 0.024 0.285 0.353 0.216 0.041 0.351 0.412
2007 0.164 0.024 0.272 0.353 0.239 0.030 0.348 0.433
2008 0.170 0.028 0.274 0.357 0.257 0.042 0.379 0.456
2009 0.166 0.031 0.285 0.358 0.257 0.053 0.386 0.457
2010 0.155 0.026 0.285 0.353 0.257 0.043 0.391 0.464
2011 0.158 0.025 0.289 0.359 0.247 0.041 0.390 0.455
2012 0.156 0.022 0.286 0.356 0.244 0.038 0.381 0.447
2013 0.153 0.028 0.283 0.354 0.236 0.047 0.384 0.448
2014 0.152 0.032 0.297 0.362 0.243 0.052 0.406 0.466
2006-2014 0.159 0.027 0.284 0.356 0.245 0.043 0.382 0.451
Observations 6110 2282
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Table 2.2 – Descriptive statistics of main dependent variables and control
variables
Descriptive statistics are based on a sample of 1,116 non-financial S&P 1500 firms from
2006-2014 (6110 CEO-firm-year observations). Executive Debt to Equity is the ratio of CEO
inside debt (the sum of accumulated pension benefits and deferred compensation) and CEO
inside equity (share and option holdings). Relative Executive Leverage is the ratio of the CEO’s
debt-to-equity scaled by the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio. Relative Executive Incentive is the
ratio of the marginal change in the value of CEO inside debt holding to the marginal change
in CEO inside equity holdings given the change in firm value, scaled by the firm’s respective
ratio. Relative Executive Leverage > 1 dummy (Relative Executive Incentives > 1 dummy) is
an indicator variable for whether the relative executive leverage (incentive) ratio exceeds 1. Ln
(Total Assets) is natural log of total assets. Leverage is long-term debt over the sum of long-term
debt and the book value of stockholders’ equity. R&D expenses/Sales is ratio of research and
development expenses to sales. Liquidity constraint represents an indicator variable that equals 1
if the firm has negative operating cash flow. Tax status is indicator variable for whether the firm
has net operating loss-carry forwards on its balance sheet. Firm age is the number years since
the firm was founded. CEO Tenure is the number of years the CEO has served in this position.
External CEO is a dummy indicator variable for whether CEO is hired from outside the firm.
CEO duality is an indicator for whether the CEO is also the board chair. CEO Age is the age of
the CEO. Board size is the number of directors sitting on the board. Board Independence is the
fraction of non-executive directors on the board. Institutional ownership is the fraction of shares
held by institutional investors.
N Mean Median Min Q1 Q3 Max St dev Skewness
Executive Debt to
Equity
6110 0.294 0.097 0.000 0.000 0.394 2.396 0.435 2.047
Relative Executive
Leverage
6110 1.563 0.426 0.000 0.000 1.743 11.378 2.584 2.231
Relative Executive
Incentive
6110 1.159 0.323 0.000 0.000 1.281 8.189 1.913 2.231
Relative Executive
Leverage >1 dummy
6110 0.359 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.48 0.586
Relative Executive
Incentive >1 dummy
6110 0.298 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.457 0.886
Ln (Total Assets) 6110 8.129 8.012 3.791 7.052 9.078 13.59 1.486 0.347
Leverage 6110 0.339 0.320 0.000 0.165 0.474 1.571 0.25 1.302
R&D expenses/Sales 6110 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.214 0.057 2.072
Liquidity constraint 6110 0.039 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.194 4.743
Tax status 6110 0.648 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.477 -0.622
Firm age 6110 31.305 25.144 1.416 15.515 41.614 89.06 20.617 1.049
CEO Tenure 6110 7.860 6.000 0.005 2.992 10.422 51.118 6.879 1.806
External CEO 6110 0.229 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.42 1.288
CEO Duality 6110 0.534 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.499 -0.136
CEO Age 6110 56.224 56.000 36.000 52.000 60 87.000 6.320 0.2660
Board Independence 6110 0.797 0.818 0.000 0.727 0.889 1.000 0.108 -1.072
Board Size 6110 9.453 9.000 4.000 8.000 11.000 23.000 2.109 0.396
Institutional Owner-
ship
6110 0.660 0.759 0.000 0.584 0.878 2.015 0.331 -1.013
46
Table 2.3 – Comparisons of firms with and without banker-directors
This table shows comparisons of means of variables for firms with directors with banking experience to firms without banker directors, for the sample
of 1,116 firms for the 2006-2014 period. Current Executive is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm has at least one board member who is a current executive in a
commercial bank. Past Executive is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm has at least one board member who is a former executive in a commercial bank. Banker
Director is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm has at least one board member who is a current executive or a previous executive in a commercial bank. Executive
Debt to Equity is the ratio of CEO inside debt (the sum of accumulated pension benefits and deferred compensation) and CEO inside equity (share and option
holdings). Relative Executive Leverage is the ratio of the CEO’s debt-to-equity scaled by the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio. Relative Executive Incentive is the ratio
of the marginal change in the value of CEO inside debt holding to the marginal change in CEO inside equity holdings given the change in firm value, scaled by
the firm’s respective ratio. Relative Executive Leverage > 1 dummy (Relative Executive Incentives > 1 dummy) is an indicator variable for whether the relative
executive leverage (incentive) ratio exceeds 1. All other variables are defined in Table 2 or Appendix A. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**),
and 0.10 (*) levels.
Current Executive Past Executive Banker Director
No Yes Difference No Yes Difference No Yes Difference
Executive Debt to Equity 0.272 0.413 -0.141*** 0.244 0.421 -0.176*** 0.234 0.403 -0.169***
Relative Executive Leverage 1.502 1.884 -0.383*** 1.435 1.881 -0.446*** 1.424 1.814 -0.391***
Relative Executive Incentive 1.124 1.343 -0.219*** 1.083 1.347 -0.264*** 1.073 1.313 -0.240***
Relative Executive Leverage >1 dummy 0.341 0.454 -0.113*** 0.323 0.450 -0.127*** 0.318 0.434 -0.116***
Relative Executive Incentive >1 dummy 0.285 0.365 -0.080*** 0.271 0.364 -0.0931*** 0.267 0.353 -0.0856***
Ln (Total Assets) 7.975 8.944 -0.969*** 7.882 8.753 -0.872*** 7.838 8.655 -0.817***
Leverage 0.325 0.414 -0.089*** 0.314 0.403 -0.089*** 0.304 0.402 -0.097***
R&D expenses/Sales 0.033 0.02 0.014*** 0.037 0.018 0.019*** 0.038 0.019 0.020***
Liquidity constraint 0.042 0.024 0.019*** 0.043 0.029 0.014** 0.044 0.03 0.014***
Tax status 0.661 0.585 0.076*** 0.667 0.601 0.066*** 0.671 0.608 0.062***
Firm age 30.050 37.928 -7.877*** 29.050 36.983 -7.933*** 28.816 35.799 -6.983***
CEO Tenure 7.883 7.742 0.141 8.237 6.912 1.325*** 8.145 7.346 0.800***
External CEO 0.241 0.165 0.076*** 0.245 0.190 0.055*** 0.255 0.184 0.071***
CEO Duality 0.520 0.609 -0.090*** 0.527 0.552 -0.025* 0.524 0.553 -0.029**
CEO Age 56.183 56.442 -0.259 56.202 56.280 -0.079 56.157 56.345 -0.188
Board Independence 0.795 0.804 -0.008** 0.789 0.816 -0.027*** 0.790 0.809 -0.020***
Board Size 9.258 10.483 -1.225*** 9.105 10.328 -1.222*** 9.042 10.194 -1.152***
Institutional Ownership 0.666 0.628 0.038*** 0.668 0.638 0.030*** 0.672 0.638 0.034***
Observations 5137 973 4374 1736 3932 2178
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Table 2.4 – The presence of banker-directors and inside debt
This table reports regressions examining whether having a director with banking experi-
ence impacts on CEO inside debt. Current Executive is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm has
at least one board member who is a current executive in a commercial bank. Past Executive
is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm has at least one board member who is a former executive
in a commercial bank. Banker Director is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm has at least one
board member who is a current executive or a previous executive in a commercial bank. All other
variables are defined in Table 2 or Appendix A. p-values are reported in parentheses. Asterisks
indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative
Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive
Leverage Incentive Leverage Incentive Leverage Incentive Leverage Incentive
Banker Director 0.364*** 0.249***
(0.001) (0.003)
Current Executive 0.256* 0.189*
(0.055) (0.060)
Past Executive 0.271** 0.175** 0.259** 0.167*
(0.021) (0.046) (0.027) (0.056)
Creditor Banker 0.453* 0.329* 0.537** 0.383**
(0.053) (0.062) (0.024) (0.031)
Non-Creditor Banker 0.265* 0.192* 0.323** 0.229**
(0.063) (0.075) (0.022) (0.031)
CEO Tenure -0.039*** -0.027*** -0.038*** -0.027*** -0.038*** -0.027*** -0.039*** -0.027***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO Duality 0.349*** 0.250*** 0.336*** 0.241*** 0.333*** 0.239*** 0.324*** 0.233***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
External CEO -0.630*** -0.470*** -0.635*** -0.474*** -0.629*** -0.469*** -0.633*** -0.472***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO Age 0.040*** 0.032*** 0.040*** 0.032*** 0.040*** 0.032*** 0.041*** 0.032***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Total Assets) 0.065 0.02 0.06 0.017 0.059 0.016 0.067 0.021
(0.198) (0.591) (0.239) (0.660) (0.250) (0.678) (0.185) (0.573)
Leverage -1.945*** -1.477*** -1.933*** -1.469*** -1.941*** -1.474*** -1.924*** -1.464***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D expenses/Sales -3.170** -2.553** -3.246** -2.610** -3.264** -2.624** -3.482** -2.763**
(0.044) (0.031) (0.039) (0.027) (0.038) (0.026) (0.026) (0.019)
Liquidity constraint -0.288 -0.177 -0.284 -0.174 -0.274 -0.167 -0.269 -0.164
(0.130) (0.234) (0.136) (0.244) (0.147) (0.259) (0.156) (0.270)
Tax status -0.085 -0.063 -0.081 -0.061 -0.083 -0.062 -0.082 -0.061
(0.422) (0.420) (0.443) (0.441) (0.434) (0.432) (0.443) (0.439)
Firm age 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.009***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Board Independence 2.021*** 1.508*** 2.035*** 1.521*** 2.051*** 1.532*** 2.132*** 1.584***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Board Size 0.127*** 0.099*** 0.126*** 0.098*** 0.124*** 0.097*** 0.129*** 0.100***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Institutional Owner-
ship
0.192 0.063 0.22 0.083 0.23 0.09 0.182 0.059
(0.753) (0.891) (0.719) (0.857) (0.706) (0.845) (0.767) (0.899)
Observations 6110 6110 6110 6110 6110 6110 6110 6110
Pseudo R2 0.084 0.090 0.084 0.090 0.084 0.091 0.083 0.090
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
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Table 2.5 – Marginal effects on actual inside debt
This table reports the marginal effects on actual inside debt based on the regressions ex-
amining whether having a director with banking experience impacts on CEO inside debt. All
specifications include industry and year dummies. p-values are reported in parentheses. Asterisks
indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the firm level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative
Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive
Leverage Incentive Leverage Incentive Leverage Incentive Leverage Incentive
Panel A: Marginal regressions
Banker Director 0.249*** 0.170***
(0.001) (0.003)
Current Executives 0.175* 0.129*
(0.055) (0.060)
Past Executives 0.185** 0.119** 0.177** 0.114*
(0.022) (0.046) (0.028) (0.056)
Creditor Banker 0.301* 0.224** 0.367** 0.261**
(0.054) (0.062) (0.025) (0.032)
Non-Creditor Banker 0.181* 0.131* 0.221** 0.157**
(0.063) (0.075) (0.022) (0.031)
Panel B: H0 : Current = Past Creditor = Creditor =
Non-Creditor Non-Creditor
F-test 0.01 0.01 0.53 0.50 0.66 0.61
Prob > F 0.938 0.921 (0.468) (0.480) (0.417) (0.434)
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Table 2.6 – Probability of having a banker-director – Heckman first stage
This table reports the regression examining the likelihood that the firm has at least one
director with current or past executive experience in a commercial bank. Bank density is the
number of commercial banks headquartered in the same five-digit zip code as the firm. Other
characteristics are as in Appendix A. The specification includes industry and year dummies.
Industry dummies are based on Fama-French 48 industry classification. The constant is estimated
but not reported. p-values are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01





Short-term debt/Long-term debt -0.002***
(0.001)








Commercial credit rating -0.034*
(0.059)




Stock return volatility -1.791*
-0.053














Table 2.7 – The presence of banker-directors and inside debt – Heckman
second stage
This table reports regressions examining whether having a director with banking experi-
ence impacts on CEO inside debt controlling for self-selection bias by including the inverse
Mills ratio from the first-stage probit regression reported in Table 5. p-values are reported in
parentheses. All variables are defined in Table 2 or Appendix A. Asterisks indicate significance at
0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative
Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive
Leverage Incentive Leverage Incentive Leverage Incentive Leverage Incentive
Panel A
Banker Director 0.355*** 0.243***
(0.002) (0.004)
Current Executive 0.240* 0.178*
(0.072) (0.076)
Past Executive 0.265** 0.171* 0.251** 0.162*
(0.025) (0.051) (0.033) (0.065)
Creditor Banker 0.452* 0.328* 0.533** 0.380**
(0.056) (0.064) (0.027) (0.034)
Non-Creditor Banker 0.254* 0.184* 0.309** 0.220**
(0.076) (0.088) (0.029) (0.040)
CEO Tenure -0.038*** -0.026*** -0.037*** -0.026*** -0.037*** -0.026*** -0.037*** -0.026***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO Duality 0.338*** 0.243*** 0.327*** 0.234*** 0.323*** 0.232*** 0.313*** 0.226***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
External CEO -0.627*** -0.468*** -0.632*** -0.472*** -0.626*** -0.468*** -0.631*** -0.471***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO Age 0.040*** 0.031*** 0.040*** 0.032*** 0.040*** 0.032*** 0.040*** 0.032***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Total Assets) 0.065 0.02 0.06 0.017 0.059 0.016 0.067 0.021
(0.199) (0.594) (0.235) (0.656) (0.248) (0.677) (0.186) (0.576)
Leverage -2.157*** -1.617*** -2.124*** -1.593*** -2.139*** -1.605*** -2.143*** -1.607***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D expenses/Sales -3.247** -2.611** -3.327** -2.670** -3.344** -2.684** -3.551** -2.816**
(0.040) (0.028) (0.035) (0.024) (0.034) (0.024) (0.024) (0.017)
Liquidity constraint -0.272 -0.167 -0.27 -0.165 -0.261 -0.158 -0.254 -0.154
(0.151) (0.262) (0.156) (0.268) (0.168) (0.286) (0.180) (0.300)
Tax status -0.076 -0.057 -0.073 -0.055 -0.074 -0.056 -0.072 -0.055
(0.471) (0.465) (0.489) (0.482) (0.483) (0.476) (0.496) (0.487)
Firm age 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.009***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Board Independence 1.761*** 1.334*** 1.798*** 1.363*** 1.805*** 1.367*** 1.862*** 1.404***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Board Size 0.124*** 0.097*** 0.123*** 0.096*** 0.121*** 0.095*** 0.126*** 0.098***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Institutional Owner-
ship
0.211 0.079 0.238 0.098 0.248 0.105 0.2 0.074
(0.730) (0.864) (0.698) (0.831) (0.685) (0.819) (0.745) (0.873)
Lambda 0.546** 0.362** 0.492* 0.324* 0.513* 0.339* 0.561** 0.371**
(0.036) (0.037) (0.063) (0.065) (0.060) (0.058) (0.036) (0.037)
Observations 6090 6090 6090 6090 6090 6090 6090 6090
Pseudo R2 0.084 0.090 0.084 0.090 0.084 0.091 0.083 0.090
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Panel B: H0 : Current = Past Creditor Creditor
Non-Creditor = Non-Creditor
F-test 0.02 0.00 0.58 0.54 0.71 0.65
Prob > F (0.896) (0.959) (0.448) (0.463) (0.399) (0.419)
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Table 2.8 – Probability of having a banker-director – Propensity-score match-
ing first stage
This table reports the regression examining the likelihood that the firm has at least one
director with current or past executive experience in a commercial bank in the 1st step of
propensity score matching with a maximum caliper difference of 0.0001 and using the logit
method. Bank density is the number of commercial banks headquartered in the same five-digit zip
code as the firm. Other characteristics are as in Appendix A. The specification includes industry
and year dummies. Industry dummies are based on Fama-French 48 industry classification. The
constant is estimated but not reported. p-values are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate





Short-term debt/Long-term debt -0.004**
(0.015)








Commercial credit rating -0.054***
(0.000)




Stock return volatility -3.062***
(0.001)














Table 2.9 – The presence of banker-directors and inside debt- Propensity-score
matching second stage
This table reports regressions examining whether having a director with banking experi-
ence impacts on CEO inside debt using the propensity-score matching technique. p-values are
reported in parentheses. All variables are defined in Table 2 or Appendix A. Asterisks indicate
significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative
Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive
Leverage Incentive Leverage Incentive Leverage Incentive Leverage Incentive
Banker Director 0.426*** 0.308***
(0.000) (0.001)
Current Executive 0.375*** 0.285***
(0.010) (0.009)
Past Executive 0.312** 0.219** 0.309** 0.218**
(0.014) (0.021) (0.014) (0.021)
Creditor Banker 0.459* 0.317* 0.540** 0.374*
(0.071) (0.095) (0.037) (0.052)
Non-Creditor Banker 0.386** 0.288** 0.426*** 0.316***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.006) (0.007)
CEO Tenure -0.027** -0.019** -0.027** -0.019** -0.027** -0.019** -0.029*** -0.020**
(0.014) (0.021) (0.014) (0.021) (0.014) (0.021) (0.009) (0.014)
CEO Duality 0.161 0.122 0.145 0.11 0.142 0.108 0.128 0.098
(0.222) (0.220) (0.272) (0.270) (0.281) (0.277) (0.331) (0.323)
External CEO -0.613*** -0.462*** -0.623*** -0.469*** -0.616*** -0.464*** -0.624*** -0.470***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO Age 0.028*** 0.024*** 0.029*** 0.025*** 0.029*** 0.025*** 0.030*** 0.025***
(0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.044 -0.002 0.035 -0.009 0.036 -0.008 0.041 -0.005
(0.453) (0.962) (0.553) (0.837) (0.541) (0.858) (0.492) (0.918)
Leverage -1.998*** -1.463*** -1.997*** -1.463*** -2.027*** -1.483*** -2.065*** -1.511***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D expenses/Sales -3.259 -2.475 -3.412 -2.592* -3.336 -2.535 -3.807* -2.868*
(0.116) (0.112) (0.100) (0.096) (0.108) (0.104) (0.063) (0.062)
Liquidity constraint -0.346 -0.191 -0.339 -0.186 -0.32 -0.172 -0.289 -0.15
(0.225) (0.409) (0.236) (0.424) (0.265) (0.461) (0.314) (0.519)
Tax status -0.107 -0.088 -0.096 -0.079 -0.099 -0.082 -0.091 -0.077
(0.398) (0.357) (0.445) (0.401) (0.431) (0.383) (0.471) (0.418)
Firm age 0.019*** 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.013*** 0.018*** 0.013***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Board Independence 1.883*** 1.454*** 1.890*** 1.463*** 1.923*** 1.485*** 2.006*** 1.544***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Board Size 0.078** 0.062** 0.073** 0.059** 0.072** 0.058** 0.074** 0.059**
(0.031) (0.024) (0.042) (0.033) (0.044) (0.034) (0.038) (0.030)
Institutional Owner-
ship
-0.763 -0.658 -0.714 -0.62 -0.709 -0.621 -0.768 -0.662
(0.276) (0.213) (0.311) (0.244) (0.312) (0.242) (0.281) (0.218)
Observations 2530 2530 2530 2530 2530 2530 2530 2530
Pseudo R2 0.100 0.109 0.101 0.110 0.101 0.111 0.099 0.109
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
H0 : Current = Past Creditor Creditor
Non-Creditor = Non-Creditor
F-test 0.09 0.18 0.07 0.02 0.16 0.08
Prob > F (0.764) (0.673) (0.791) (0.887) (0.685) (0.781)
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Table 2.10 – Time-variation in board composition (1) - Appointment of a banker to the board
This table reports univariate and multivariate analyses of how CEO inside debt changes after the firm appoints a director with executive experience in
a commercial bank. Dependent variables are different proxies for CEO inside debt: Relative Executive Leverage and Relative Executive Incentive. Post is a
dummy variable indicating the period after the appointment of a banker-director. All variables are as in Table 2 or Appendix A. Regressions are run in different
windows around the year of the appointment (year 0). All specifications include industry and year dummies. Industry dummies are based on Fama-French 48
industry classification. p-values are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the firm level.
Panel A: Univariate analysis
N Pre Post Difference
Relative Executive Leverage 443 1.005 1.262 -0.257*
Relative Executive Incentive 443 0.759 0.935 -0.176*
Relative Executive Leverage > 1 dummy 443 0.312 0.436 -0.124***
Relative Executive Incentive > 1 dummy 443 0.223 0.332 -0.109**
Panel B: Regression analysis
[-1; 0] [-1; 1] [-2; 2] [-3; 3] Full
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative
Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive
Leverage Incentive Leverage Incentive Leverage Incentive Leverage Incentive Leverage Incentive
Post 0.128 0.031 0.192 0.101 0.477** 0.313** 0.511** 0.337* 0.567** 0.369**
(0.490) (0.826) (0.376) (0.639) (0.010) (0.034) (0.013) (0.039) (0.015) (0.047)
Observations 152 152 206 206 296 29 366 366 443 443
Pseudo R2 0.344 0.408 0.327 0.383 0.288 0.341 0.262 0.306 0.23 0.271
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
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Table 2.11 – Time-variation in board composition (2) -Appointment of a
banker to the board after covenant violation
This table reports regressions examining whether new banker-directors appointed after a
covenant violation impact on CEO inside debt. The dependent variables are different proxies
for CEO inside debt: Relative Executive Leverage and Relative Executive Incentives. New
appointment is an (treatment group) indicator variable that equals one if there is an appointment
of banker-director between year 0 and year 2 after the covenant violation. After is an indicator
variable that equals one in the post-violation period. Other characteristics are as in Appendix A.
Industry dummies are based on Fama-French 48 industry classification. p-values are reported in
parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Panel A: Pre-treatment differences
Control Treatment Differences t-statistics
Ln (Total Assets) 8.157 8.707 -0.550 -0.586
Leverage 0.544 0.517 0.028 0.139
R&D expenses/Sales 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.619
Liquidity constraint 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
Tax status 0.615 1.000 -0.385 -1.041
Firm age 21.543 8.636 12.907 1.264
CEO Tenure 7.839 11.423 -3.584 1.264
External CEO 0.385 0.500 -0.115 -0.539
CEO Duality 0.538 1.000 -0.462 -0.290
CEO Age 56.308 62.75 -6.442 -1.297
Board Independence 0.778 0.787 -0.009 -0.093
Board Size 10.077 9.000 1.077 0.568
Institutional Ownership 0.624 0.715 -0.09 -0.389
Panel B: Difference-in-differences estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relative Relative Relative Relative
Executive Executive Executive Executive
Leverage Incentive Leverage Incentive
New appointment * After 0.740* 0.447** 0.823** 0.498***
(0.090) (0.047) (0.015) (0.004)
After -0.588 -0.388 -0.462 -0.333
(0.429) (0.357) (0.431) (0.324)
Observations 177 177 177 177
R2 0.831 0.816
Pseudo R2 0.517 0.657
Control variables Size Size Size Size
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes No No
Industry FE No No Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS Tobit Tobit
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Table 2.12 – Optimal CEO incentive ratio
This table reports regressions relating relative executive incentives and deviation from op-
timal incentive ratio. The dependent variable is Relative Executive Incentive, the proxy for
CEO inside debt. Deviation from optimum is the gap between the predicted optimal level of
incentives and the actual relative executive incentive ratio. The optimum is estimated based
on the (untabulated) first-stage regression following Campbell, Galpin and Johnson (2016). All
variables are as in Table 2 or Appendix A. All specifications include industry and year dummies.
Industry dummies are based on Fama-French 48 industry classification. The constant is estimated
but not reported. p-values are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01
(***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relative Relative Relative Relative
Executive Executive Executive Executive
Incentive Incentive Incentive Incentive
Deviation from optimumt-1 -0.825*** -0.822*** -0.806*** -0.897***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO Tenure -0.019*** -0.023***
(0.000) (0.000)
CEO Duality 0.201*** 0.256***
(0.000) (0.000)
External CEO -0.341*** -0.527***
(0.000) (0.000)
CEO Age 0.027*** 0.033***
(0.000) (0.000)




R&D expenses/Sales -0.585* -4.126***
(0.059) (0.000)
Liquidity constraint -0.087 -0.184**
(0.176) (0.044)
Tax status -0.037* 0.01
(0.094) (0.758)
Firm age 0.007*** 0.011***
(0.000) (0.000)
Board Independence 0.835*** 1.553***
(0.000) (0.000)
Board Size 0.057*** 0.119***
(0.000) (0.000)
Institutional Ownership -0.245** 0.204
(0.038) (0.259)
Observations 4843 4843 4843 4843
R2 0.604 0.738
Pseudo R2 0.193 0.376
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS Tobit Tobit
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Table 2.13 – Optimal CEO incentive ratio – the impact of banker-directors
This table reports regressions relating relative executive incentives and deviation from op-
timal incentive ratio. The dependent variable is Relative Executive Incentive, the proxy for
CEO inside debt. Deviation from optimum is the gap between the predicted optimal level of
incentives and the actual relative executive incentive ratio. The optimum is estimated based
on the (untabulated) first-stage regression following Campbell, Galpin and Johnson (2016). All
variables are as in Table 2 or Appendix A. All specifications include industry and year dummies.
Industry dummies are based on Fama-French 48 industry classification. The constant is estimated
but not reported. p-values are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01
(***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relative Relative Relative Relative
Executive Executive Executive Executive
Incentive Incentive Incentive Incentive
Deviation from optimumt-1 -0.793*** -0.796*** -0.779*** -0.874***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Banker Director 0.288*** 0.203*** 0.436*** 0.232***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Banker Director * Deviation from optimumt-1 -0.082** -0.069*** -0.092* -0.059**
(0.022) (0.010) (0.053) (0.049)
CEO Tenure -0.019*** -0.024***
(0.000) (0.000)
CEO Duality 0.206*** 0.263***
(0.000) (0.000)
External CEO -0.332*** -0.514***
(0.000) (0.000)
CEO Age 0.027*** 0.033***
(0.000) (0.000)




R&D expenses/Sales -0.4 -3.807***
(0.188) (0.000)
Liquidity constraint -0.078 -0.165*
(0.211) (0.065)
Tax status -0.039* 0.009
(0.063) (0.763)
Firm age 0.007*** 0.011***
(0.000) (0.000)
Board Independence 0.732*** 1.278***
(0.000) (0.000)
Board Size 0.053*** 0.113***
(0.000) (0.000)
Institutional Ownership -0.176 0.290*
(0.117) (0.096)
Lambda 0.808*** -0.064 0.038 -0.314*
(0.000) (0.626) (0.859) (0.059)
Observations 4843 4843 4843 4843
R2 0.604 0.738
Pseudo R2 0.193 0.376
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS Tobit Tobit
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Table 2.14 – The presence of banker-directors and inside debt: Monitoring mechanisms
This table reports regressions examining whether having a director with banking experience impacts on CEO inside debt in firms with different corpo-
rate governance standards, controlling for self-selection bias by including the inverse Mills ratio from the first-stage probit regression. Dependent variables are
different proxies for CEO inside debt: Relative Executive Leverage and Relative Executive Incentive. Relative Executive Leverage is the ratio of the CEO’s
debt-to-equity scaled by the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio. Relative Executive Incentive is the ratio of the marginal change in the value of CEO inside debt holding
to the marginal change in CEO inside equity holdings given the change in firm value, scaled by the firm’s respective ratio. Banker Director is a dummy that
equals 1 if a given firm has at least one board member who is a current executive or a previous executive in a commercial bank. Institutional ownership indicates
the percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional investors. G-Index is the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick’s Antitakeover Index. The observations are
divided into high and low institutional ownership and G-Index based on the medians of the variables. Lambda is the inverse Mills ratio from the first-stage probit
regression. Other characteristics are as in Appendix A. All specifications include industry and year dummies. Industry dummies are based on Fama-French 48
industry classification. p-values are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the firm level.
Institutional ownership G-Index


























Banker Director 0.131 0.512*** 0.065 0.375*** 0.479*** 0.358 0.333*** 0.244
(0.393) (0.000) (0.564) (0.000) (0.000) (0.187) (0.001) (0.228)
Lambda 0.716*** -0.046 0.478*** -0.078 0.665*** -0.877 0.454*** -0.778
(0.005) (0.939) (0.003) (0.868) (0.008) (0.179) (0.004) (0.164)
Observations 3042 3048 3042 3048 3310 1937 3310 1937
Pseudo R2 0.088 0.094 0.098 0.1 0.088 0.084 0.1 0.09
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Panel B: H0: High = Low
F-test 2.56 3.44 0.11 0.09
Prob > F (0.110) (0.064) (0.746) (0.767)
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2.10 Appendices of Chapter 2
Appendix 2.A. Variable definitions
Variable Definition
Inside Debt Variables
Executive Debt to Equity The ratio of CEO inside debt (the sum of the present value of
accumulated pension benefits and deferred compensation) and
CEO inside equity (the value of share and option holdings)
Relative Executive Executive debt to equity divided by the firm’s long-term
Leverage debt to the market value of equity ratio
Relative Executive The ratio of the marginal change in the value of CEO inside
Incentives debt holdings to the marginal change in CEO inside equity
holdings given the change in firm value, scaled by the firm’s
respective ratio
Relative Executive Indicator variable for whether the relative executive leverage
Leverage>1 dummy exceeds 1
Relative Executive Indicator variable for whether the relative executive incentive
Incentives>1 dummy exceeds 1
Deviation from optimum The gap between the predicted optimal level of incentives and
the actual relative executive incentive ratio. The optimum
is estimated based on the regression following
Campbell et al. (2016).
Board Members Variables
Banker Director A dummy that equals 1 if the firm has at least one board
member who is a current or past executive in a commercial
bank
Current Executive A dummy that equals 1 if the firm has at least one board
member who is a current executive in a commercial bank
Past Executive A dummy that equals 1 if the firm has at least one board
member who is a former executive in a commercial bank
Creditor Banker A dummy that equals 1 if the firm has at least one board
member who is a current executive in a commercial bank
that has at least one loan to the company at the end of the
fiscal year as a sole lender or as a lead arranger in a syndicate
Non-Creditor Banker A dummy that equals 1 if the firm has a board
member who is a current executive in a commercial bank
Continued on next page
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Appendix 2.10– continued from previous page
Variable Definition
that has no lending relationship with the firm
New Appointment A dummy that equals 1 if there is a new appointment
of a banker-director between year 0 and year 2 after
a covenant violation
CEO characteristics
CEO Tenure The number of years the CEO has served in this position
CEO Duality A dummy that equals 1 if the CEO is also the board chair
External CEO A dummy that equals 1 if the CEO was hired from outside
the firm
CEO Age Age of the CEO in years
Firm-specific characteristics
Ln(Total Assets) (or Size) The natural logarithm of total assets
Leverage Long-term debt divided by the sum of long-term debt and
the book value of equity
R&D expenses/Sales Research and development expenses scaled by sales
Liquidity Constraint A dummy that equals 1 if the firm has negative
operating cash flow
Tax Status A dummy that equals 1 if the firm has net operating loss
carry-forwards on its balance sheet
Firm Age The number years since the firm was founded
Bank Density The number of commercial banks headquartered in the same
five-digit zip code as the firm
Short-term debt/Long-term debt Short-term debt scaled by long-term debt
PPE Property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets
Market-to-book Market value of equity divided by the book value of equity
Commercial credit rating S&P long-term issuer credit rating
(AAA = 1, AA + = 2 . . . )
Credit rating dummy A dummy that equals 1 if the firm has a commercial credit
rating
Bankruptcy risk Probability that the firm will go bankrupt, based on
Shumway (2001)
Stock return volatility Standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the
prior three years
Stock return volatility square Square of stock return volatility
Violation A dummy that equals 1 if the firm violates the net worth,
tangible net worth or current covenant in any quarter
of the year
Continued on next page
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Appendix 2.10– continued from previous page
Variable Definition
After A dummy that equals 1 in the post-covenant violation period
Corporate Governance Measures
Board Size The number of directors on the board
Board Independence The fraction of outside directors on the board
Institutional Ownership The fraction of shares held by investment companies
G-Index The Gompers et al. (2003)’s Antitakeover Index
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Appendix 2.B. Correlation matrix
This table shows the correlation matrix between variables used in main regressions. All definitions of variables are reported in Appendix A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Relative Executive Leverage (1) 1
Relative Executive Incentive (2) 0.984 1
Ln (Total Assets) (3) 0.143 0.113 1
Leverage (4) -0.194 -0.202 0.270 1
R&D expenses/Sales (5) -0.021 -0.03 -0.108 -0.219 1
Liquidity constraint (6) -0.062 -0.055 -0.113 0.061 0.086 1
Tax status (7) -0.076 -0.076 -0.168 -0.08 0.071 0.006 1
Firm age (8) 0.249 0.227 0.453 0.142 -0.123 -0.041 -0.171 1
CEO Tenure (9) -0.083 -0.067 -0.124 -0.065 0.023 0.046 0.022 -0.131 1
External CEO (10) -0.140 -0.138 -0.143 0.019 0.109 0.02 0.036 -0.137 -0.096 1
CEO Duality (11) 0.134 0.129 0.181 0.038 -0.098 -0.039 -0.025 0.174 0.301 -0.064 1
CEO Age (12) 0.120 0.132 0.079 -0.021 -0.086 0.001 -0.029 0.087 0.405 0.009 0.261 1
Board Independence (13) 0.125 0.116 0.229 0.114 0.001 -0.042 -0.058 0.254 -0.136 0.075 0.178 -0.038 1
Board Size (14) 0.187 0.168 0.596 0.214 -0.150 -0.080 -0.142 0.413 -0.186 -0.112 0.077 0.051 0.172 1
Institutional Ownership (15) -0.075 -0.075 -0.183 -0.056 0.067 -0.025 0.072 -0.243 0.015 0.104 -0.005 -0.057 0.026 -0.230 1
Observations 6110
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Appendix 2.C. Summary statistics of variables used in the first stage of
Heckman and PSM procedures
This table shows the summary statistic of independent variables used in the first
stage of Heckman and propensity score matching procedures reported in Tables 5 and 7,
respectively. All definitions of these variables are reported in Appendix A.
N Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std dev
Bank density 6110 0.058 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.263
Short-term debt/Long-term debt 6110 0.233 0.122 0.039 0.268 0.312
Ln (Total Assets) 6110 7.774 7.934 6.960 8.762 0.920
Leverage 6110 0.331 0.308 0.158 0.457 0.334
PPE 6110 0.549 0.453 0.236 0.82 0.385
Market-to-book 6110 2.989 2.248 1.524 3.396 3.302
Commercial credit rating 6110 14.447 12.667 9.000 22.000 6.224
Credit rating dummy 6110 0.623 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.485
Bankruptcy risk 6110 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.019
Stock return volatility 6110 0.363 0.339 0.249 0.443 0.151
Stock return volatility square 6110 0.155 0.115 0.062 0.197 0.137
Institutional ownership 6110 0.796 0.812 0.705 0.901 0.172
Board independence 6110 0.787 0.810 0.718 0.875 0.106
Board size 6110 9.382 9.333 8.000 11.000 1.667
Observations 6110
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Appendix 2.D Summary statistics of covenant violation data – quarterly
frequency
This table shows the number of observations and the fraction of covenant violations
based on the current ratio, net worth, and tangible net worth. The sample consists of
quarterly observation of S&P1500 non-financial firms from 2006-2014 for which syndicated
loans data are available from Dealscan. The table compares our sample statistics with
those in Chava and Roberts (2008) and Ferreira et al. (2018).
Our full sample Chava and Roberts (2008) Ferreira et al. (2018)
N Fraction of N Fraction of N Fraction of
violation N violation N violation
Current ratio 2488 0.239 5428 0.15 808 0.09
Net worth 9706 0.102 13021 0.14 3727 0.05
Tangible net worth 5074 0.068 13021 0.14 2138 0.04
Net worth/Tangible net 15119 0.122
worth or Current ratio
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Appendix 2.E Robustness tests
Table 2.E.1: The presence of banker-directors and inside debt: Adding
firm performance and firm risk variables
This table reports regressions examining whether having a director with banking
experience impacts on CEO inside debt controlling for self-selection bias by including
the inverse Mills ratio from the first-stage probit regression and adding firm perfor-
mance (ROA)and firm risk (σROA). ROA is calculated as net income divided by total
assets.(σROA) is calculated as the standard deviation of past 5 years of quarterly re-
turn on assets. Other characteristics are as in Table 2 or Appendix A. All specifications
include industry and year dummies. Industry dummies are based on Fama-French 48 in-
dustry classification. The constant is estimated but not reported. p-values are reported
in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative
Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive
Leverage Incentive Leverage Incentive Leverage Incentive Leverage Incentive
Banker Director 0.354*** 0.243***
(0.002) (0.004)
Current Executive 0.238* 0.177*
(0.074) (0.078)
Past Executive 0.263** 0.170* 0.249** 0.161*
(0.025) (0.050) (0.033) (0.064)
Creditor Banker 0.461* 0.334* 0.541** 0.386**
(0.051) (0.059) (0.024) (0.031)
Non-Creditor Banker 0.250* 0.182* 0.304** 0.217**
(0.080) (0.092) (0.031) (0.042)
ROA 2.116** 1.477** 2.087** 1.455** 2.129** 1.486** 2.094** 1.464**
(0.024) (0.031) (0.025) (0.033) (0.023) (0.030) (0.025) (0.032)
σROA -1.484 -0.738 -1.468 -0.743 -1.388 -0.683 -1.672 -0.866
(0.549) (0.692) (0.551) (0.688) (0.574) (0.712) (0.500) (0.642)
Lambda 0.500* 0.331* 0.447* 0.293* 0.467* 0.309* 0.515* 0.339*
(0.056) (0.057) (0.092) (0.095) (0.087) (0.085) (0.055) (0.055)
Observations 6090 6090 6090 6090 6090 6090 6090 6090
Pseudo R2 0.085 0.091 0.084 0.091 0.085 0.091 0.084 0.091
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
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Table 2.E.2: The presence of banker-directors and inside debt: using OLS
method
This table reports OLS regressions examining whether having a director with banking ex-
perience impacts on CEO inside debt controlling for self-selection bias by including the inverse
Mills ratio from the first-stage probit regression. Other characteristics are as in Table 2 or Ap-
pendix A. All specifications include industry and year dummies. Industry dummies are based on
Fama-French 48 industry classification. The constant is estimated but not reported. p-values are
reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative
Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive
Leverage Incentive Leverage Incentive Leverage Incentive Leverage Incentive
Banker Director 0.301*** 0.205***
(0.001) (0.003)
Current Executive 0.216** 0.160*
(0.049) (0.052)
Past Executive 0.232** 0.148** 0.219** 0.139**
(0.015) (0.036) (0.021) (0.048)
Creditor Banker 0.427** 0.309** 0.497** 0.353**
(0.043) (0.050) (0.022) (0.028)
Non-Creditor Banker 0.229* 0.165* 0.275** 0.195**
(0.054) (0.064) (0.020) (0.029)
CEO Tenure -0.033*** -0.023*** -0.033*** -0.023*** -0.033*** -0.023*** -0.033*** -0.023***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO Duality 0.281*** 0.201*** 0.272*** 0.194*** 0.269*** 0.192*** 0.261*** 0.187***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
External CEO -0.453*** -0.339*** -0.457*** -0.342*** -0.453*** -0.339*** -0.456*** -0.341***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO Age 0.034*** 0.027*** 0.034*** 0.027*** 0.034*** 0.027*** 0.034*** 0.027***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln(Total Assets) -0.010 -0.034 -0.015 -0.037 -0.016 -0.038 -0.010 -0.033
(0.791) (0.249) (0.708) (0.209) (0.680) (0.198) (0.807) (0.252)
Leverage -1.946*** -1.458*** -1.918*** -1.439*** -1.931*** -1.449*** -1.936*** -1.451***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D expenses/Sales -0.380 -0.445 -0.433 -0.486 -0.453 -0.501 -0.625 -0.610
(0.700) (0.549) (0.661) (0.513) (0.645) (0.499) (0.523) (0.407)
Liquidity constraint -0.125 -0.066 -0.124 -0.064 -0.116 -0.059 -0.111 -0.056
(0.319) (0.517) (0.324) (0.525) (0.352) (0.558) (0.375) (0.582)
Tax status -0.111 -0.082 -0.108 -0.080 -0.108 -0.081 -0.106 -0.079
(0.177) (0.178) (0.188) (0.188) (0.185) (0.185) (0.197) (0.196)
Firm age 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.007***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Board Independence 1.072*** 0.823*** 1.102*** 0.848*** 1.106*** 0.850*** 1.155*** 0.880***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Board Size 0.065*** 0.053*** 0.064*** 0.052*** 0.062*** 0.051*** 0.067*** 0.054***
(0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002)
Institutional Owner-
ship
-0.196 -0.215 -0.165 -0.194 -0.154 -0.186 -0.187 -0.207
(0.668) (0.533) (0.718) (0.575) (0.737) (0.590) (0.685) (0.552)
Lambda 0.455** 0.299** 0.408* 0.266* 0.424* 0.278** 0.469** 0.307**
(0.031) (0.027) (0.057) (0.052) (0.055) (0.047) (0.030) (0.026)
Observations 6090 6090 6090 6090 6090 6090 6090 6090
R2 0.085 0.091 0.084 0.091 0.085 0.091 0.084 0.091
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
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Table 2.E.3: The presence of banker-directors and inside debt: alterna-
tive measures of inside debt
This table reports OLS regressions examining whether having a director with banking
experience impacts on CEO inside debt controlling for self-selection bias by including the
inverse Mills ratio from the first-stage probit regression. Other characteristics are as in
Table 2 or Appendix A. All specifications include industry and year dummies. Industry
dummies are based on Fama-French 48 industry classification. The constant is estimated
but not reported. p-values are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at
0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm
level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative
Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive Executive
Leverage Incentive Leverage Incentive Leverage Incentive Leverage Incentive
> 1 dummy > 1 dummy > 1 dummy > 1 dummy > 1 dummy > 1 dummy > 1 dummy > 1 dummy
Banker Director 0.262*** 0.231***
(0.001) (0.004)
Current Executive 0.218** 0.157*
(0.020) (0.097)
Past Executive 0.166** 0.160* 0.169** 0.153*
(0.046) (0.061) (0.040) (0.068)
Creditor Banker 0.311* 0.307* 0.359** 0.354**
(0.072) (0.077) (0.040) (0.044)
Non-Creditor Banker 0.164 0.141 0.201** 0.177*
(0.112) (0.181) (0.047) (0.091)
CEO Tenure -0.028*** -0.026*** -0.028*** -0.026*** -0.028*** -0.026*** -0.028*** -0.026***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO Duality 0.238*** 0.212*** 0.227*** 0.202*** 0.225*** 0.200*** 0.219*** 0.195***
(0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.009)
External CEO -0.489*** -0.458*** -0.492*** -0.461*** -0.490*** -0.460*** -0.493*** -0.463***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO Age 0.031*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.036*** 0.032*** 0.036*** 0.032*** 0.036***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.001 -0.026 -0.002 -0.029 -0.002 -0.029 0.003 -0.025
(0.975) (0.471) (0.950) (0.438) (0.963) (0.423) (0.937) (0.495)
Leverage -1.736*** -2.047*** -1.704*** -2.018*** -1.716*** -2.033*** -1.709*** -2.027***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D expenses/Sales -1.201 -1.068 -1.252 -1.116 -1.274 -1.133 -1.404 -1.239
(0.174) (0.233) (0.156) (0.212) (0.149) (0.206) (0.110) (0.165)
Liquidity constraint -0.243 -0.143 -0.239 -0.140 -0.232 -0.135 -0.226 -0.129
(0.126) (0.379) (0.134) (0.391) (0.146) (0.405) (0.157) (0.425)
Tax status -0.071 -0.119* -0.068 -0.117 -0.069 -0.118 -0.068 -0.118
(0.332) (0.098) (0.350) (0.104) (0.345) (0.103) (0.350) (0.104)
Firm age 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
Board Independence 1.559*** 1.184*** 1.596*** 1.210*** 1.585*** 1.209*** 1.626*** 1.248***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Board Size 0.064*** 0.059*** 0.062*** 0.058*** 0.062*** 0.057*** 0.065*** 0.060***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.002) (0.005)
Institutional Owner-
ship
-0.158 -0.153 -0.127 -0.131 -0.122 -0.122 -0.142 -0.143
(0.700) (0.707) (0.758) (0.748) (0.767) (0.765) (0.731) (0.727)
Lambda 0.538** 0.608** 0.493** 0.574** 0.518** 0.590** 0.545** 0.613**
(0.016) (0.030) (0.028) (0.040) (0.021) (0.037) (0.015) (0.030)
Observations 6046 6046 6046 6046 6046 6046 6046 6046
Pseudo R2 0.193 0.178 0.192 0.177 0.192 0.178 0.191 0.177
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes




Freedom of the press and corporate misconduct
Abstract
This study examines how freedom of the press affects corporate misconduct, focus-
ing mainly on earnings management. I find that firms engage more in accrual-based
earnings management when they have a high percentage of sales in countries with
low media freedom. This effect is stronger when foreign product markets are fur-
ther away from firm headquarters, when English is not the national language of the
foreign partners, or when the fraction of institutional investors is low. This suggests
that the influence of media freedom of foreign partners on earnings management
depends on how domestic investors process information about firm export markets.
I further show that the insiders of these firms tend to be involved in opportunistic
insider trading through buy and sell transactions, suggesting a probability of having
corporate misconduct for this type of firms. Overall, these results show that corpo-
rate misconduct can be in part explained by a spill over effect of media freedom of
export markets.
JEL classification: D81, G14, G34, M1, M41.




The media acts as a monitor or “watchdog” to reduce accounting frauds (Miller,
2006). A firm may be covered often and by many news sources, but the infor-
mation can still be biased if the media is controlled or influenced by other parties
(Burgess, 2010; El Ghoul et al., 2019). A growing literature on media independence
has indicated that in an environment with high media freedom, information can flow
more openly to the public (Kim et al., 2017; Kanagaretnam et al., 2018; You et al.,
2018). More specifically, such an environment incentivises journalists and the media
industry to disseminate news and share unrestricted perspectives without fear of
repercussions, and that information sharing, in turn, improves investors’ attention.
Thus, the quality of media matters.
Additionally, existing literature on media freedom and firm activities (see, e.g.,
Kim et al., 2017; Kanagaretnam et al., 2018) has focused on the cross-sectional coun-
try level instead of on the firm-level. This focus may be due to the fact that the
variation of media freedom within each country is relatively challenging to study
over time. Thus, in this paper, I explore the impact of media freedom on corporate
misconduct, with a special focus on earnings management, by using exposure to
foreign product markets with media restriction to fill this research gap. According
to Krause et al. (2016), U.S. firms are more likely to adjust their strategies and
corporate governance factors to match those of the geographic regions in which the
firms need to compete for sales. Following this argument, when firms have high
engagements in countries with low media freedom, firms would align their activities
with their partners. Furthemore, Engelberg and Parsons (2011) find that local me-
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dia coverage plays a more effective role in sharing information and is more accurate
in forecasting local trading. As a result, I hypothesise that outside investors may
encounter challenges in verifying information about firms which export a consider-
able share of their sales to countries with low media freedom. Consequently, these
firms might take advantage of such situation, and corporate misconduct is likely to
appear.
To test this hypothesis, I construct a firm-level index that captures the sales-
weighted media restriction1 in a firm’s export markets relative to the U.S., using
country-level data on media restriction from Freedom House website and data on for-
eign sales of U.S. firms from the COMPUSTAT Historical Segment database. Since
the media freedom is the same for all U.S. firms, focusing on the sales-weighted media
restriction ensures that exposure to countries with low media freedom is the primary
driver of media restriction.2 I find that firms are more likely to engage in accrual-
based earnings management when they have a high fraction of sales in countries
with low media freedom. The effect is economically substantial. I also demonstrate
media freedom in terms of economic, political and legal factors is important, and
that these three aspects together have an impact on earnings management. Further
analysis on the specific direction of accrual-based earnings management as in Yu
(2008) and Kim et al. (2012) suggests that manager are more likely to manage earn-
ings through income-increasing activities when firms have a high fraction of sales in
countries with low media freedom. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis
1In this paper, I use both of the concepts ‘media freedom’ and ‘media restriction’, noting here
that they are each other’s complement, interchangeably
2For example, in 2016, if Firm A has $100 mil sales to the UK (media restriction score is 25)
and their total sales is $1,000 mil, the index is thus (100/1000)×(25-23)/100 = 0.002. If firm B
has $10 mil sales to Venezuela (media restriction score is 81), and their total sales are $100 mil,
the media restriction thus is (10/100)*(81-23)/100= 0.058.
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that firms take advantage of media restriction to manipulate earnings upward.
This investigation, however, is still vulnerable to endogeneity concerns. For
example, the decision to sell in a certain country is not random. Firms may jointly
choose to trade in countries with unfree media while engaging in earnings man-
agement (self-selection bias). Alternatively, media freedom may be correlated with
other unobservable characteristics that affect earnings management (omitted vari-
able bias). Therefore, to partially alleviate these concerns, I employ different ap-
proaches.
I first focus on a sample of firms with a change in media freedom category
of trading partners. Specifically, I examine earnings management across a set of
firms with no change in a sales relationship and at least one trading country that
experienced a change in the status of media freedom. For example, I focus on firms
that constantly trade with the Philippines and test how their earnings management
varied in 2003 when the media freedom in Philippines changed from free media to
partly free media.3 In general, Freedom House changes status in media freedom
of a country when there is a change in attacks against journalists such as harass-
ment, physical violence and death threats, or when there is an exogenous impact
on independent media ownership. Thus, the status change itself reflects the change
in media freedom of a country rather than other factors. I find that firms with a
negative change in media freedom of their foreign partners engage more in accrual-
based earnings management, whereas firms experiencing a positive change in media
3In the report of Freedom House in 2004 for the media freedom of the Philippines for
2003: “Status change explanation: The Philippines’ status changed from Free to Partly
Free to reflect the continuing impunity enjoyed by those who threaten and kill journalists”.
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2004/philippines. Similarly, the report about
Russia in 2003: “Status change explanation: Russia’s rating declined from Partly Free to
Not Free because of the closure of the last independent national television broadcaster, neg-
ative state influence over public and private media, and repeated attacks against journalists.
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2003/russia
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freedom do not engage in accrual-based earnings management. Hence, the results
based on this test support my baseline findings.
The second test is based on the change in the efficiency of access to foreign
information for U.S. investors, with the introduction of a new product of Dow Jones
News Services, namely NewsPlus, as a source of variation to identify how the quality
of media affects accrual-based earnings management. In particular, the launch of
NewsPlus platform introduces more powerful search tools and more quickly updated
news about foreign markets which, in turn, grants U.S. investors a better channel
to access foreign information provided by branches of Dow Jones around the world.
This analysis relies on the argument of Dyck et al. (2008) that foreign media can
partially disseminate information about countries with low media freedom. More-
over, as hypothesised, when firms have a high share of sales in countries with low
media freedom, the U.S domestic investors have challenges to verify information
about foreign segments and external barriers to the U.S. firms. Hence, the overall
quality of the information about foreign markets would improve after the launch
of NewsPlus. I find that, after the application of the service, the effect of media
restriction on earnings management is less pronounced. This result implies that
the improvement in information quality of media results in a reduction in earnings
management.
Next, I identify a potential economic mechanism underlying the link between
media restriction of international markets and earnings management. My results
show that the effect of media freedom in foreign product markets on accrual-based
earnings management depends on how U.S. domestic investors process information
about firm export markets. Specifically, I document that firms with a large share of
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sales in countries with low media freedom manage earnings (1) when their foreign
partners are further away from the U.S, (2) when the main national language of
their foreign product markets is not English, or (3) when the fraction of institutional
investors with more information about foreign product markets is low.
Furthermore, additional tests show that under the high cost of being scruti-
nised by high audit quality and being detected due to low accounting flexibility,
accrual-based earnings management appears in this type of firms which suggests
that it is easier to manage earnings by taking advantage of the non-transparent
environment created by media restriction. Notably, I find that media restriction in-
creases opportunities for insiders to trade on non-public information. Firm insiders
with a higher percentage of sales in countries with low media freedom benefits, not
only from their insider purchases, but also from sales transactions.
Together, these results suggest that media restriction can result in the prob-
ability of having corporate misconduct. When firms have a significant fraction of
sales in countries with low media freedom, outsiders face challenges to process in-
formation about foreign product markets of these firms. Consequently, these firms
are more likely to engage in accrual-based earnings management and opportunistic
insider trading.
In the final section, I add a set of robustness tests. First, I conduct regressions
on earnings management measures, for which I apply the one-step procedure of
Chen et al. (2018) to identify total accrual earnings management and the alternative
measures of accrual-based earnings management based on McNichols (2002); Kothari
et al. (2005). I find that the effect of media freedom on earnings management remains
unchanged. Second, I present the result from alternative construction for media
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freedom to support the findings. Following these tests, I further show that the main
findings are robust after considering alternative explanations, such as subsidiaries’
characteristics and corporate governance factors.
Overall, the findings enhance the understanding of the influences of media free-
dom on corporate outcomes. The results of this paper bring together two strands
of research. First, a growing literature on the media freedom has shown that in-
dependent media could lower corruption in bank lending (Houston et al., 2011),
improve corporate social responsibility (El Ghoul et al., 2019), enhance firms’ infor-
mation environment (Kim et al., 2017), affect firms’ operating efficiency You et al.
(2018) and reduce corporate tax aggressiveness (Kanagaretnam et al., 2018). My
paper contributes to the literature by showing that media freedom at the firm-level
based on the exposure to countries with media restriction affects corporate miscon-
duct, such as earnings management and opportunistic insider trading. Moreover, I
also find evidence that the U.S domestic investors’ information processing plays an
important role in explaining how the exposure to foreign product markets affects
corporate outcomes.
Second, this study also adds to the literature on the spill-over effect of insti-
tutional characteristics of foreign product markets on firms headquartered in the
U.S.. By focusing on the geographic concentration of sales, demand-side cultural
variance and industry context, Krause et al. (2016) show that firms may adjust their
corporate governance characteristics to match those of the foreign product market’s
culture. My study contributes to this literature by showing that firms may affect
corporate misconduct once they have a large share of sales in countries with low
media freedom. In a study closely related to this paper, Dyreng et al. (2012a) show
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that firms with foreign operations in countries with weak rule of law engage more in
earnings management. However, my paper differs from theirs in two ways. First, I
focus not only on media restriction of foreign product market but also on the country
in which firms are incorporated or headquartered (U.S.). By doing this, my results
highlight how the difference in social norm between firms and their partners affects
corporate misconduct. Second, I show that media restriction can also permeate
through foreign product markets and influences corporate misconduct, regardless of
having subsidiaries or operations in those foreign countries.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 develops hypothe-
ses. Section 3.3 describes my sample and the data. Section 3.4 reports and discusses
my main empirical results, while Section 3.5 presents additional analyses. Section
3.6 shows robustness checks and section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
3.2.1 Related literature
A growing literature on the role of media shows that media coverage may promote
market efficiency by disseminating or disclosing information to capital markets (Fang
and Peress, 2009; Bushee et al., 2010; Peress, 2014). Additionally, Miller (2006) and
Dyck et al. (2010) find that external actors to the market, such as press coverage,
have been effective in detecting accounting fraud. Similarly, Dai et al. (2015) show
that media coverage has a monitoring role in deterring insider trading activities.
However, according to El Ghoul et al. (2019), the literature on media coverage
focuses on the number of times that a firm is covered by news sources, instead of
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the quality of media. More importantly, freedom in press incentivises journalists to
disseminate news and share unrestricted perspectives without fear of repercussions
(Burgess, 2010). Thus, information sharing, when media is free, improves investors’
attention and operating efficiency. In other words, information from the media is
an important factor that tailors the quality of media.
Further, prior studies on media freedom have shown the impact of media inde-
pendence on the financial system and firms’ information environment. Particularly,
a lack of independent media increases levels of bank corruption (Houston et al., 2011)
and the likelihood of tax aggressiveness (Kanagaretnam et al., 2018). Moreover, Kim
et al. (2017) argue that freedom for the media to fully disseminate collected infor-
mation to capital markets enhances the information environment. Specifically, the
authors state that low media independence weakens the ability to generate firm-level
transparency, creates opportunities for firms to adjust their disclosures, and makes
analyst forecast less accurate. Therefore, a lack of media independence could lead to
information asymmetry and lower market efficiency. From external corporate mech-
anism aspect, You et al. (2018) compare news articles written by state-controlled
and market-oriented Chinese media and show the accuracy and stronger corporate
monitoring role of market-oriented media. Taken together, media freedom is an im-
portant institutional characteristic that enhances media quality and introduces the
possibility of external monitoring.
3.2.2 Hypothesis development
Previous studies indicate that managers are more likely to engage in oppor-
tunistic earnings management if their wealth is more closely linked to stock prices
77
(Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006) or if they encounter pressure from capital mar-
kets and career-related incentives (Graham et al., 2005; Malmendier and Tate, 2009).
Moreover, prior literature on earnings management also demonstrates that although
accrual-based earnings management is based purely on accounting choices or meth-
ods, this method is more likely to draw auditors or regulatory scrutiny. A survey of
Graham et al. (2005) shows that top executives prefer not to use accrual-based earn-
ings management because this method is more likely to be scrutinised by auditors
and regulators. Similarly, Cohen et al. (2008) show that after the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (SOX), managers have switched away from accrual-based earnings management
to decrease the probability of detection.
Furthermore, as a mechanism to disseminate local information to non-local
market participants, Engelberg and Parsons (2011) find that local media coverage
plays a more effective role in sharing information and is more accurate in forecast-
ing local trading. Besides, firms are more likely to adjust their activities to align
with their foreign customers’ social norms and characteristics when firms do busi-
ness with customers in foreign markets because they need to win against their local
competitors (Krause et al., 2016). Therefore, it is a valid concern that if firms have
a high share of sales in countries with low media freedom, managers could decide
to match firm activities to their export markets, allowing them to escape scrutiny.
Furthermore, firms could choose where they could manage earnings. In particular,
Dyreng et al. (2012a) suggest that profitable firms with subsidiaries in tax haven
countries manage earnings more than other firms and that earnings management
of these firms mainly comes from foreign income. Further, Beuselinck et al. (2019)
show that firms engage in earnings management across subsidiaries over which they
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exert significant impact. As a consequence, there is a possibility that firms may
withhold information or manage earnings where investors are hard to verify the
quality of earnings information. Thus, I hypothesise that when firms have high ex-
posure to countries with low media freedom, the U.S. domestic investors could have
difficulties with verifying information about firm activities and with understanding
foreign barriers to U.S. firms. In turn, these firms could be more prone to corporate
misconduct and engage in accrual-based earnings management.
3.3 Data, Sample and Measures
3.3.1 Data and Sample selection
The initial sample consists of all firms available in the Execucomp database for the
period 1998-2016. I exclude financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and utility firms (SIC
4900-4999). The sample starts from 1998 because since December 1997, under SFAS
131, firms have been required to disclose more information about segments if rev-
enues or assets from external customers attributed to each individual foreign country
are material (Berger and Hann, 2003). To obtain data about geographic segments,
I use the COMPUSTAT Historical Segment database to retrieve the information. I
further use COMPUSTAT and CRSP for financial information and stock prices.
3.3.2 Measurements of media freedom variable
First, following the similar approach as in Krause et al. (2016), I identify
net sales to each individually disclosed country at the end of the financial year,
because information on net sales is one of the most complete data provided in the
COMPUSTAT Historical Segment. To collect information about geographical sales
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either in the US or foreign sales, I focus on variables with geographical information
in the COMPUSTAT Historical Segment database.4
Moreover, under SFAS 131, since there is no particular requirement about
standard formats for classifying countries, there are different names for the same
countries in firms’ reports. To increase the precision and consistency of segment
information, I manually check each listed country in each firm and recode names of
these countries. For example, “UK”, “United Kigdom”, “United Kindom”, “Great
Britain”, “U.K.”, “England”, “United Kingdom (UK)”, “British” are recoded as
“United Kingdom”. Additionally, for a firm-year with no disclosure for any indi-
vidual foreign country, sales to foreign markets are set to zero. Further, a group
of countries or regions or continents is also set as zero. For example, if firms dis-
close “Europe” or “Asia”, I set this disclosure as zero. If firms disclose a group of
countries, such as “Asia Pacific” or “Canada and United Kingdom”, I also set this
disclosed foreign sales as zero.
In the second step, I calculate the difference in media restriction between each
trading country and the U.S. by using the reports on the Freedom of the Press from
199 countries, which are available on the Freedom House website.5 Each country
is scored on a numerical scale from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating a lower
media freedom. In other words, this index represents the media restriction of a
country. Also, each country is allocated in a group of free (score from 0-30), partly
free (score from 31-60), or not free media (score above 60).6
Then, I construct two measures of media freedom in firms’ export markets
4The COMPUSTAT Historical Segment provides four types of segments: business, geographic,
operating and state. In the scope of this chapter, I focus on geographic segment information, which
is calculated based on domestic sales, non-domestic sales and total foreign sales.
5https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-press
6In the paper, I scale this score by 100 to easily interpret the results.
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based on these two inputs. The first measure is employed similar to the approach
of Krause et al. (2016) by matching the percentage of each firm’s sales trading with
specific countries to total sales with the difference in media freedom index between






× (Mj,t −MUS,t) (3.1)
where: Media restrictioni,t is sale-weighted media restriction of firm i ’s export
markets in year t ; Si,j,t is sales of firm i to country j in year t, Si,t is sales of firm i in
year t ; Mj,t is media restriction in country j in year t; MUS,t is US media restriction
in year t. Thus, a higher value of Media restriction indicates a low media freedom
environment.
The second measure is the percentage of sales that firms have to countries
in several groups of media freedom (only considering countries with non-missing
individual country names in COMPUSTAT Segment Files). Sales to free mediai,t
is the percentage of sales in free media countries, Sales to partly-free mediai,t is the
percentage of sales in partly free media countries; Sales to non-free mediai,t is the
percentage of sales from non-free media countries.
Table 3.1 summarises the percentage of foreign sales of firms from 1998 to 2016.
On average, sales to individual countries account for 8.2% of total sales during the
sample period . Also, for those firms disclosing non-zero foreign sales, the average
sales to foreign countries are approximately about 22.9%. Furthermore, on average,
foreign sales are monotonically increasing from 2.6% in 1998 to about 10.4% in 2016.
This pattern is also similar to the percentage of foreign sales for firms with positive
individual disclosure sales, which increases from 13.5% in 1998 to 24.8% in 2016.
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Further, Table 3.1 also presents the summary statistics for the percentage of
foreign sales in each category of media freedom countries. During the period from
1998 to 2016, average sales to countries with free media freedom account a more
substantial proportion in total sales (5.5%) compared to sales to countries with
partly free media (0.8%) and non-free media (1.8%). For the firms with positive
individually disclosed foreign sales, sales to free media countries account 15.9%,
while there are 2.1% and 4.9% of sales, respectively, to partly free media countries
and non-free media countries.7
[Insert Table 3.1 here]
3.3.3 Measure of earnings management
To construct a measure of accrual-based earnings management, I employ the
modified Jones (1991) model of Dechow et al. (1995) and take the absolute value
of the discretionary accruals calculated from this model. The estimate is calculated
separately for each two-digit SIC industry-year group, using all observations for
each two-digit SIC industry-year group with available data on the COMPUSTAT
database.Based on previous empirical estimates for earnings management, I only
take into account each industry-year group, which has at least ten observations.
3.3.4 Control variables
Following the previous empirical papers about the determinants of accrual-
based earnings management (Kim et al., 2012; Zang, 2012; Ali and Zhang, 2015;
7This is relatively comparable to the percentage of good exports that accounts in U.S. GDP
for 1998 and 2016. Specific information about exports of goods from the U.S. to all countries with
indexed freedom level is reported in Appendix 3.B. Export data is collected from the U.S. Census
Bureau https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/index.html and GDP data is from the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis https://www.bea.gov/itable/. Further, I also report the percentage
of sales to each country with different media categories in Appendix 3.C.
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Irani and Oesch, 2016), a set of control variables is added to the main regressions:
Firm size (Size) – natural logarithm of total assets, growth opportunities (MTB)
– market-to-book ratio, operational performance (ROA) – return on assets, Lever-
age (Leverage) – Long-term debt over total assets and real earnings management
(REM).8
Additionally, media freedom is associated with country-level economic growth
and helps to transmit information to investors on the market (Bushman et al.,
2004). Therefore, I include additional country-level control variables to alleviate
this concern . First, I add GDP growth, Ln(GDP) and CPI to control for the
time-varying macroeconomic characteristics relating to financial development and
economic growth of customers’ countries. Country-level control variables are col-
lected from the World Development Indicators website.
Moreover, Gentzkow et al. (2006) suggest that media freedom could reduce
and deter the value-destroying activities that firms are unwilling to voluntarily re-
port, including corruption and fraud. Also, prior studies of Leuz et al. (2003) and
McLean et al. (2012) show that the quality of country corporate governance has
direct effects on corporate policies, operational environment and structure. Thus,
country governance plays a particularly important role in media independence. To
control for quality of country governance of firm foreign product markets, I construct
the sales-weighted average country governance index based on two steps. First, fol-
lowing Karolyi and Taboada (2015), I construct country governance index of each
country based on the first principal component of five composite governance indica-
tors: control of corruption (CC), government effectiveness (GE), rule of law (RL),
8Real earnings management is calculated as –(REMCFO - RMDISX). My results are robust to
alternative measure of real earnings management –(REMPRO - RMDISX).
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regulatory quality (RG) and political stability (PS).9 Next, I take the sales-weighted
average of the country governance index for each country (CGI).10
Additionally, following the previous literature about the relationship between
tax and earnings management of Badertscher et al. (2009), Desai and Dharmapala
(2006) and Dyreng et al. (2012a), I add the tax haven indicators of foreign trading
partners as a control variable.
Summary statistics of the variables and control variables are reported in Table
3.2. The detailed definitions of the variables are described in Appendix 3.A. Also,
Table 3.3 presents the correlation matrix between variables using in the regressions.
The correlation between Media restriction and accrual-based earnings management
(Earnings management) is positive and statistically significant.11
[Insert Table 3.2 and 3.3 here]
3.4 Empirical results
3.4.1 Freedom of the press and earnings management
Baseline findings
I investigate the relationship between freedom of the press and earnings man-
agement based on the following model:
Yi,j,k,t = α + βMedia Restrictioni,t + γZ1,i,t + θZ2,j,t + ak,t + εi,j,k,t (3.2)
9I do not include the voice and accountability index (VA) to construct the country governance
index because this index could include media freedom. However, my results are robust to including
voice and accountability index (VA)
10I follow Curti and Mihov (2018) to rescale the indices by dividing these indices to 10 and
transform them to be non-negative data.
11Further, the coefficients between dependent variables are relatively low and the absolute value
of the highest coefficient is 0.566. Thus, it is expected not to have multicollinearity.
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where Yi,j,k,t or (Earnings managementi,j,k,t) is accrual-based earnings manage-
ment of firm i that has sales in a number of countries j in industry k in year t.
Media Restrictioni,t is the proxy for the media freedom. Z1,i,t is a vector of con-
trols for firm characteristics. Z2,j,t is a vector of controls for foreign product market
characteristics. ak,t controls for industry-year fixed effects.
12 Industry-year fixed ef-
fects are included to control for industry characteristics and overall macroeconomic
factors changing in a certain year. Industries are based on two-digit SIC codes. I
also use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level (Petersen, 2009).
Results are presented in Table 3.4. Across all columns, I find a significant
positive relationship between the exposure to countries with low media freedom and
the accrual-based earnings management, after controlling firm and foreign product
market characteristics. In columns 1 and 2, I report the results for the relationship
between media restriction of firms’ export markets and earnings management for
all available firms, including firms without foreign sales. Column 3 is the baseline
model which focuses on firms disclosing information about their foreign product
markets. Column 4 shows the relationship between the percentage of sales in each
media freedom category and earnings management. Columns 5 and 6 show the main
results with firm-fixed effects. In general, the coefficients of Media restriction and
Sales to non-free media countries are positive and statistically significant at the level
of 1%.
Based on the estimate in column 3 of Table 3.4, a one-standard-deviation in-
crease in Media restriction increases accrual-based earnings management by approx-
imately 5.88% of the sample mean. This is economically significant. For example,
12I also use firm fixed effects across all regressions to control for time-invariant firm characteris-
tics.
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Dyreng et al. (2012b) and Liu (2016) find that a one-standard-deviation increase
in religious adherence and corruption culture in their respective samples increases
accrual-based earnings management by 2.3% of the mean.
[Insert Table 3.4 here]
Further, among control variables, in particular the results reported in columns
3 and 4, I find that the coefficient on Size is negative and statistically significant,
consistent with the argument that smaller firms are less likely to be subjected to po-
litical costs and therefore report more aggressively (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).
The coefficient on MTB is statistically positive, suggesting that firms with high
growth prospects are more likely to inflate earnings due to the concern about missing
earnings benchmarks (Frankel et al., 2002). The coefficient on ROA is significant
negative, consistent with the result in Lee and Masulis (2011). They argue that
companies with good performance have lower incentives to inflate earnings. The
coefficient on Leverage is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that high
leveraged firms tend to be distressed companies undergoing contractual renegotia-
tion which incentives firms to reduce earnings (Becker et al., 1998). Finally, the
coefficient on real earnings management REM is negative and statistically signifi-
cant, showing a trade-off relationship between accrual-based earnings management
and real earnings management as in (Zang, 2012).
Types of media freedom and accrual-based earnings management
The above results show the effect of media freedom in general. To further
understand different aspects of media freedom, I examine how different types of me-
dia freedom affects accrual-based earnings management. Freedom House database
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classifies media freedom into three categories: freedom in legal aspects, freedom in
political issues and freedom in economic news. Hence, I re-estimate my baseline re-
gressions with these three independent variables, separately: RestrictionECONOMIC,
RestrictionLEGAL, RestrictionPOLITICAL. The results reported in column 1 to column
3 of Table 3.5 show the effects of media freedom in economic, legal political as-
pects on earnings management. I find that the coefficients on RestrictionECONOMIC,
RestrictionLEGAL, RestrictionPOLITICAL are statistically significant at the level of 1%.
In additional, F-tests show that there is no significant difference between these three
coefficients (prob > Chi2 = 0.3151). Therefore, this result suggests that media free-
dom in term of economic, political and legal factors is important, and that these
three aspects together affect accrual-based earnings management of firms.
[Insert Table 3.5 here]
Furthermore, columns 5 and 6 of Table 3.5 show analysis on the specific direc-
tion of accrual-based earnings management as in Yu (2008) and Kim et al. (2012).
The coefficient of Media restriction is positive (0.115) and statistically significant
at the level of 1% for the subsample with the positive discretionary accruals. This
result suggests that managers are more likely to manage earnings through income-
increasing activities when firms have a high fraction of sales in countries with low
media freedom.
3.4.2 Endogeneity tests
One concern that might affect the main result in this paper is that the choice
to trade with foreign partners may not be random. Firms with a high probability to
engage in earnings management can self-select to trade in a country with low media
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freedom to match with their strategies. Alternatively, the media freedom of foreign
product markets and earnings management could be jointly determined by unob-
servable firm characteristics. Therefore, in this section, I use different approaches
to partially alleviate these concerns.
Using a sample of firms tradings with countries that experienced a change
in media freedom
First, I examine the earnings management activities for a set of firms that have
at least one partner that switched in media freedom from high to low free media,
and from low to high media freedom. Moreover, in this sub-test, I only investigate
firms that have no change in sales relationship or no new sales relationship with
other countries during my sample period.
In general, Freedom House changes status in media freedom of a country when
there is a change in attacks against journalists such as harassment, physical violence
and death threats, or when there is an exogenous impact on independent media
ownership. Thus, the change of status itself reflects the changes in media freedom
or quality of news revealed by media within the country.
Particularly, since firms have many trading countries within a year, I manually
read and check foreign sales to identify the changes in trading partners. Panel A
of Table 3.6 presents the regression results. The results based on the subsample of
firms with changes from high to low media freedom in their foreign trading partners
reported in columns 1 and 2 of panel A show that the proxies for media freedom (Me-
dia restriction and Sales to non-free media) are statistically significant and positive
with accrual-based earnings management. Conversely, as in columns 3 and 4, I find
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that firms having a positive change in media freedom do not engage in accrual-based
earnings management. This finding implies that when there is a switch from high
to low media freedom from firms’ trading partners, managers can take advantage of
such situation to engage more in earnings management which supports my baseline
findings.
[Insert Table 3.6, panel A here]
Using a difference-in-differences analysis
The results thus far provide evidence of the media freedom of foreign customers
influencing firms’ earnings management by using subsamples of firms with a change
in media freedom of foreign product partners. To further mitigate possible identifi-
cation issues, I attempt to strengthen my inferences by using a source of variation
in the information quality.
Particularly, Dyck et al. (2008) state that foreign media can partially dissem-
inate information about countries with low media freedom. Therefore, in this sub-
section, I use the changes in efficiency of access to foreign information for U.S. firms
– the introduction of a new product of Dow Jones News Services in 2003, namely
NewsPlus. This is a platform designed to facilitate the speed to access relevant and
critical information beyond thousands of daily news articles. Specifically, NewPlus
introduces some features such as providing more powerful search tools to navigate
news stories and sort news based on subscribers’ demand, including updated ref-
erence and financial market overview with customisable filters. As a result, after
the launch of the NewsPlus platform, Dow Jones News provides to U.S. investors
more information foreign product markets.13 As hypothesised, when a firm has a
13It was introduced from the President of Dow Jones Newswire that new platform New-
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high share of sales in countries with low media freedom, U.S domestic investors have
challenges to verify information about foreign segments as well as foreign barriers to
the U.S. firms. Consequently, after the implementation of the new platform, media
quality improves, and information about foreign product markets is more transpar-
ent. Therefore, this new platform could reduce earnings management of firms that
were enable to hide from scrutiny more easily before the introduction of NewsPlus.
In other words, I expect a negative relationship between media restriction of foreign
product markets and accrual-based earnings management post-News Plus.
To conduct this test, I focus on a subsample with treatment and control groups
that are constructed based on a propensity score matching procedure between firms
in the top and bottom quartile of having trades with low media freedom countries
to ensure that treatment and control groups are similar pre-event. I use Post as
an indicator variable that takes the value of one if year t is after 2003 and zero
otherwise. The results are presented in panel B – Table 3.6. I find that the positive
impact of exposure to countries with low media freedom and accrual-based earn-
ings management becomes less pronounced after the introduction of the NewsPlus
platform. In particular, the interaction terms Media restriction*Post and Sales to
non-free media* Post are negative and statistically significant at the level of 1%.
This result suggests that after the introduction of the new platform, the quality of
media has become significantly stronger, which makes firms exposed to countries
with low media freedom reduce their accrual-based earnings management.
[Insert Table 3.6, panel B here]
Collectively, after controlling for some potential endogeneity issues, my main
Plus would be a valuable tool for accessing and using the crucial news about firms’ prac-
tices and customers (https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20030326005075/en/Dow-Jones-
Newswires-Launches-Dow-Jones-NewsPlus)
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findings suggest that media freedom plays a significant role in reducing firm earnings
management.
3.5 Economic mechanisms
My main findings so far show that firms with a large share of sales in countries
with low media freedom engage in accrual-based earnings management. In this sec-
tion, I extend the main analysis by showing possible economic mechanisms through
which media freedom of foreign product markets could affect accrual-based earnings
management. My results show that the effect of media freedom in foreign prod-
uct market on accrual-based earnings management depends on how U.S. domestic
investors process foreign information.
3.5.1 Geography of information
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) show that geographic distance influences
the trade activities of firms. Moreover, U.S. analysts located close to firms’ head-
quarters issue more precise earnings forecasts (Malloy, 2005). Therefore, from U.S.
investors’ point of view, information about countries that are closer to the U.S.
(e.g., Canada or Mexico) would be more transparent and easier to approach than
information about countries that are further away (e.g., Philippines or Africa). If
media freedom in foreign countries affects the U.S. domestic investors’ information
processing, I expect the effect of media freedom to be more salient in the subsample
with a higher share of sales in countries that are far from the U.S.
I partition my sample based on the distance of foreign partners from the U.S.
Following Ahern et al. (2015), I calculate the geographic distance between capitals
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using the great circle formula.14 Then, I construct a proxy for a geographic distance
to foreign product markets based on the sales-weighted average of each foreign prod-
uct market. A firm is categorised in a far subsample if the sales-weighted average of
geographic distance is in the top quartile group. In contrast, if a firm is in the first
quartile group, I classify that firm into the close subsample.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.7 present the results. Consistent with my expec-
tation, the finding indicates that media restriction affects accrual-based earnings
management in the subsample with a large fraction of countries further away from
the U.S. In contrast, media restriction does not exert a statistically significant effect
on accrual-based earnings management in the subsample where partners are closer
to the U.S. firms.
[Insert Table 3.7 here]
3.5.2 Language barriers
Moreover, Brochet et al. (2016) find that conference calls of firms located
in countries with greater language distance from English are more likely to have
non-plain English and erroneous expressions. Based on this argument, I suggest
that U.S. investors may encounter difficulties to obtain relevant information about
foreign product markets because of the language barrier in countries with low media
freedom.
This test is based on the language barrier proxy:15 difference in English speak-
14Longitude and latitude data are extracted from CEPII database:
http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/en/bdd modele/bdd.asp
15Ahern et al. (2015) use the same language as a control variable for the difference in culture
between acquirers and targets. Based on this intuition, I construct the language barrier variable
based on English language in each country and the U.S. Main languages of each country are
collected from the United Nation website: http://data.un.org/DataMartInfo.aspx. Furthermore,
the fraction of native English speakers in one country is quite sticky; hence, for countries without
available data for a certain year (or period), I will use the data available on the Ethnologue website:
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ing population and English national language. For each country-year specific mea-
sure, I construct the language variables relied on the sales-weighted average of these
variables. In the first sub-test based on English national language, a firm is classified
into English-speaking group if at least one trading partner is using English as the
statutory national language. Further, in the second sub-test based on the difference
in language, a firm is categorised in a low subsample if the sales-weighted average of
the difference in the proportion of the population who can speak English is in first
quartile group. In contrast, a firm that is in a high subsample if the firm is in the
top quartile group.
Columns 3 to 6 of Table 3.7 present the results. I find that the effect of
media restriction on accrual-based earnings management is statistically significant in
subsamples of firms with high language barrier: countries that do not use English as
the national language or countries with a low proportion of the population speaking
English.
3.5.3 Institutional investors
Furthermore, institutional investors are more likely to have a better under-
standing of firm activities because they have more information and more sophisti-
cated activities Bushee (1998, 2001). As a result, the significant presence of insti-
tutional ownership could increase the probability to have more information about
foreign product markets. Hence, the effect of media restriction on earnings manage-
ment would appear in a subsample with the smaller presence of institutional owner-
ship. The results reported in columns 7 and 8 of Table 3.7 support my expectation.
I find that the positive relationship between media restriction and accrual-based
https://www.ethnologue.com/language/eng.
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earnings management is statistically significant at the level of 1% when firms have
a lower proportion of institutional ownership.
Collectively, the findings in this section suggest that media freedom in foreign
countries affects US domestic investors’ information processing through which the
media freedom of foreign product markets has an impact on accrual-based earnings
management.
3.6 Additional analyses
3.6.1 Costs of accrual-based earnings management
Based on the results in the above sections, when firms have a high percentage
of sales in countries with low media freedom, managers engage more in accrual-
based earnings management. This section takes a further look at how accrual-based
earnings management varies under the high cost of this method.
Previous literature has documented that scrutiny from external monitors and
accounting flexibility constrain accrual-based earnings management (Zang, 2012;
Irani and Oesch, 2016). In particular, accrual earnings management activities are
more likely to be detected by auditors and regulators. High quality auditors are
expected to be more experienced and can limit extreme accounting choices made
by managers (Becker et al., 1998). Furthermore, auditors with knowledge of the
industry may have the ability to detect and impede earnings management (Balsam
et al., 2003). Another factor that constrains accrual-based earnings management
is flexibility within firms’ accounting systems. Barton and Simko (2002) find that
managers are limited in their earnings management strategy through accrual-based
activities if firms are inflexible due to a high risk of being detected by auditors and
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of violating GAAP.
Hence, in this section, I use audit industry specialisation and net operating
assets at the beginning of the year as a proxy for auditor scrutiny and accounting
flexibility, respectively, to test for costs associated with accrual-based earnings man-
agement. I also split the sample into two groups: high and low costs based on the
median of cost variables.
[Insert Table 3.8 here]
The results of this analysis are illustrated in Table 3.8. Columns 1 and 2 of Ta-
ble 3.8 show how auditors (based on audit industry specialisation) affects earnings
management. Particularly, the estimated coefficient on Media restriction is positive
and statistically significant for accrual-based earnings management in columns 1
and 2. Similarly, it is found that, for a group of firms where accounting flexibility is
low, firms with a high percentage of sales in countries with low media freedom still
engage in accrual-based earnings management.
These results suggest that firms with a high percentage of sales in countries
with low media freedom engage in accrual-based earnings management regardless of
the costs of being scrutinised by auditors or regulatory. Thus, this finding implies
that it is easier to manage earnings by taking advantage of the non-transparent
environment created by media restriction in the foreign product market.
3.6.2 Opportunistic insider trading
In addition to the earnings management, in this section, I also examine the
relationship between media freedom and opportunistic insider trading to show fur-
ther how media freedom of foreign product market affects the probability of having
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corporate misconduct. Prior studies show that when insiders trade on non-public
information for their private benefits, firms are more likely to have corporate mis-
conduct (Cumming et al., 2015; Liu, 2016). Opportunistic insider trading occurs
when insiders trade on non-public information for their private benefits. Hence, un-
der the restriction on media freedom, insiders could enrich their benefits by trading
on non-public information. I find that media restriction increases opportunities for
insiders to trade on non-public information. Table 3.9 presents the relevant analysis.
[Insert Table 3.9 here]
Table 8 shows regression models for two dependent variables: a price pattern
of insider purchases and a price pattern of insider sales. To identify whether insiders
trade on non-public information, I calculate the proportion of market-adjusted gross
return over the 20 days after the insider transaction and market-adjusted gross
return over the 20 days before the insider transaction [as in Liu (2016) based on
a measure of Rozanov (2008)]. This measure indicates that if insiders trade on
private information through purchases, they will gain more after these transactions.
In other words, the ratio should be higher for more favourable insider purchases
(Liu, 2016). Conversely, this ratio should be lower for more favourable insider sales
when insiders trade on non-public information.
To do this analysis, I use data from the Thomson Reuters Insiders database
to collect insider-trading data and focus on transactions with the cleansing code
of either H or R that excludes option exercises. Besides, I also average the price
pattern ratio across transaction days within a given year to have a firm-year price
pattern ratio. Insiders used in my sample are all officers and directors.
I find that in column 1 reported in Table 3.9, the coefficient on media restric-
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tion is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that media restriction affects
insiders’ ability to profit from purchases via private information-based trades. Based
on this estimate, a one-standard-deviation increase in media restriction on the price
pattern ratio is associated with a rise of 1.10% in the price pattern. The effect of
media restriction on the price pattern of insiders purchases is economically meaning-
ful. By way of comparison, Liu (2016) finds that a one-standard-deviation decrease
in corporate corruption is associated with a reduction of 0.86% in the price pattern
of insider purchases. Additionally, column (3) examines the relationship between
media restriction and the price pattern of insider sales and shows a negative and
statistically significant coefficient on media restriction which suggests that insiders
of these firms also gain benefits from their transactions.
Together with the results on earnings management, the evidence shows a fairly
consistent picture, suggesting that firms with a large share of sales in countries with
low media freedom take advantage of the low quality of media to engage in earnings
management and opportunistic insider trading, which could increase the probability
of having corporate misconduct.
3.7 Robustness tests
3.7.1 Alternative measures and model specifications
The association between media freedom and earnings management activities
is robust to the alternative procedure in regression of media freedom on earnings
management. I test this with a one-step procedure and alternative measure of
accrual-based earnings management (panel A of Table 3.10).
[Insert Table 3.10, Panel A here]
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Column 1 shows the measure with total accruals using the one-step procedure
as in Chen et al. (2018). Column 2 and 3 show my replication for the baseline
regressions using discretionary accruals calculated following Kothari et al. (2005) and
McNichols (2002). I find that the coefficient of Media restriction remains positive
and statistically significant in all these regressions.
Additionally, I use the interaction term between the percentage of foreign
sales to each country to total foreign sales and the foreign sales-weighted score of
the difference in media freedom Foreign Sales*WSCORE as the alternative measure
for main measure Media restriction. This construction considers how foreign sales in
countries with low media freedom affect earnings management. Column 4 shows that
the coefficient on Foreign Sales*WSCORE is positive and statistically significant,
supporting the results based on my main measure of media freedom.
3.7.2 Control for characteristics of subsidiaries
Recent work further tests whether firms manage earnings at their headquarters
or at their subsidiaries and shows that headquarters affect subsidiary earnings man-
agement policies directly (Beuselinck et al., 2019). They argue that MNC-parents
have a stronger influence on subsidiaries when these subsidiaries bear the same name
as their parents or when interlock directors control their subsidiaries.16 Also, firms
are more likely to manage earnings more in foreign subsidiaries because foreign sub-
sidiaries are located far from SEC premises (Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011). Therefore,
to control for these effects, I conduct further analyses, including a set of control
16Beuselinck et al. (2019) show the analyses on the degree of subsidiary integration and the extent
of subsidiary earnings management opportunities based on different proxies. However, due to the
limitation on data, in this paper, I only focus on subsidiaries with same names as parents’ names
(collected based on SEC EDGAR Exhibit 21) and interlock directors (collected from BoardEx and
manually read all profiles).
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variables for subsidiary characteristics.
I use the data from Dyreng et al. (2012a) to identify the subsidiaries of firms
for a period from 1998 to 2013 and manually update this information based on SEC
EDGAR Exhibit 21 from 2014. Then, I check if subsidiaries have the same names as
parent firms. Also, I manually read the profiles of directors on board using BoardEx
database to check whether these directors are sitting on the board of subsidiaries.
Table panel B of Table 9 reports the results. I find that the effect of media restriction
on earnings management activities does not change after including control variables
for subsidiaries’ characteristics.
[Insert Table 3.10, Panel B here]
3.7.3 Control for corporate governance factors
Besides, other corporate governance channels can constrain managers’ earn-
ings management activities. Thus, I add several corporate governance variables in
the regression to control for the alternative corporate governance channels. These
variables include an external corporate governance channel (analysts following) and
internal corporate governance variables (board independence, board size and CEO
duality). The results in Table 3.10 – panel C show that the coefficient of Media
restriction is positive and statistically significant in regressions with Earnings man-
agement. Therefore, the effect of media freedom and earnings management activities
is not driven by omitted corporate governance variables.
[Insert Table 3.10, Panel C here]
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3.8 Conclusion
When the capital market realises opportunistic insider activities, it may result
in negative market consequences such as a higher cost of capital (Aboody et al.,
2005; Francis et al., 2008). Media plays a role in disseminating news to the market
and monitoring firm activities. Therefore, it is crucial to look at the relationship
between the quality of media and corporate misconduct. In this paper, I examine the
effect of media freedom on earnings management and opportunistic insider trading
by using the sales-weighted average of difference in media restriction of a firm’s
export market. When firms are exposed to countries with high media restriction,
managers are more likely to take advantage of the low quality of the press and engage
in accrual-based earnings management and opportunistic insider trading. These
results are robust to multiple identification strategies, characteristics of subsidiaries
and corporate governance factors. The effect of exposure to countries with high
media restriction on corporate misconduct depends on how U.S. domestic investors
process foreign information. My paper adds to the literature on the relation between
media freedom and firm activities. This paper also contributes to the literature on
the spill-over effect of institutional characteristics of the product markets on firms
headquartered in the U.S. by showing that media freedom of foreign product markets
has an impact on corporate misconduct, regardless of having subsidiaries in those
markets.
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3.9 Tables of Chapter 3
Table 3.1 – Percentage of foreign product markets
This table reports the percentage of sales to countries in different categories of media free-
dom for all non-financial S&P 1500 firms from 1998 to 2016. All is the percentage of sales of
individual disclosed foreign sales. Sales to free media is the percentage of sales to free media
countries, Sales to partly-free media is the percentage of sales to partly free media countries; Sales
to non-free media is the percentage of sales to non-free media countries
All firms Firms with positive individually
disclosed foreign sales
Year All Sales to Sales to Sales to All Sales to Sales to Sales to
free partly-free non-free free partly-free non-free
media media media media media media
1998 0.026 0.025 0.001 0.000 0.135 0.129 0.006 0.000
1999 0.059 0.05 0.004 0.005 0.186 0.157 0.014 0.015
2000 0.065 0.054 0.006 0.005 0.192 0.159 0.017 0.016
2001 0.063 0.055 0.004 0.004 0.200 0.174 0.012 0.014
2002 0.064 0.054 0.003 0.007 0.200 0.169 0.01 0.021
2003 0.069 0.056 0.005 0.008 0.207 0.169 0.014 0.024
2004 0.077 0.06 0.005 0.012 0.223 0.174 0.014 0.035
2005 0.079 0.06 0.005 0.014 0.224 0.171 0.015 0.038
2006 0.082 0.062 0.006 0.014 0.228 0.171 0.017 0.040
2007 0.088 0.064 0.007 0.017 0.244 0.177 0.02 0.047
2008 0.087 0.061 0.009 0.017 0.24 0.168 0.024 0.048
2009 0.091 0.059 0.010 0.022 0.256 0.166 0.029 0.061
2010 0.094 0.055 0.011 0.028 0.263 0.155 0.031 0.077
2011 0.098 0.057 0.013 0.028 0.269 0.155 0.036 0.078
2012 0.102 0.058 0.014 0.030 0.271 0.154 0.036 0.081
2013 0.102 0.058 0.012 0.032 0.262 0.149 0.03 0.083
2014 0.102 0.057 0.012 0.033 0.261 0.146 0.031 0.084
2015 0.099 0.056 0.011 0.032 0.249 0.141 0.027 0.081
2016 0.103 0.055 0.011 0.037 0.248 0.135 0.025 0.088
1998 - 2016 0.082 0.056 0.008 0.018 0.229 0.159 0.021 0.049
Observations 19371 6710
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Table 3.2 – Summary statistics
Descriptive statistics are based on a sample of non-financial S&P1500 firms from 1998 to
2016. Media restriction is the sales-weighted of the difference in media freedom indices between
the U.S. and foreign countries, Sales to free media is the percentage of sales to free media countries
of individually disclosed foreign sales firms, Sales to partly-free media is a percentage of sales to
partly free media countries; Sales to non-free media is a percentage of sales to non-free media
countries. Other variable characteristics are reported in Appendix A.
N Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std. dev.
All firms
Media restriction 19371 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.052
Sales to non-free media 19371 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.079
Sales to non-free media 19371 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.043
Sales to non-free media 19371 0.055 0.000 0.000 0.069 0.113
Foreign Sales 19371 0.081 0.000 0.000 0.098 0.164
WSCORE 19371 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.110
Earnings management 19371 0.052 0.034 0.015 0.066 0.059
REM 19371 -0.002 0.020 -0.110 0.132 0.240
Size 19371 7.177 7.067 6.021 8.26 1.645
MTB 19371 3.156 2.304 1.456 3.739 3.77
ROA 19371 0.038 0.053 0.016 0.090 0.113
Leverage 19371 0.182 0.155 0.008 0.283 0.186
Price PatternPurcharses 8084 1.098 1.055 0.979 1.164 0.239
Shares tradedPurcharses 8084 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002
Price PatternSales 12542 0.963 0.970 0.924 1.000 0.100
Shares tradedSales 12542 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.005 0.012
Firms with positive individually disclosed foreign sales
Media restriction 6710 0.038 0.004 0.001 0.03 0.083
Sales to non-free media 6710 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.128
Sales to non-free media 6710 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.071
Sales to non-free media 6710 0.160 0.123 0.061 0.223 0.143
Foreign Sales 6710 0.233 0.162 0.090 0.0313 0.206
WSCORE 6710 0.105 0.030 0.010 0.136 0.166
Earnings management 6710 0.051 0.034 0.015 0.065 0.057
REM 6710 0.001 0.019 -0.102 0.127 0.222
Size 6710 7.437 7.394 6.313 8.489 1.599
MTB 6710 2.977 2.253 1.473 3.613 3.239
ROA 6710 0.039 0.053 0.016 0.089 0.108
Leverage 6710 0.177 0.159 0.02 0.269 0.166
GDP growth 6710 1.634 1.315 0.513 2.556 2.071
Ln(GDP) 6710 9.570 9.805 8.865 10.458 1.014
CPI 6710 1.248 0.907 0.346 1.796 1.604
CG index 6710 0.345 0.306 0.162 0.510 0.215
Tax haven 6710 0.130 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.336
Price PatternPurcharses 2261 1.095 1.055 0.983 1.156 0.238
Shares tradedPurcharses 2261 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002
Price PatternSales 4419 0.964 0.973 0.930 1.000 0.082
Shares tradedSales 4419 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.010
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Table 3.3 – Correlation matrix
This table shows the correlation matrix between all variables using in the main regressions based on a sample of S&P1500 firms from 1998 to 2016. *,
**, *** indicate significance level at 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively. All variable are defined in Appendix A.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (-6) (7) (8) (9) (-10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
(1) Media restriction 1
(2) Sales to non-free media 0.961 1
(3) Sales to partly-free media 0.312 0.108 1
(4) Sales to free media 0.011 -0.047 0.013 1
(5) Earnings management 0.088 0.079 0.013 0.037 1
(6) REM1 -0.065 -0.065 0.058 0.046 -0.042 1
(7) REM2 -0.078 -0.077 0.053 0.028 -0.016 0.933 1
(8) Size -0.051 -0.039 0.014 -0.121 -0.190 0.034 0.025 1
(9) MTB -0.02 -0.009 -0.078 -0.047 0.003 -0.217 -0.245 0.083 1
(10) ROA -0.044 -0.037 -0.033 -0.031 -0.347 -0.099 -0.155 0.196 0.213 1
(11) Leverage -0.068 -0.065 0.038 -0.123 -0.030 0.126 0.161 0.243 -0.031 -0.135 1
(12) GDP growth 0.165 0.183 -0.098 -0.251 0.014 -0.046 -0.025 -0.045 0.047 0.040 0.047 1
(13) Ln(GDP) -0.567 -0.495 -0.365 -0.153 -0.036 -0.029 -0.016 -0.009 0.047 0.065 -0.006 -0.017 1
(14) CPI 0.002 0.002 0.066 -0.271 0.009 0.096 0.108 -0.009 -0.080 -0.002 0.127 0.301 0.050 1
(15) CGI -0.292 -0.252 -0.228 -0.321 -0.001 -0.027 -0.008 -0.021 0.049 0.018 0.058 0.326 0.631 0.278 1
(16) Tax haven 0.298 0.288 0.174 0.171 0.038 -0.036 -0.049 -0.066 -0.015 -0.039 -0.055 -0.107 -0.343 -0.144 -0.350 1
Observations 6710
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Table 3.4 – Freedom of the press and earnings management
This table reports regressions examining the relationship between media freedom and earnings
management. The dependent variable: Earnings management is accrual-based earnings man-
agement based on the modified Jones (1991) of Dechow et al. (1995). Media restriction is the
sales-weighted difference in media freedom indices, Sales to free media is the percentage of sales to
free media countries of individually disclosed foreign sales firms, Sales to partly-free media is the
percentage of sales to partly free media countries of individually disclosed foreign sales firms; Sales
to non-free media is the percentage of sales to non-free media countries of individually disclosed
foreign sales firms. Other characteristics are as in the Appendix. Industry dummies are based
on 2-digit SIC codes. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below parameter estimates.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate the significance level at
1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings
management management management management management management
Media restriction 0.043*** 0.063*** 0.066***
(0.013) (0.019) (0.024)
Sales to non-free media 0.028*** 0.038*** 0.038***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.014)
Sales to partly-free media 0.004 0.010 0.015
(0.011) (0.012) (0.022)
Sales to free media 0.000 0.009 0.018
(0.005) (0.007) (0.014)
Size -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.003 0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
MTB 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA -0.157*** -0.157*** -0.171*** -0.172*** -0.179*** -0.179***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018)
Leverage -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010 -0.010 -0.012 -0.012
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
REM -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.010* -0.010* -0.022 -0.022
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.014)
GDP growth -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln(GDP) 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
CPI 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CG index 0.002 0.003 0.009 0.011
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Tax haven 0.001 0.000 -0.005 -0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.008 0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.014) (0.014) (0.034) (0.035)
Observations 19371 19371 6710 6710 6710 6710
Adjusted R2 0.206 0.206 0.208 0.208 0.271 0.271
Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Firm FE No No No No Yes Yes
Year FE No No No No Yes Yes
104
Table 3.5 – Freedom of the press and earnings management: Different types
of media freedom and earnings management
This panel reports regressions examining the relationship between different types of media
freedom and earnings management. The dependent variable: Earnings management is accrual-
based earnings management based on the modified Jones (1991) of Dechow et al. (1995).
RestrictionLEGAL is the sales-weighted average of the difference in media freedom in legal aspects.
RestrictionPOLITICAL is the sales-weighted average of the difference in media freedom in political
aspects. RestrictionECONOMIC is the sales-weighted average of the difference in media freedom
indices in the economic aspects. Other characteristics are as in Table 2 or the Appendix. Industry
dummies are based on 2-digit SIC codes. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below
parameter estimates. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate
the significance level at 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Earnings Earnings Earnings Positive Negative








Media restriction 0.115*** 0.003
(0.043) (0.028)
Size -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
MTB 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 -0.003**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
ROA -0.172*** -0.172*** -0.172*** 0.183*** 0.431***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.034) (0.097)
Leverage -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 0.004 0.083
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.065)
REM -0.010* -0.010* -0.010* 0.059*** 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.070)
GDP growth -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Ln(GDP) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.007
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
CPI 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CG index 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.016* -0.028
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.021)
Tax haven 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Constant 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.080*** -0.104**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.050)
Observations 6710 6710 6710 3763 2947
Adjusted R2 0.206 0.206 0.206 0.139 0.079
Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: H0: RestrictionLEGAL = RestrictionPOLITICAL = RestrictionECONOMIC
Chi2 2.31
Prob > Chi2 0.3151
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Table 3.6 – Endogeneity tests
This table reports regressions examining the relationship between media freedom and earnings
management addressed endogeneity issues. Panel A reports an endogeneity test using a sample of
firms with foreign trading partners having a change in media freedom category. A firm is classified
into this sample when that firm does not have changes in trading countries but at least one
trading country having a switch in its status from high (low) to low (high) media freedom. Panel
B shows the effects of a new product of Dow Jones News Service on the relationship between
media freedom and corporate earnings management. Post is an indicator that takes the value of
one if year t is after the introduction of NewPlus service of Dow Jones. Other characteristics are
as in Table 2, or Appendix A. Industry dummies are based on 2-digit SIC codes. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses below parameter estimates. Robust standard errors are clustered at
the firm level. *, **, *** indicate the significance level at 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent,
respectively.
a – Panel A: Endogeneity tests using a sample of firms with foreign trading partners having a
change in media freedom
Change from high to low Change from low to high
Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings
management management management management
Media restriction 0.079* -0.043
(0.041) (0.097)
Sales to non-free media 0.057** -0.006
(0.024) (0.062)
Sales to partly-free media 0.009 -0.024
(0.028) (0.047)
Sales to free media 0.037 -0.056
(0.030) (0.062)
Size -0.005* -0.005* -0.002 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
MTB 0.003* 0.003* 0.013*** 0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
ROA -0.260*** -0.262*** 0.040 0.058
(0.027) (0.027) (0.099) (0.108)
Leverage -0.044 -0.038 0.091 0.108
(0.027) (0.028) (0.062) (0.066)
REM -0.010 -0.008 -0.046 -0.048
(0.022) (0.022) (0.047) (0.051)
GDP growth -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009)
Ln(GDP) -0.001 -0.001 -0.017 -0.016
(0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011)
CPI 0.018*** 0.017*** -0.006 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008)
CG index -0.081* -0.069 -0.008 -0.043
(0.044) (0.045) (0.095) (0.106)
Tax haven -0.006 -0.007 0.012 0.009
(0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.019)
Constant 0.101* 0.091 0.171 0.173
(0.060) (0.059) (0.106) (0.107)
Observations 146 146 39 39
Adjusted R2 0.503 0.505 0.443 0.415
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b – Panel B: Endogeneity tests using difference-in-differences analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings
management management management management
Media restriction 0.198*** 0.258***
(0.056) (0.086)
Media restriction * Post -0.154*** -0.201***
(0.054) (0.068)
Sales to non-free media 0.118*** 0.135***
(0.037) (0.041)
Sales to non-free media * Post 0.011 -0.037
(0.027) (0.034)
Sales to partly-free media 0.027 0.044
(0.022) (0.030)
Sales to partly-free media * Post -0.023 -0.031
(0.024) (0.026)
Sales to free media 0.001 0.080**
(0.030) (0.036)
Sales to free media * Post -0.093*** -0.115***
(0.035) (0.037)
Size -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.008*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
MTB 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA -0.170*** -0.170*** -0.178*** -0.178***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021)
Leverage -0.015** -0.015** -0.024** -0.020*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011)
REM -0.013* -0.014** -0.027* -0.027*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.016) (0.016)
GDP growth -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln(GDP) 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
CPI 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CG index -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Tax haven 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant 0.054*** 0.058*** -0.049 -0.041
(0.015) (0.016) (0.035) (0.034)
Observations 3978 3978 3978 3978
Adjusted R2 0.223 0.221 0.300 0.301
Industry*Year FE Yes Yes No No
Firm FE No No Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes
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Table 3.7 – Economic mechanism: Domestic investors’ information processing
and the effect of media freedom
This table reports regressions examining how the information processing of domestic in-
vestors affect the relationship between media freedom and earnings management. The dependent
variable: Earnings management is accrual-based earnings management based on the modified
Jones (1991) ofDechow et al. (1995). Media restriction is the sales-weighted difference in media
freedom. Geographic distance is the sales-weighted average of the difference in the distance
between the US and foreign countries. English-speaking countries is the sales-weighted average of
countries with English used as the national language. Difference in language is the sales-weighted
average of the difference in the proportion of populations speaking English. Institutional investors
is the fraction of institutional ownership. Other characteristics are as in the Appendix. All
specifications include industry and year dummies. Industry dummies are based on 2-digit SIC
codes. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below parameter estimates. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate the significance level at 1 per cent, 5 per
cent, and 10 per cent, respectively.
Geographic English-speaking Difference in Institutional
distance countries language investors
Far Close Low High Low High Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Media restriction 0.063** -0.077 0.091*** 0.012 0.094*** 0.413 0.079*** -0.001
(0.030) (0.048) (0.017) (0.032) (0.023) (0.421) (0.023) (0.025)
Size -0.001 -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.003** -0.002* -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
MTB 0.000 0.000 0.001* 0.001** 0.001 0.002** 0.001* 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ROA -0.173*** -0.140*** -0.160*** -0.168*** -0.159*** -0.153*** -0.152*** -0.168***
(0.021) (0.028) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022) (0.031) (0.023) (0.026)
Leverage -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.016 -0.000 -0.017 -0.024** 0.006
(0.011) (0.013) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
REM -0.033** -0.014 -0.010 -0.010 -0.013 0.004 -0.008 -0.013
(0.014) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
GDP growth -0.002* 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln(GDP) -0.002 -0.005 0.004*** -0.003 0.003 -0.008 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002)
CPI 0.004* 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.004 -0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
CG index 0.021 0.009 0.001 0.004 0.007 0.017 0.006 0.000
(0.014) (0.019) (0.007) (0.016) (0.012) (0.022) (0.011) (0.010)
Tax haven 0.004 -0.002 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.009 -0.004 0.006
(0.005) (0.012) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.070*** 0.134*** 0.035** 0.100*** 0.033 0.152 0.063*** 0.067***
(0.023) (0.051) (0.015) (0.023) (0.023) (0.104) (0.021) (0.022)
Observations 1677 1678 4036 2674 1676 1766 2436 2452
Adjusted R2 0.185 0.143 0.203 0.172 0.191 0.165 0.186 0.158
Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Test of coefficient differences between two subsamples
Chi2 6.33 6.48 0.47 4.428
Prob > Chi2 0.0119 0.0109 0.492 0.0385
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Table 3.8 – Impact of costs to accrual-based earnings management
This table reports regressions examining the effects of costs of using accrual-based earn-
ings management on the relationship between media freedom and earnings management. A
firm with above-median audit industry specialisation, High Audit Industry Specialisation, or a
firm with below-median NOA, Low Accounting Flexibility, is assigned to the high-cost of using
accrual earnings management. Other characteristics are as in Table 2, or Appendix A. Industry
dummies are based on 2-digit SIC codes. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below
parameter estimates. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate
the significance level at 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent, respectively.
Audit Industry Specialisation Accounting Flexibility
High Low High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Media restriction 0.046* 0.096** 0.071*** 0.046*
(0.024) (0.040) (0.026) (0.023)
Size -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
MTB 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
ROA -0.164*** -0.158*** -0.204*** -0.113***
(0.014) (0.027) (0.017) (0.019)
Leverage -0.013** 0.000 -0.014* -0.002
(0.006) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008)
REM -0.007 -0.016** -0.016* -0.005
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007)
GDP growth -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln(GDP) -0.000 0.003 0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
CPI 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CG index 0.006 -0.008 -0.002 0.004
(0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009)
Tax haven 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.075*** 0.043* 0.061*** 0.068***
(0.016) (0.026) (0.018) (0.020)
Observations 4711 1998 3632 3078
Adjusted R2 0.201 0.194 0.266 0.149
Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.9 – Freedom of the press and opportunistic insider trading
This table reports regressions examining the relationship between media freedom and opportunistic
insider trading. The dependent variable Price Pattern is the ratio of the market-adjusted gross
return over 20 days after insider transactions and the market-adjusted gross return over 20 days
before insider transactions. Media restriction is the sales-weighted difference in media freedom.
Sales to free media is the percentage of sales to free media countries of individually disclosed
foreign sales firms, Sales to partly-free media is the percentage of sales to partly free media
countries of individually disclosed foreign sales firms, Sales to non-free media is the percentage
of sales to non-free media countries of individually disclosed foreign sales firms. Shares traded is
the number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding. Other characteristics
are as in the Appendix. Industry dummies are based on 2-digit SIC codes. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses below parameter estimates. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
firm level. *, **, *** indicate the significance level at 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent,
respectively.
Purchases Sales
Price Price Price Price
pattern pattern pattern pattern
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Media restriction 0.248** -0.049*
(0.102) (0.029)
Sales to non-free media 0.115** -0.033*
(0.058) (0.017)
Sales to partly-free media 0.051 0.038
(0.088) (0.030)
Sales to free media -0.029 -0.002
(0.045) (0.012)
Size -0.012*** -0.012*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
MTB -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA -0.219*** -0.219*** -0.004 -0.004
(0.063) (0.063) (0.024) (0.024)
Leverage 0.042 0.041 -0.005 -0.005
(0.034) (0.034) (0.012) (0.012)
CPI -0.004 -0.005 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP growth -0.005** -0.005* 0.002 0.002*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln(GDP) -0.006 -0.009 -0.003 -0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003)
CG index 0.086** 0.085** 0.003 0.001
(0.037) (0.038) (0.012) (0.012)
Tax haven 0.010 0.011 0.002 0.001
(0.017) (0.017) (0.005) (0.005)
Shares traded 0.076 0.087 0.016 0.014
(0.165) (0.166) (0.090) (0.090)
Constant 1.215*** 1.252*** 0.950*** 0.936***
(0.086) (0.085) (0.027) (0.029)
Observations 2261 2261 4419 4419
Adjusted R2 0.069 0.067 0.058 0.059
Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.10 – Robustness tests
This table shows robustness tests for the regression of earnings management on media
freedom. Panel A shows regressions examining the relationship between media freedom and
earnings management: Column (1) shows the one-step regression to identify accrual-based earn-
ings management as inChen et al. (2018), Column (2) and (3) show alternative measures based
on Kothari et al. (2005) andMcNichols (2002), Colum (4) shows alternative construction of media
freedom. Panel B reports regressions examining the relationship between media freedom and
earnings management, controlling for subsidiaries characteristics. Panel C reports regressions
examining the relationship between media freedom and earnings management, controlling for
corporate governance. All variables are as in Appendix A. Industry dummies are based on 2-digit
SIC codes. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below parameter estimates. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate the significance level at 1 per
cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent, respectively.
a – Panel A: One-step regression on earnings management, alternative accrual-based earnings
management measure and alternative media restriction construction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Accruals ABS Kothari ABS McNichols Earnings
management








Size -0.003** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
MTB -0.001 0.001 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA 0.749*** -0.034*** -0.205*** -0.171***
(0.094) (0.011) (0.029) (0.014)
Leverage 0.028 0.006 -0.005 -0.010
(0.027) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006)
REM 0.039** -0.022*** -0.010 -0.010*
(0.018) (0.007) (0.012) (0.006)
GDP growth -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln(GDP) 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
CPI 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CG index -0.001 0.004 0.005 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Tax haven 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
1/AT(t-1) 1.157
(0.713)




Constant -0.028 0.067*** 0.054*** 0.058***
(0.032) (0.012) (0.017) (0.019)
Observations 6710 6710 6710 6710
Adjusted R2 0.280 0.106 0.236 0.208
Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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b – Panel B: Freedom of the press and earnings management: Controlling for characteristics of
subsidiaries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings
management management management management
Media restriction 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Size -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
MTB 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA -0.161*** -0.160*** -0.161*** -0.160***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Leverage -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
REM -0.009* -0.009* -0.009* -0.009*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
GDP growth -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln(GDP) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CPI 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CG index 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Tax haven 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Foreign subsidiary -0.001
(0.002)
Same names -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Interlock directors -0.015*** -0.015***
(0.005) (0.005)
Constant 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.061***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 6710 6710 6710 6710
Adjusted R2 0.205 0.205 0.205 0.205
Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Media restriction 0.061*** 0.046** 0.046**
(0.018) (0.020) (0.020)
Size -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
MTB 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA -0.161*** -0.159*** -0.159***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
Leverage -0.008 -0.004 -0.003
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
REM -0.007 -0.007 -0.005
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
GDP growth -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln(GDP) 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
CPI 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CG index 0.000 -0.002 -0.003
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Tax haven 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Analysts following 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Board Indepedence -0.010 -0.009
(0.012) (0.012)
Board size -0.007 -0.005
(0.005) (0.005)
CEO Duality -0.003* -0.003*
(0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.073***
(0.014) (0.018) (0.019)
Observations 6710 5209 5209
Adjusted R2 0.206 0.196 0.197
Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes
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3.10 Appendices of Chapter 3
Appendix 3.A. Variable definitions
Variable Definition Source
Earnings management variable
Earnings management The absolute value of the residual of the abnormal a COMPUSTAT
ccruals estimation based on the modified Jones (1991)
model of Dechow et al. (1995)
Opportunistic insider trading
Price pattern The proportion of market-adjusted gross return Thomson Reuters
over the 20 days after the insider transaction and market- Insiders
adjusted return over 20 days before the insider transaction
Media freedom variable
Media restriction The sales-weighted average of the difference COMPUSTAT
in media freedom between the foreign countries and the US Freedom House
RestrictionECONOMIC The sales-weighted average of the difference COMPUSTAT
in media freedom in term of economic aspect Freedom House
RestrictionLEGAL The sales-weighted average of the difference COMPUSTAT,
in media freedom in term of legal aspect Freedom House
RestrictionPOLITICAL The sales-weighted average of the difference COMPUSTAT
in media freedom in term of political aspect based on total sales Freedom House




WSCORE Foreign sales weighted media restriction COMPUSTAT
Freedom House
Sales to non-free media The percentage of sales in free media countries COMPUSTAT
Freedom House
Sales to partly-free media The percentage of sales in partly-free media countries COMPUSTAT
Freedom House
Sales to free media The percentage of sales in non-free media countries COMPUSTAT
Freedom House
Firm control variables
Size Natural logarithm of total assets COMPUSTAT
Continued on next page
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Appendix 3.10– continued from previous page
Variable Definition Source
MTB Market-to-Book COMPUSTAT
Leverage Long-term debt over total assets COMPUSTAT
ROA Return on total assets is calculated as COMPUSTAT
income before extraordinary items divided by total assets
REMPROD Abnormal production costs computed COMPUSTAT
following Roychowdhury (2006)
REMDISX Abnormal discretionary expenses computed COMPUSTAT
following Roychowdhury (2006)
REMCFO Abnormal cash flow from operations computed COMPUSTAT
following Roychowdhury (2006)
REM Real earnings managements: COMPUSTAT
REM = -REMCFO - REMDISX
Country control variables
GDP growth The sales-weighted average of the change in World Bank
GDPs of the countries in which the firms
have individually disclosed sales
Ln (GDP) The sales-weighted average of the natural logarithm World Bank
of GDP per capita of the countries of foreign product
markets
CPI The sales-weighted average of the consumer price index World Bank
for the countries in which the firms have individually
disclosed sales
CG Index Country Governance Index: The sales-weighted average World Bank
of country governance index which is calculated based
on a sale weighted of the first principal component
of the rule of law indices (RL), control of corruption
indices (CC), regulatory quality (RQ) indices,
political stability indices and government
effectiveness (GE) indices.
Tax haven Dummy variable that equals one if a firm OECD
has at least one disclosed country from tax haven country
Other variables
Continued on next page
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Appendix 3.10– continued from previous page
Variable Definition Source
Audit industry The dummy variable takes COMPUSTAT
specialisation the value of one if the firm is audited by an auditor
with the largest market share in the firm’s two-digit
SIC industry during the year
Accounting flexibility The net operating assets at the beginning of the year COMPUSTAT
Total accruals Total Accruals based on Chen et al. (2018) COMPUSTAT
Foreign subsidiary Indicator variable takes the value of one if Dyreng et al. (2012a),
the company has at least one subsidiary in foreign SEC EDGARD
trading partner countries, and zero otherwise Exhibit 21
Interlock directors Indicator variable takes the value of one if BoardEx
at least one subsidiary board member sits
on the board of parent and subsidiary board
and zero otherwise
Same names Indicator variable takes the value of one if SEC EDGARD
the subsidiary is named after parent names, Exhibit 21
and zero otherwise
Difference in language The sales-weighted average of the difference in United Nation;
English speaking population which is calculated based on Ethnologue
sales-weighted of the difference between the fraction
of English speakers in total population in one country
and in the U.S.
English speaking The sales-weighted average of English national language Ethnologue
countries which is calculated base on sales-weighted of a dummy
variable that takes the value of one if English is the
statutory national language
Geographic distance The sales-weighted average of geographic distance CEPII
is calculated as the sales-weighted of geographic
distance based on using the great circle formula
between capitals
Analysts following Number of analysts following IBES
Institutional Ownership The percentage of the institutional ownership Thomson Reuter
Board Independence Percentage of independent directors BoardEx
Continued on next page
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Appendix 3.10– continued from previous page
Variable Definition Source
Board Size Natural logarithm of the number of directors on board BoardEx
CEO Duality CEO duality BoardEx
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Appendix 3.B. U.S. export of goods
This table shows exports of goods from the U.S. to all countries with indexed freedom levels,
total GDP of the U.S. and shares of exports of each group to total GDP of the U.S from 1998
to 2016. Export data is collected from the U.S. Census Bureau, and GDP data is from the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Export of goods (in millions) Shares of GDP
Year Sales to Sales to Sales to All Sales to Sales to Sales to
free partly-free non-free free partly-free non-free
media media media media media media
1998 464,071.50 135,720.70 66,310.90 0.073 0.051 0.015 0.007
1999 483,611.90 137,338.10 59,450.70 0.070 0.05 0.014 0.006
2000 534,651.70 167,565.70 62,418.10 0.074 0.052 0.016 0.006
2001 490,806.90 155,801.30 65,769.20 0.067 0.046 0.015 0.006
2002 452,160.90 146,846.20 78,724.30 0.062 0.041 0.013 0.007
2003 454,812.80 164,397.20 89,381.50 0.062 0.04 0.014 0.008
2004 520,130.00 189,273.50 102,171.80 0.066 0.042 0.015 0.008
2005 567,074.70 209,364.40 120,476.70 0.068 0.043 0.016 0.009
2006 646,148.00 232,634.30 142,291.50 0.074 0.047 0.017 0.01
2007 716,740.20 263,746.90 161,190.70 0.079 0.050 0.018 0.011
2008 727,340.70 363,742.40 186,134.10 0.087 0.049 0.025 0.013
2009 586,049.60 298,641.10 164,574.70 0.073 0.041 0.021 0.011
2010 647,776.10 235,945.80 386,602.60 0.085 0.043 0.016 0.026
2011 716,117.50 321,332.70 435,669.30 0.095 0.046 0.021 0.028
2012 718,198.40 317,253.00 499,490.90 0.095 0.044 0.02 0.031
2013 728,687.80 302,556.70 536,669.90 0.094 0.044 0.018 0.032
2014 755,069.80 304,987.00 552,501.60 0.093 0.043 0.018 0.032
2015 707,927.60 266,527.70 520,021.10 0.082 0.039 0.015 0.029
2016 682,981.40 256,474.20 502,972.30 0.077 0.037 0.014 0.027
1998-2016 0.078 0.045 0.017 0.016
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Appendix 3.C. U.S. export of goods to each country
This table shows exports of goods from the U.S. to each country with indexed freedom levels from 1998 to 2016.
Country Mean Status Country Mean Status Country Mean Status Country Mean Status
Australia 0.064 F Switzerland 0.057 F Malawi 0.000 PF Bahrain 0.005 NF
Austria 0.026 F Taiwan 0.158 F Mauritania 0.085 PF Bangladesh 0.097 NF
Bahamas 0.006 F Trinidad and Tobago 0.039 F Mozambique 0.000 PF Brunei 0.012 NF
Barbados 0.000 F United Kingdom 0.100 F Namibia 0.014 PF Cameroon 0.026 NF
Belgium 0.065 F Brazil 0.077 F, PF Nigeria 0.070 PF China 0.154 NF
Canada 0.075 F Chile 0.078 F, PF Paraguay 0.012 PF C d’Ivoire 0.004 NF
Costa Rica 0.060 F Hong Kong 0.140 F, PF Romania 0.004 PF Equatorial Guinea 0.050 NF
Cyprus 0.002 F Hungary 0.037 F, PF Senegal 0.061 PF Gabon 0.004 NF
Czech Republic 0.044 F Israel 0.031 F, PF Tanzania 0.046 PF Iraq 0.237 NF
Denmark 0.026 F Italy 0.049 F, PF Algeria 0.135 PF, NF Jordan 0.006 NF
Finland 0.093 F Panama 0.012 F, PF Argentina 0.048 PF, NF Kazakhstan 0.007 NF
France 0.076 F Philippines 0.053 F, PF Colombia 0.032 PF, NF Libya 0.030 NF
Germany 0.101 F Poland 0.026 F, PF Congo(Kinshasa) 0.000 PF, NF Malaysia 0.077 NF
Iceland 0.126 F South Africa 0.043 F, PF Ecuador 0.021 PF, NF Morocco 0.016 NF
Ireland 0.066 F South Korea 0.106 F, PF Egypt 0.121 PF, NF Myanmar 0.001 NF
Jamaica 0.059 F Ghana 0.091 F, PF, NF El Salvador 0.040 PF, NF Oman 0.043 NF
Japan 0.109 F Peru 0.097 F, PF, NF Honduras 0.008 PF, NF Qatar 0.066 NF
Luxembourg 0.003 F Thailand 0.088 F, PF, NF Macedonia 0.000 PF, NF Saudi Arabia 0.065 NF
Malta 0.104 F Benin 0.007 PF Mexico 0.064 PF, NF Singapore 0.087 NF
Netherlands 0.075 F Bolivia 0.169 PF Pakistan 0.023 PF, NF Sri Lanka 0.003 NF
New Zealand 0.027 F Bulgaria 0.013 PF Russia 0.042 PF, NF Togo 0.002 NF
Norway 0.071 F Congo(Brazzaville) 0.006 PF Tunisia 0.036 PF, NF United Arab Emirates 0.032 NF
Papua New Guinea 0.065 F Croatia 0.005 PF Turkey 0.017 PF, NF Uzbekistan 0.045 NF
Portugal 0.023 F Guatemala 0.021 PF Ukraine 0.024 PF, NF Vietnam 0.022 NF
Slovakia 0.032 F Guyana 0.080 PF Venezuela 0.151 PF, NF Yemen 0.041 NF
Spain 0.064 F India 0.028 PF Zambia 0.041 PF, NF Zimbabwe 0.000 NF
Suriname 0.012 F Indonesia 0.065 PF Angola 0.074 NF
Sweden 0.070 F Kuwait 0.027 PF Azerbaijan 0.105 NF
Total 0.087
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Appendix 3.D. Summary statistics and correlation matrix of country gov-
ernance components
This table shows the summary statistics and correlation matrix of county governance com-
ponents in which the firms have individually disclosed sales, which are used to calculate the country
corporate governance index based on the first principal component analysis. RL is the weighted
average based on foreign sales of the rule of law indices, CC is the weighted average based on
foreign sales of corruption indices, RQ is the weighted average based on foreign sales of regulatory
quality indices, PS is the weighted average based on foreign sales of political stability indices, GE
is the weighted average based on foreign sales of government effectiveness indices, and VA is the
weighted average based on foreign sales of voice and accountability indices in which the firms have
individually disclosed sales.
Panel A: Summary Statistics
N Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std. dev.
CC 6710 0.935 0.846 0.220 1.830 0.799
GE 6710 0.928 0.810 0.289 1.737 0.694
PS 6710 0.465 0.377 0.094 0.976 0.505
RQ 6710 0.825 0.702 0.254 1.559 0.652
RL 6710 0.857 0.805 0.219 1.690 0.723
VA 6710 0.660 0.652 0.179 1.333 0.677
Observations 6710
Panel B: Correlation matrix
CC GE PS RQ RL VA
CC 1.000
GE 0.981*** 1.000
PS 0.874*** 0.861*** 1.000
RQ 0.970*** 0.967*** 0.813*** 1.000
RL 0.986*** 0.974*** 0.890*** 0.966*** 1.000
VA 0.926*** 0.896*** 0.838*** 0.916*** 0.933*** 1.000
Observations 6710
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Appendix 3.E. Logit model estimate of the propensity-score-matching
procedure
TThis table reports regressions examining the likelihood that a firm has low media freedom.
The dependent variable Low Free Media is a dummy variable that equals one if firms are in the
top quartile of weighted distance media freedom. AZ is Altman’s Z-score; Sales growth is the
annual growth rate of sales; Cumulative returns is cumulative monthly stock returns over the year.
Volatility cumulative returns is the standard deviation of stock returns over three years. Cash flow
is cash flows from operation scaled by total assets. Volatility cash flow is the standard deviation
of cash flow over the past three years. Loss dummy is a dummy variable that takes the value of
1 if firms have a negative operating income. Other characteristics are as in Table 2, or Appendix
A. Industry dummies are based on 2-digit SIC codes. p-value are reported in parentheses below
parameter estimates. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) levels.































Appendix 3.F. Accrual-based earnings management measure
To construct an empirical accrual-based earnings management, I employ the modified Jones
(1991)model of Dechow et al. (1995). First, I estimate the following model to find the normal
level of accruals for each two-digit SIC industry-year group. The normal level of accruals for each
industry-year pair:
TAit/Ait−1 = λ0 + λ1(1/Ait−1) + λ2(∆REVit − ∆ARit−1)/Ait−1 + λ3(PPEit/Ait−1) + εit (3.3)
where: TAit−1 is the total accruals of firm i in a given year t, defined as the difference between
net income and cash flow from operations; Ait−1 is the total asset of firm i at year t-1; (∆REVit
is the change in revenue in year t; and PPEit is the gross property, plant, and equipment of firm
i in year t. Then, I take the estimated coefficients from equation 3.3 to calculate normal accruals
for each firm:
NAit/Ait−1 = λ1(1/Ait−1) + λ2(∆REVit − ∆ARit−1)/Ait−1 + λ3(PPEit/Ait−1) (3.4)
where: NAit−1 is the normal accruals of a given firm in year t, ∆ARit is the change in receivables
in year t; other variables have the same definition as above. Lastly, the absolute value of the
difference between total accruals and the predicted firm-level normal accruals is used as a measure
for accrual-based management or discretionary accruals (Earnings management).
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Chapter 4
Political Uncertainty and Private Debt
Contracting: Evidence from the U.S.
Gubernatorial Elections
Abstract
We investigate the effect of political uncertainty on private loan contracts by ex-
ploiting the U.S. gubernatorial elections as a source of variation in uncertainty. We
show that lenders are more likely to impose financial covenants and state-contingent
pricing grids on borrowers headquartered in the states in election years, compared
with off-election years. The effects are stronger when the winning voting margins
are small, supporting the notion of political uncertainty manifesting itself in loan
contracting outcomes. Additionally, consistent with the intuition that uncertainty
exacerbates adverse selection problems, the effect of elections is more pronounced
among the borrowers with greater information asymmetry. Overall our evidence
suggests that gubernatorial elections increase transitory uncertainty, yielding signif-
icant impacts on debt contracts and the cost of private debt capital.
Keywords: political uncertainty, gubernatorial elections, private debt contract-
ing, debt covenants.
JEL classification: G32, G38, H70, R50.
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4.1 Introduction
How do political frictions play out in capital markets and corporate decisions? The
question has received increasing academic interests and media attention. The bur-
geoning literature assessing such an impact of political uncertainty documents the
evidence of its link with corporate investment activities (Julio and Yook, 2012; Gulen
and Ion, 2016; Jens, 2017), capital structure (Çolak et al., 2018), asset prices and
risk premia (Pástor and Veronesi, 2012, 2013), IPO activity (Çolak et al., 2017), and
the prices of corporate bonds (Waisman et al., 2015) and municipal bonds (Gao and
Qi, 2019). While this strand of the literature suggests that both firms and investors
adjust their strategies to mitigate risks associated with changes in political lead-
ership and economic policies, little is known about how private lenders assess and
deal with risks of this kind. Given the unique features of private debt contracting,
as well as the growing significance of private loans as a source of capital for many
firms, we believe it is important to fill this void in the literature.
By exploiting gubernatorial elections as an exogenous source of variation in po-
litical uncertainty, we investigate how this type of uncertainty affects private debt
contracts – consisting largely of syndicated bank loans in our sample. Our study
highlights, among others, the role of debt contracting mechanisms in alleviating the
uncertainty, particularly the one that is transitory. The main economic insights de-
rive in the literature examining how debt contracts are designed to reduce changes
in the future circumstances and asymmetric information problems (Garleanu and
Zwiebel, 2009; Roberts, 2015; Hollander and Verriest, 2016; Demerjian, 2017). Do
lenders require more maintenance covenants in gubernatorial election years to en-
sure that timely monitoring and transfer of control rights, when necessary, can be
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implemented? Do lenders raise loan interest rates outright or are they, given the
transitory nature of election-related uncertainty, more likely to require that pricing
be contingent upon the evolution of a borrower’s economic fundamental? What role
does a borrower’s lending relationship play? We aim to extend the literature by
addressing these questions.
For the purpose of our study, using gubernatorial elections as a quasi-natural
experiment offers inter alia two main advantages. First, as election dates are set
by the state laws and thus predetermined, gubernatorial elections are exogenous to
firm-specific events or decisions. Like in prior studies (see, e.g., Çolak et al., 2017;
Boone et al., 2018), our identification strategy thus mitigates potential endogeneity
concern – often associated with index-based measures of uncertainty – that corporate
outcomes might drive increases in uncertainty, changes in economic policies, or any
political dynamics. Second, the staggered nature of the gubernatorial election cycle
– i.e., election years varying across different states – allows us to exploit cross-
sectional variation in political uncertainty while differencing out other confounders
such as macroeconomic effects. Therefore, gubernatorial election, compared with
presidential election, offers a more desirable empirical setting with which reliable
statistical inferences can be drawn (Çolak et al., 2017; Dai and Ngo, 2018). During
our sample period of 1992–2014, there are 293 gubernatorial elections, whereas there
are only six presidential elections. It is also important to note that a governor of
each of 50 states possesses a substantial executive power overseeing a wide array of
issues, such as state budgets, legislative proposals, and the implementation of state
laws.
Using a large sample of U.S. syndicated loans, we document that gubernatorial
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elections have significant impacts on lenders’ monitoring demand and their demand
for state-contingent loan pricing, there yielding important implications for the firms’
costs of capital associated with private loans. Our results show that in a gubernato-
rial election year, lenders are more likely to require maintenance covenants in loans
extended to firms headquartered in that state. The number of covenants increases
by 0.06 (or 3% with respect to the sample median) in election years, compared
with off-election years. To gauge the lenders’ monitoring demand in conjunction
with political uncertainty, we focus our analysis on financial covenants. It is well-
documented in the literature that financial covenants function as a tripwire, serving
as an ex-ante commitment to the renegotiation of a contract or the transfer of control
rights from equity to debt (Demerjian, 2017; Hollander and Verriest, 2016; Prilmeier,
2017). Our results, therefore, suggest that in response to potential changes in politi-
cal landscape, lenders increase their monitoring intensity as an attempt to ameliorate
the uncertainty about borrowers’ future economic circumstances.
Moreover, we document a nuanced yet positive effect of the gubernatorial elec-
tion on loan pricing. Given the positive effects on stock and bond risk premia of
political uncertainty documented by previous studies (Pástor and Veronesi, 2012,
2013; Waisman et al., 2015; Gao and Qi, 2019), one would naturally expect private
lenders to command higher interest rates in gubernatorial election years. However,
applying higher rates altogether can be inefficient, because much of the uncertainty
tied to election outcomes resolves once a new governor takes office. Had lenders im-
plemented such an outright increase across the board, they would undergo a surge
of renegotiations in the years following elections. Along these lines, prior litera-
ture predicts that facing uncertainty, the contracting parties instead set a pricing
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schedule – referred to as performance pricing – conditioned on the measures of cred-
itworthiness of borrowers (see, e.g., Asquith et al., 2005). Armstrong et al. (2010)
and Demerjian (2017) show that performance pricing provisions help mitigate costly
renegotiations.1 Consistent with these insights, our evidence shows that guberna-
torial election, although exerting little impact on loan spreads per se, does have
a large positive effect on the likelihood that a loan contract includes performance
pricing provisions. Since the realized changes in loan spreads are not observable,
the direct effect on the borrowers’ cost of capital is not quantifiable. However, a
5% increase in the likelihood of performance pricing provisions being included in
a contract seems a sizeable impact, enough to discourage firms’ capital raising. It
is important to note that our estimate is likely a lower bound, because we do not
observe loan contracts that would have required performance-pricing provisions but
had not reached an agreement. Our findings therefore indicate that gubernatorial
elections have a significant pricing implication for private loan contracts.
To provide evidence corroborating our findings, we extend our analysis in
several ways. By splitting covenants and pricing grids into two broad categories,
namely, performance- and capital-based ones (Christensen and Nikolaev, 2012), we
shed further light on the motivation underlying increases in covenants and perfor-
mance pricing provisions during gubernatorial election years. Specifically, capital
covenants (C-covenants henceforth) are concerned primarily with ensuring enough
skin-in-the-game that aligns the interests of debt and equity, whereas performance
covenants (P-covenants) mainly play a tripwire role facilitating the timely transfer of
control rights to debtholders. Similarly, capital-based pricing grids (C-grids hence-
1In this sense, gubernatorial election is a desirable empirical setting to examine how private
lenders, and specialized monitors like banks in particular, deal with transitory uncertainty.
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forth) and performance-based pricing grids (P-grids), respectively, can be viewed as
a description of compensation required by lenders commensurate with a borrower’s
capital adequacy and future profitability, respectively. We show that all types of
covenants and pricing grids become more prevalent during gubernatorial election
years. Although an increase in C-grids is insignificant, the weak effect seems substi-
tuted for by a significant increase in credit-rating grids (Rating-grids). These results
taken together indicate that lenders, in response to increased political uncertainty,
place emphasis on both ex-ante and ex-post monitoring roles of covenants. That is,
lenders’ actions derive in, it seems, not just the risk-shifting concern but also the
lack of relevant information in setting initial contracts during election years.
To sharpen our analysis, we zoom into potential economic mechanisms under-
lying the link between debt contracting outcomes and gubernatorial elections we
find. As the first step, we check our baseline premise, that is, whether the uncer-
tainty about political decision-making is a channel through which elections affect
lenders’ monitoring demand and contingent pricing. We posit that less predictable
elections exacerbate the uncertainty, thus increasing further the likelihood that a
loan contract includes maintenance covenants and performance pricing provisions.
Using the winning voting margin to gauge the predictability of an election, we find
evidence consistent with our hypothesis.
Additionally, we investigate whether asymmetric information problems are an
intervening variable that plays a role in the effect of political uncertainty on debt
contracting outcomes. Since the quality of information and the ease of information
acquisition can aid lenders’ assessment of a borrower’s economic state, these features
are likely to alleviate lenders’ concerns about the difficulty in evaluating a borrower
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under the increased uncertainty. Consistent with this intuition, we show that the
effect of gubernatorial election is weakened among the borrowing firms that have a
lending relationship in the past five years (Prilmeier, 2017).
We perform additional checks to ensure that our findings are robust to alterna-
tive settings. We show that our conclusions remain when we control for concurrent
events such as presidential elections or the quality of borrowing firms’ financial
reporting. Additionally, we repeat our main analyses using the economic policy
uncertainty index developed by Baker et al. (2016) (BBD index henceforth) in lieu
of our gubernatorial election variable. The results show that the BBD index ap-
pears to have overall positive effects on covenant intensity and performance-pricing
provisions.
Our study contributes to the literature by extending two broad strands of
research. First, a large volume of research concerned with private debt contract
designs has shown that loan covenants mitigate the risks associated with informa-
tion asymmetry and uncertainty. Recent studies in this line of literature find a
strong information-driven motive in the lenders’ use of covenants (see, e.g., Hollan-
der and Verriest, 2016; Prilmeier, 2017). Our paper is the first to study how private
lenders assess gubernatorial elections and employ different contractual arrangements
in dealing with transitory uncertainty related to elections. In a study closely related
to ours, Demerjian (2017) documents a positive link between uncertainty and debt
covenants. However, our paper differs from his in that we exploit exogenous vari-
ation in uncertainty, rather than the borrower-level or industry-level measures of
uncertainty.
Second, the literature investigating the impact of political uncertainty on cap-
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ital markets and corporate outcomes has documented that during the high uncer-
tainty periods, corporate in-vestment activities shrink (Gulen and Ion, 2016; Jens,
2017), the number of IPOs declines (Çolak et al., 2017), and the risk premia increase
(Pástor and Veronesi, 2012, 2013; Waisman et al., 2015). Our evidence complements
this literature by documenting a strong impact of political uncertainty on private
loans, an increasingly important source of capital for many firms. Given that loan
spreads per se are largely unaffected, a casual intuition might suggest that guber-
natorial elections have little to do with the costs of private debt capital. However,
by focusing our analysis on covenants and state-contingent pricing in particular, we
uncover implicit yet important effects on loan pricing that can go unnoticed.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 develops hypothe-
ses. Section 4.3 describes our sample and the data. Section 4.4 reports and discusses
our main empirical results, while Section 4.5 presents additional robustness checks.
Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Related literature and the main predictions
4.2.1 Private debt contracting
It is a widely-held view in the literature that covenants in debt contracts play
a role in protecting debtholders against equity’s ex-post opportunistic activities,
which would otherwise unduly transfer wealth from debtholders to shareholders. The
traditional view put forth by, among others, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Smith
and Warner (1979), suggests that debt covenants reduce claim conflicts between
debt and equity by enabling shareholders and debtholders to monitor managerial
behaviour.
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More recently, the literature on debt contracting emphasizes two main roles
of financial covenants. First, covenants provide lenders with protection against the
unforeseen states of the economy in the presence of agency and information problems
(Berlin and Mester, 1992; Dessein, 2005). Garleanu and Zwiebel (2009) demonstrate
that financial contracts in equilibrium can be characterized as a trade-off between the
costs and benefits associated with early information acquisition as to the economic
states of a borrower. They argue that early information acquisition becomes costly
when such information is unnecessary in the first place, when lenders acquire wrong
information, or when the scope for ex-post renegotiation is small. Garleanu and
Zwiebel (2009) model thus predicts that lenders are more likely to impose stricter
conditions when the information environment is opaque or the uncertainty about
the future state is high.
Second, debt covenants give rise to a greater incentive for lenders to monitor
their borrowers. Rajan and Winton (1995), whose model highlights the choice be-
tween a short-term loan without covenants and a long-term loan with covenants,
show that covenants increase monitoring incentives. Moreover, by focusing on the
optimal debt structure, Park (2000) demonstrates that monitoring incentives can be
maximized when senior claims have the most restrictive covenants.
Prior empirical evidence generally supports the notion that debt covenants
facilitate the allocation of control rights between debt and equity. Since it is pro-
hibitively costly to write a complete contract, the state-contingent control allocation
mitigates uncertainty and information asymmetry faced by lenders. The tripwire
role played by debt covenants (Dichev and Skinner, 2002) therefore allows lenders
to take over the control of a borrowing firm if the firm undergoes financial dis-
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tress. Hollander and Verriest (2016) find a strong information-driven motive in the
link between remote lenders and debt covenants. Prilmeier (2017) documents that
borrower’s relationship with lenders are positively correlated with covenant tight-
ness because the relationship between borrowers and lenders reduces information
asymmetry concerns for lenders. Overall, previous evidence suggests that covenants
in debt contracts mitigate agency problem and alleviate exogenous uncertainty for
lenders.
4.2.2 Political uncertainty
The literature examining the impact of political frictions on corporate out-
comes is fast-growing. Changes in government policies or political leadership lead
to uncertainty about the economic environment in which firms operate. Such uncer-
tainty in economic policies, in turn, affects various corporate outcomes and decisions.
Real options theory suggests that firms concerned with uncertainty find it optimal to
delay their irreversible investment and wait until the uncertainty resolves (Bernanke,
1983; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Recent studies provide empirical support to this
prediction in conjunction with economic policy uncertainty. For example, Julio and
Yook (2012) show that in response to the increased political uncertainty due to
national elections, firms cut down their investment expenditures. Similarly, Gulen
and Ion (2016), using a news-based index of policy uncertainty (Baker et al., 2016),
document a negative relationship between firm-level capital investment and eco-
nomic policy uncertainty. Jens (2017) confirms this relationship using state-level
gubernatorial elections as a shock to uncertainty.
Moreover, prior literature suggests that when political uncertainty rises, the
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costs of corporate bonds (Waisman et al., 2015) and municipal bonds (Gao and Qi,
2019) increase. Çolak et al. (2017) document that IPO activities decrease during
the state gubernatorial election periods. Using an international sample, Çolak et al.
(2018) similarly show that political uncertainty raises financial intermediation costs,
leading to slow adjustment speeds toward firms’ optimal capital structure. In a
similar vein, Pástor and Veronesi (2012, 2013) show that when political uncertainty
increases, asset prices decline and risk premia increase. Collectively, prior evidence
suggests that both equity- and debt-capital-market investors command higher risk
premia to protect themselves against political uncertainty.
The question as to how private debt contract design – optimally – responds
to political uncertainty, however, has received little attention in the literature. Our
study highlights, among others, the role played by debt contracting mechanisms that
ameliorate uncertainty. Do lenders require more maintenance covenants in election
years, compared with off-election years, to ensure that timely monitoring can be
implemented? Do lenders raise loan interest rates outright or do they – given the
costs associated with ex-post renegotiation – make pricing contracted upon changes
in a borrower’s economic fundamental? Do the quality of information and the ease of
information acquisition matter? We aim to contribute to the literature by addressing
these questions.
4.2.3 Main predictions
Although not possessing fully independent sovereignty, each state of the U.S.
does exercise certain functions of government. A governor, as a commander-in-chief,
oversees and makes influences on a wide array of issues in her state, including state
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budgets, legislative proposals, and the implementation of state laws. Peltzman
(1987) argues that presidents and governors have similar executive powers in ap-
pointment and budget making. Besley and Case (1995) show that the gubernatorial
election outcome affects economic policy choices because a newly elected governor
can make changes to taxes, state and federal contracts, and wages. A gubernatorial
election thus can bring about substantial uncertainty to the economic environment
of a state in which firms are based and operate.
While the outcome of an election – and its economic consequences – is uncer-
tain, the election cycle is known to everyone; that is, the increased uncertainty is
anticipated by lenders or any market participants. It is thus highly conceivable that
lenders ex-ante take this uncertainty into account. Theory suggests that lenders
can mitigate the uncertainty about a borrowing firm by setting an ex-ante rule
that enables the transfer of control rights from equity to debt contingent on the
firm’s economic fundamentals (Aghion and Bolton, 1992). It is well-documented
that financial covenants function as, inter alia, a tripwire and thus a threshold for
the control allocation (Christensen and Nikolaev, 2012). We, therefore, hypothesize
that as the lenders’ monitoring demand grows in election years, financial covenants
are more likely included in loans extended to borrowers based in a state that is
about to have a gubernatorial election.
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood that a loan contract includes financial covenants
is higher in gubernatorial election years than off-election years.
Prior literature documents a positive effect on stock and bond risk premia of
political uncertainty. On this ground, one could easily speculate that lenders would
command higher interest rates for the syndicates loans closed in gubernatorial elec-
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tion years. Charging higher rates across the board, however, can cause substantial
inefficiency, because much of the uncertainty associated with a state’s gubernato-
rial election can resolve once a new governor takes the office. Given that the new
information – as to the governor’s policy stance and the state’s economic outlook
– becomes available shortly after the election concludes, a rational borrower would
return to its lenders to lower the loan interest rate if the information received is
favorable (Roberts, 2015; Roberts and Sufi, 2009). Were lenders and borrowers to
deal with ex-post renegotiations after each election, the costs would be non-trivial.
Presumably, the contracting parties would benefit from ex-ante agreeing on a pricing
schedule that is conditioned on the evolution of a borrowing firm’s creditworthiness.
As is well-documented in the literature, performance pricing is a common feature
in debt contracts that enables a commitment to modify loan interest rates on the
basis of changes in a borrowing firm’s financial performance, credit rating, or other
similar measures (see, e.g., Asquith et al., 2005). A performance-pricing provision in
a loan contract thus specifies a state-contingent pricing grid, a mapping between the
loan spread schedule and a measure of the borrower creditworthiness. As Armstrong
et al. (2010) argue, in the presence of contracting frictions that make incomplete
contracts unavoidable, performance pricing provisions help to reduce costly debt
renegotiations that would otherwise occur too often. In a similar vein, Demerjian
(2017) notes that ex-ante negotiations are less costly than ex-post renegotiations
triggered by a default event, such as covenant violations. We, therefore, predict
that while loan spreads are not materially affected, performance pricing provisions
become more prevalent in gubernatorial election years.
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood that a loan includes performance pricing terms
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is higher in guber-natorial election years than off-election years.
4.3 Data and the empirical model
4.3.1 Data
To construct our sample, we begin by retrieving all syndicated loan contracts
from the Thomson Reuters LPC’s Dealscan database between 1992 and 2014. Our
loan sample contains the information on all dollar-denominated loans extended to the
U.S. borrowers. Following Christensen and Nikolaev (2012), we focus our analysis on
the loan-package level by aggregating the facility information at the package level,
because in most cases, financial covenants apply to all loan facilities in a package.2
Excluding deals without information on covenants, we are left with an initial sample
of 15 thousand observations. We then merge our loan sample with Compustat and
CRSP files to obtain borrower characteristics.3 Excluding financial firms (SIC from
6000 to 6999), we obtain 8,413 observations for our baseline sample. We extract the
historical information on firms’ headquarters address from Bill McDonald’s website
because Compustat only provides current headquarter locations.4 The state-level
data, such as real GDP, GDP per capita, are collected from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) Regional Economic Accounts database. Unemployment rates are
extracted from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
2As document Berlin et al. (2019), a split-control-right arrangement has become popular in the
later part of our sample period (i.e., 2010–2014). Under this arrangement, a loan package consists
of revolving credits with maintenance covenants and term loans without covenants. The term-loan
tranche participants—usually dispersed—therefore avoid getting involved in costly renegotiation
process, although still benefiting from monitoring activities taken by revolving creditors. Our
baseline sample includes 2,828 loans with multiple facilities (34% of the sample) and our results
are robust to filtering these loans out in our tests.
3We use the Dealscan-Compustat link table from Chava and Roberts (2008). The version we
used contains the links updated through the end of 2017.
4The EDGAR 10-K header information compiled by Bill McDonald and Tim Loughran is avail-
able from https://sraf.nd.edu/data/augmented-10-x-header-data/. As the EDGAR database be-
gins from 1994, we back-ward-interpolate missing values for 1992 and 1993.
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We collect gubernatorial election data from Congressional Quarterly (CQ)
Electronic Library. The gubernatorial election is an indicator variable that equals
one if the loan is issued to a firm headquartered in a state in which a gubernato-
rial election was held in that year, and zero otherwise. During our sample period
from 1992 to 2014, there are 293 gubernatorial elections and only six presidential
elections.
Like Hollander and Verriest (2016), we use the number of financial covenants
(Covenant intensity) in a loan package to measure lenders’ monitoring demand.
Following prior literature (e.g., Nini et al., 2009), we classify various covenants into
financial covenants and nonfinancial ones. Financial covenants are further divided
into one of the following six types: ratios of debt to balance sheet items, coverage
ratios, ratios of debt to cash flow items, liquidity ratios, net worth requirements,
and EBITDA requirements (Nini et al., 2009). We then count the number of these
six types of financial covenants to construct Finance covenant intensity. Table 4.1
reports the frequency of each group, as well as individual covenants, in our sample.
The most commonly-used types of financial covenants are coverage, debt to cash
flow, and net worth categories, which, respectively, are included in 83.5%, 66.3%,
and 33.8% of loans in our sample. Overall the statistics in Table 4.1 are in line with
those reported in prior literature.5
[Insert Table 4.1 here]
We use performance-pricing provisions to gauge the lenders’ demand for state-
contingent loan pricing. We use a dummy indicator for such provisions in our tests
(Demerjian, 2017).
5Prilmeier (2017) for instance reports 79%, 60%, and 43%, respectively, for coverage, debt to
cash flow, and net worth categories.
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4.3.2 Empirical model
To investigate the impact of gubernatorial elections on loan contracting out-
comes, we estimate the following equation:
Yi,j,s,t = βGEs,t + γWi,j,s,t + δXj,s,t + φZs,t + as + bk + εi,j,s,t (4.1)
where: Yi,j,s,t is a measure of either financial covenant intensity or performance
pricing imposed on a loan i issued for a firm j headquartered in state s in year t
and GEs,t is a dummy indicator that takes one if a gubernatorial election is held
in the state s in year t. By including state fixed effects as, we estimate the effect
of elections after differencing out time-invariant heterogeneities in economic and
political conditions across states. Similarly, industry fixed effects bs ensure that our
results are not driven by industry-specific factors (e.g., investment opportunities).
We also include vectors of covariates Wi,j,s,t, Xj,s,t, and Zs,t to account for loan
characteristics, firm attributes, and time-varying economic conditions of states, re-
spectively.6 Following prior literature, we include in Wi,j,s,t deal size, loan maturity,
all-in-drawn loan spreads, the secured-loan dummy, the revolving-loan dummy, and
the lending-relationship dummy. The vector Xj,s,t includes, as a lagged form, firm
size, market to book, leverage ratio, asset tangibility, Altman’s (1969) Z-score, cash
to assets, earnings volatility,7 sales growth rate, research and development (R&D)
expenses to assets, the negative-earning dummy, return on assets (ROA), and the
6Our regression model, like that of Colak et al. (2017) and Boone et al. (2017), does not
include year fixed effects because aggregate economic conditions are controlled for. In baseline
results, however, we find that our results are robust to including year fixed effects.
7We measure earnings volatility based on Hasan et al., 2017, which is based on the standard
deviation of quarterly earnings in the last three years. Our results are also robust when we scale
earnings to total assets
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credit-rating dummy. We winsorize the variables at 1% in both tails. Appendix 4.A
provides the variable definitions in details.8
[Insert Table 4.2 here]
Table 4.2 reports the summary statistics for the variables used in our baseline
regressions. These statistics are in line with those reported in prior literature. The
sample mean of the number of financial covenants is 2.3, very similar to the means
reported by Demerjian (2017) and Prilmeier (2017). Approximately 69% of the loans
in our sample have at least one performance-pricing provision, comparable to 55%
reported by Ball et al. (2008). Statistics for other loan-level variables in our sample
are also similar to those reported by prior studies (see, e.g., Hasan et al., 2017).
[Insert Table 4.3 here]
Further, we also compare the means of covenants, performance pricing and a
set of control variables for election years and off-election years. Table 4.3 presents
the results of this analysis. The univariate tests show that, during gubernatorial
elections, financial covenants and performance pricing terms are higher than off-
election years. Notably, the analysis also shows that loan spreads are indifferent
between election and non-election years. Also, we find that during election years,
maturity of loans is lower than during off-election years. Therefore, this analysis im-
plies that banks will not apply higher rates altogether during election years, because
much of the uncertainty tied to election outcomes resolves after the elections.
8Correlation matrix table is reported in Appendix 4.B
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4.4 Empirical results
4.4.1 Baseline regression results
We begin by examining how gubernatorial elections affect financial covenants
and performance pricing provisions. We estimate OLS-type model – with state and
industry fixed effects – to examine the financial covenant intensity. The logit model
is estimated when we investigate the likelihood that a contract includes perfor-
mance pricing provisions. Following Bertrand et al. (2004), we use standard errors
accounted for within-state clustering.
Table 4.4 reports the baseline results. Across all models, the coefficient on the
gubernatorial election dummy is positive and statistically significant. Consistent
with our hypothesis, during gubernatorial election years, lenders are more likely to
require maintenance covenants and performance-pricing provisions in loan contracts.
The effect we document is also economically sizeable. For example, the number of
financial covenants increases by 0.058 (the coefficient on Gubernatorial election),
which is equivalent to an increase by 3% relative to the sample median (2.000). It
is worth noting that our estimate is likely a lower bound, because some firms, with
stricter covenant requirements imposed, might have decided not to enter into their
loan agreements. These unexecuted contracts are not observable to us. Overall,
our evidence suggests that, in response to the increased uncertainty associated with
potential changes in political leadership and subsequent economic policies, lenders
increase their monitoring intensity. Moreover, we document an important pricing
implication of gubernatorial elections that may go unnoticed. As discussed above,
given the transitory nature of election uncertainty, along with the prevalence of
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renegotiations in private loan contracting, lenders’ action of increasing loan interest
rates outright across the board is likely a costly proposition for both sides of con-
tracting parties. Consistent with this intuition, we find that loan spreads remain
largely unaffected in gubernatorial election years.9 The marginal effects reported in
panel B of Table 4.4, however, show that gubernatorial election is associated with
a 4.6% increase in the likelihood that a loan contract includes performance pricing
provisions. A pricing gird in a loan contract allows lenders to adjust loan interest
rates conditional on ex post economic states of borrowers but the realized changes
in these rates are not observable. Although this property renders the direct effect on
firms’ cost of capital unmeasurable, the economic magnitude of the implicit pricing
effect, inferred from our evidence on performance pricing, appears to be non-trivial,
enough to make firms to reconsider their capital raising decisions. Overall our find-
ings suggest that gubernatorial elections have important implications for syndicated
loan contracting and the cost of private debt capital. The associated uncertainty,
albeit arguably transitory, significantly impacts lenders’ stance on monitoring of
borrowers and state-contingent pricing.
Finally, the control variables show that large borrowers with S&P rating on
average have fewer financial covenants (Demerjian, 2017). In particular, the co-
efficient on firm size (Ln(assets)) is negative statistically, while the coefficient on
Unrated is positive and statistically significant with Financial covenant intensity.
Further, the coefficient on R&D is negative and statistically significant, consistent
with the finding of Skinner (1993) and Christensen and Nikolaev (2012), suggesting
that high-growth firms face fewer covenants. The coefficient on ROA is positive
and statistically significant, suggesting that firms with better performance have
9The results are reported in Appendix 4.C
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higher financial covenants (Christensen and Nikolaev, 2012). We also find that the
covenant intensity exhibits a positive association with loan maturity, suggesting that
covenants make debt maturity conditional on performance and thus are likely to be
more valuable in contracts with longer maturity (Christensen and Nikolaev, 2012).
Consistent with the finding of Ivashina (2009), we find a positive association be-
tween covenant intensity and loan spread, suggesting that lenders use both spreads
and financial covenants to compensate for higher credit risk (Hollander and Verriest,
2016). Moreover, we find a positive and statistically significant association between
relationship lending and financial covenants, consistent with the finding of Prilmeier
(2017) which suggests that borrowers are more likely to loose bargain power when
they have long-term relationship with banks. Considering macroeconomic factor,
we find that borrowers in states with high GDP per capita have lower financial
covenant intensity, suggesting that certain about economic factors10 make banks set
lower covenants in loan contracts (Demerjian, 2017).11
[Insert Table 4.4 here]
4.4.2 Capital-based and performance-based covenants and pricing grids
Our baseline results in the previous subsection implicitly assume that all fi-
nancial covenants and performance-pricing provisions have the same impact. In this
section, we perform two sets of analyses to investigate the implications of setting
different types of covenants and performance pricing provisions in a loan contract
10We do not find a positive relationship between unemployment rate and covenant intensity.
However, we use the US’s unemployment rate instead of states’ as in prior study (Boone et al.,
2018). Thus, the negative sign could be driven by other positive factors which could compensate
for the high unemployment rate.
11We find the opposite directions for many control variable and performance pricing. The possible
explanation for these results is that performance pricing is considered as a contingent complied
with loan spreads and therefore this mechanism is used to compensate for an increase in loan
spread (Asquith et al., 2005; Demerjian, 2017).
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during gubernatorial elections.
Capital-based and performance-based covenants
First, prior incomplete contract theory predicts that an optimal debt contract
can be characterized by the trade-off between ex-ante interest alignment and ex-post
control rights (Aghion and Bolton, 1992). Consistent with this prediction, Chris-
tensen and Nikolaev (2012) show that financial covenants mitigate the conflicts of
interest between lenders and borrowers either by reducing agency problem via capital
covenants or by facilitating the transfer of control rights to lenders via performance
covenants when the value of their claim is at risk. They argue that C-covenants
help align the interests of shareholders with debtholders because the covenants of
this type require shareholders to maintain enough skin in the game. C-covenants
thus encourage shareholders to monitor management and reduce incentives to ex-
propriate the value of deb. In contrast, P-covenants primarily serve as a tripwire
facilitating ex-post monitoring and a timely transfer of control rights to debtholders
when necessary. In other words, C-covenants and P-covenants are concerned with
different types of risks faced by lenders.
Accordingly, we expect that during the gubernatorial election period, lenders
are likely to rely on both types of covenants to protect themselves against uncertainty
via two complementary channels. First, banks could design more restrictive terms
based on capital-covenants to monitor borrowers ex-ante and reduce the conflict of
interests between debtholders and shareholders. In other words, lenders would set
more C-covenants in a loan contract. Second, banks could contingent control trans-
fers by reducing the contractibility of accounting based on performance-covenants.
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Therefore, we follow Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) to classify financial covenants
into two groups: C-covenants and P-covenants.12 We then count the number of
each type of covenants to construct our variables for C-covenants and P-covenants.
Summary statistics of different types of covenants are also reported in Table 4.2.
On average, there are 1.581 P-covenants and 0.728 C-covenants in our sample.
Table 4.5 reports our results. The estimations on Gubernatorial election are
positive and significant in columns 1 and 2. More specifically, the results also suggest
that firms headquartered in the states holding gubernatorial elections have signifi-
cantly larger numbers of P-covenants and C-covenants, compared with no election
states, implying that lenders care about both ex-ante and ex-post monitoring roles
of covenants during the high political uncertainty periods. The result for CovMix,
defined as P-covenant divided by the sum of P-covenant and C-covenant, confirms
that the effect of election uncertainty is similar across the two types (Column 3).
[Insert Table 4.5 here]
Different types of pricing grids in performance pricing provisions
In this subsection, we investigate the use of performance-pricing terms in lend-
ing agreements to shed further light on how lenders set a state-contingent pricing
schedule, conditioned on the evolution of a borrower’s creditworthiness.
As Asquith et al. (2005) demonstrate, lenders are more likely to set pricing
grids linked to accounting metrics or credit ratings in an attempt to reduce adverse
selection when information asymmetry is high. Further, Ball et al. (2008) find that
12Specifically, the following covenants are classified as C-covenants: quick ratio, current ratio,
debt to equity, loan to value, debt to tangible net worth, leverage ratio, senior leverage ratio,
and the net worth requirement. Included in P-covenants are: cash interest coverage ratio, debt
service coverage ratio, level of EBITDA, fixed charge coverage ratio, interest coverage ratio, debt
to EBITDA, and senior debt to EBIT.
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accounting metrics are more commonly employed by lenders to design performance
pricing provisions than are credit ratings. They argue that credit rating-based pric-
ing grids would be used only when accounting information is a weak predictor of
credit risk. In their analysis of different types of pricing grids contracted upon ac-
counting information, Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) similarly argue that capital-
based pricing grids (C-grids) have an interest-alignment effect similar to that of
C-covenants. Therefore, C-grids included in a contract are indicative of lenders’
concerns about ex-ante monitoring. On the other hand, if gubernatorial elections
create uncertainty about the future economic state of a borrowing firm, lenders are
more likely to rely on profitability-based grids (P-grids). We, therefore, examine the
use of different types of pricing grids.
We estimate the logit model to predict the likelihood that a contract stipulates
a set of pre-negotiated state-contingent pricing schedules.
[Insert Table 4.6 here]
Table 4.6 reports our results. We find that the coefficient on the Guberna-
torial election is positive and significant for P-grid and Rating-grid. However, we
do not find a significant effect for C-grid. These results suggest that lenders are
more likely to set pricing-grids based on performance or profitability indicators and
credit ratings during the gubernatorial election period to compensate for the ag-
gravation of credit risk. These findings are generally in line with Ball et al. (2008)
and Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) in that the substitution effect between per-
formance indicators and credit ratings in performance pricing provisions, but not
between capital-based indicators and credit ratings. Overall, lenders take into ac-
count both ex-ante and ex-post monitoring in response to greater uncertainty during
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gubernatorial election years.
4.4.3 Inspecting economic mechanisms
Our main findings suggest that gubernatorial elections increase transitory un-
certainty there affecting lenders’ monitoring intensity and state-contingent pricing.
In this subsection, we check our baseline premise, i.e., whether political uncertainty
is the key economic mechanism underlying the relationship we find. We then fur-
ther examine differences in the lenders’ responses across firm attributes that are
presumed to be an intervening variable for the impact of uncertainty.
The extent to which elections are contested
We first analyse how the degree of election uncertainty affects our main results.
The first analysis is based on the election margin. Prior literature of Julio and Yook
(2012) and Boutchkova et al. (2012) also use the winning margin as a measure
for election-related political uncertainty. Additionally, Çolak et al. (2017) state
that although the winning margin is an ex-post measure of election closeness, this
measure reflects the ex-ante uncertainty level of the election outcome. Based on this
argument, we expect a high value of election margin–equivalently a narrow winning
margin–indicates a greater uncertainty. Therefore, we generate a dummy variable
Election margin that takes one if election margin value is larger than the median, and
zero otherwise. We also set Election margin to zero when Gubernatorial election
is zero, which indicates the lower bound for political uncertainty in the leading
up election period. The average election margin in our sample is 84.53% for all
guber-natorial election observations. And, approximately 12.24% observations of
our sample have high election-related uncertainty due to the high election margin.
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[Insert Table 4.7 here]
Using Election margin in place of the Gubernatorial election variable, we then
re-estimate our baseline model. Table 4.7 reports our results. For all two main de-
pendent variables in columns 1–2, the coefficient on Election margin is positive and
statistically significant. We find that during the gubernatorial election period with
close election margin, the number of financial covenants increases by 0.074 (the coef-
ficient on Gubernatorial election), which is equivalent to an increase by 3.2% relative
to the sample mean (2.309). More importantly, the likelihood that lenders set perfor-
mance pricing provisions increases by 6.0% due to election closeness. These results
suggest that close election leading to high election-related uncertainty encourages
lenders to impose more restrictive covenants and performance pricing provisions on
borrowers against uncertainty. Overall, these results suggest that political uncer-
tainty associated with gubernatorial elections does play a crucial role in private debt
contracting space.
Adverse selection problems
Next, we examine how adverse selection problems affect the relationship be-
tween political uncertainty and debt contracts. Garleanu and Zwiebel (2009) suggest
that lenders could set more restrictive covenants on borrowers to provide protection
against the ex-ante information asymmetry. Thus, if adverse selection problems in-
crease lenders’ concerns about borrowers, we expect to see a stronger effect in the
subsamples of borrowers with greater information problems.
We classify firms into high adverse selection problems and low adverse selection
problems based on Relationship lending. Demiroglu and James (2010) find a posi-
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tive and significant relationship between tightness of financial covenants. Further,
Prilmeier (2017) examines the effect of relationship lending on covenant choices and
finds that the duration of a lending relationship affects covenant terms, especially for
opaque borrowers. Therefore, if relationship lending helps to overcome the impact of
election-related political uncertainty on financial covenants and performance-pricing
provisions, we expect to see a weaken effect in the subsamples of borrowers with a
long-term relationship with lenders. We divide our sample based on whether bor-
rowers have a prior lending relationship with the lead banks in the past five years
(Giannetti and Yafeh, 2012). We focus on the lead arranger(s) in this analysis be-
cause they have main roles in monitoring and screening the loan contract terms
(Ivashina, 2009). We also follow prior study on debt contracts (e.g. Gopalan et al.,
2011) to identify lead arrangers and generate Relationship lending indicator variable
which takes a value of one if a borrower has a lending relationship with lead banks
in the last five years.
[Insert Table 4.8 here]
Table 4.8 presents our results with a set of control variables but excluding
Relationship lending variable. We find that the coefficients of Gubernatorial elec-
tion are more positive and significant for without relationship lending subsample,
whereas we do not find significant results for the subsample with relationship lend-
ing. These findings are consistent with our expectation that information asymmetry
drives banks to impose more restrictive loan contracts during gubernatorial election
years.
Taken together, our results suggest that both the difficulty in information
acquisition and the quality of information are an important economic mechanism
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underlying the link between political uncertainty and lenders’ demand for covenants
and state-contingent pricing.
4.5 Robustness tests
In this section, we ensure that our main findings are robust to various consid-
erations.
4.5.1 Alternative measures of political uncertainty
First, we replace our main dependent variable for political uncertainty with
economic policy uncertainty (BBD) index following Baker et al. (2016). Prior studies
on policy uncertainty use this proxy as main measure (Gulen and Ion, 2016; Bonaime
et al., 2018). In our tests, we use three-month mean (Columns 1–2) and twelve-
month mean (Columns 3–4) values of the BBD index.
[Insert Table 4.9, Panels A here]
Panel A of Table 4.9 shows our results based on different measures of uncer-
tainty based on BBD index. The results show that the BBD index appears to have
overall positive effects on covenant intensity and performance-pricing provisions.
Therefore, the result on the relationship between economic policy uncertainty and
the intensity of financial covenants is robust.13
13Although we do not find the significant relationship between the indicator for performance-
pricing provisions and BBD index, one of the plausible explanations for this result is that BBD
index reflects policy uncertainty in general, which may or may not arise in an election or may not
change even after election outcomes (Nagar et al., 2019). Furthermore, gubernatorial elections
naturally show the expected and transitory shock, as opposed to unexpected and perennial shock
of economic policy uncertainty index.
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4.5.2 Controlling for a concurrent event
Next, we explore whether our results are influenced by other confounding elec-
tion events, particularly presidential elections which accounts for 25% observations
of our sample. We first generate a dummy variable that takes the value of one if there
is a presidential election in a certain year and zero otherwise. To control for this
confounding election, we control for the presence of presidential elections. Columns
1 - 2 in panel B of Table 4.9 show the findings. We find that after control for the
presidential election dummy variable, the coefficients on Gubernatorial election are
still positive and statistically significant. Furthermore, we do not find significant
coefficients on the Presidential election for covenant intensity and the number of
performance-pricing provisions.
Alternatively, we exclude from our sample the observations with presidential
elections. Models 3 - 4 in panel B of Table 4.9 present the results. We document
that the coefficient on Gubernatorial election is still positive and significant after
dropping the governor election concurrent with presidential elections.
[Insert Table 4.9, Panel B here]
4.5.3 Controlling for other accounting decisions
As in Graham et al. (2008), banks set tighter loan contracts to reduce risk
and information problems arising from financial reporting quality. Therefore, in
this sub-section, we show the results are robust to the inclusion of additional ac-
counting decision measure, which may cause adverse selection problems. In columns
1 - 2 of panel C - Table 9, we add earnings management measures to control for
financial reporting quality. The earning management measure is based on the Mod-
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ified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995). Columns 3 - 4 of panel C show the re-
sults with additional control for accounting conservatism. We use Khan and Watts
(2009) model to calculate for our conditional accounting conservatism. We find
that the coefficients on the Gubernatorial election are statistically significant and
positive. These results are consistent with our main findings, implying that our
results are not driven by the earnings management or accounting conservatism.
[Insert Table 4.9, Panel C here]
4.6 Conclusion
By exploiting the U.S. gubernatorial elections as an exogenous shock to polit-
ical uncertainty, we have examined how the uncertainty affects lenders’ monitoring
demand and loan pricing decision in the private syndicated loan markets. We doc-
ument a substantial impact of political uncertainty on the covenant requirements
and the state-contingent pricing grids. Our results show a sizeable increase in the
likelihood that a loan contract includes financial covenants and performance-pricing
provisions in gubernatorial election years, compared with off-election years. The
more fiercely fought an election is, the stronger are these effects, indicating that
political uncertainty is indeed the main channel through which elections affect the
loan contracting outcomes. The ease of information acquisition and the quality of
information also play an important economic mechanism in this relationship. Ad-
ditional analysis suggests that lenders are concerned about inter alia two factors:
the claim conflict between debt and equity and the lack of information about future
performance in setting initial contracts. Overall, our evidence suggests that politi-
cal uncertainty associated with gubernatorial elections has a significant impact on
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private loans, an increasingly important source of capital for many firms.
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4.7 Tables of Chapter 4
Table 4.1 – Frequency of financial and nonfinancial covenant types
This table reports the frequency of inclusion of different types in our sample for the pe-
riod 1992 to 2014
Fraction (%)
Financial covenants
Debt to equity covenant 0.53
Debt to tangible net worth covenant 6.63
Leverage ratio covenant 21.35
Loan to value covenant 0.06
Senior leverage covenant 0.13
Any debt to balance sheet covenant 28.70
Cash interest coverage covenant 1.11
Debt service coverage covenant 5.46
Fixed charge coverage covenant 38.05
Interest coverage covenant 38.92
Any coverage covenant 83.53
Debt to EBITDA covenant 57.09
Senior debt to EBITDA covenant 9.91
Any debt to cash flow covenant 66.28
Current ratio covenant 8.55
Quick ratio covenant 1.75
Any liquidity covenant 10.30
Net worth covenant 17.84
Tangible net worth covenant 19.3
Any net worth covenant 33.77
EBITDA covenant 8.30
Non-financial covenant
Asset sales sweep 41.80
Equity issuance sweep 34.26
Debt issuance sweep 37.31





Table 4.2 – Descriptive statistics
This table provides the summary statistics for variables in the baseline model. The sam-
ple contains 8,413 loan package-year observations during the period 1990-2014. Variables are
defined in the Appendix. All financial ratios are winsorised at the 1% and 99% level. Loan
characteristics and state-level variables are computed as of year t. Loans with many facilities are
aggregated into package level. Firm-level characteristics are computed as of year t-1.
N Mean Std dev P1 Median P99
Main dependent variables
Covenant Intensity 8413 2.309 1.026 1.000 2.000 5.000
P-covenants 8413 1.581 0.963 0.000 2.000 4.000
C-covenants 8413 0.728 0.792 0.000 1.000 3.000
Performance Pricing 8413 0.691 0.462 0.000 1.000 1.000
P-grid 8413 0.419 0.493 0.000 0.000 1.000
C-grid 8413 0.042 0.202 0.000 0.000 1.000
Rating grid 8413 0.251 0.434 0.000 0.000 1.000
Firm-level variables
Ln(assets) 8413 6.841 1.698 3.159 6.793 10.764
MTB 8413 2.495 3.258 -8.487 1.930 19.995
Profitability 8413 0.025 0.101 -0.446 0.039 0.224
Leverage 8413 0.295 0.188 0.000 0.278 0.933
Tangibility 8413 0.340 0.243 0.023 0.274 0.909
Z-score 8413 1.834 1.261 -1.765 1.83 5.268
Cash holding 8413 0.074 0.093 0.000 0.037 0.429
Sales growth 8413 0.077 0.204 -0.683 0.077 0.619
Earnings volatility 8413 0.045 0.106 0.000 0.01 0.706
Loss dummy 8413 0.214 0.410 0.000 0.000 1.000
R&D 8413 0.014 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.168
ROA 8413 0.085 0.08 -0.169 0.083 0.305
Unrated 8413 0.488 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000
State-level variables
Real GDP growth 8413 0.028 0.026 -0.042 0.027 0.085
Ln (GDP per capita) 8413 10.584 0.241 10.073 10.584 11.103
Unemployment rate 8413 5.760 1.570 3.967 5.408 9.608
Loan-level variables
Secured 8413 0.566 0.496 0.000 1.000 1.000
Revolver 8413 0.870 0.337 0.000 1.000 1.000
Relationship lending 8413 0.489 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000
Relative deal size 8413 0.334 0.330 0.017 0.239 1.812
Deal maturity 8413 46.123 19.349 6.000 48.000 86.112
Ln (Spread) 8413 4.915 0.760 2.996 5.011 6.397
Observations 8413
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Table 4.3 – Univariate test
This table provides comparisons of means of covenants, performance pricing, loan charac-
teristics and other control variables for election years and off-election years. The sample contains
8,413 loan package-year observations during the period 1990-2014. Variables are defined in
Appendix 4.A. All financial ratios are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Loan characteristics
and state-level variables are computed as of year t. Loans with many facilities are aggregated into
package level. Firm-level characteristics are computed as of year t-1.
N Non-election Election Difference
Coefficient t-stat
Financial Covenant Intensity 8413 2.298 2.345 0.047* -1.790
P-covenants 8413 1.570 1.617 0.047* -1.896
C-covenants 8413 0.728 0.728 0.000 -0.015
Performance Pricing 8413 0.683 0.718 0.035*** -2.991
P-grid 8413 0.410 0.448 0.037*** -2.956
C-grid 8413 0.043 0.041 -0.002 0.390
Rating grid 8413 0.251 0.253 0.002 -0.205
Ln(assets) 8413 6.863 6.770 -0.094** 2.148
MTB 8413 2.487 2.519 0.032 -0.38
Leverage 8413 0.295 0.294 -0.001 0.259
Tangibility 8413 0.342 0.336 -0.006 0.958
Z-score 8413 1.846 1.798 -0.048 1.475
Cash holding 8413 0.072 0.078 0.006** -2.308
Sales growth 8413 0.087 0.045 -0.042*** 8.094
Earnings volatility 8413 0.046 0.043 -0.004 1.291
Loss dummy 8413 0.210 0.227 0.017 -1.609
R&D 8413 0.014 0.016 0.001* -1.714
ROA 8413 0.086 0.080 -0.005*** 2.66
Unrated 8413 0.483 0.504 0.021* -1.666
Real GDP growth 8413 0.029 0.023 -0.006*** 9.688
Ln (GDP per capita) 8413 10.582 10.59 0.008 -1.342
Unemployment rate 8413 5.782 5.691 -0.091** 2.255
Secured 8413 0.559 0.589 0.030** -2.382
Revolver 8413 0.871 0.866 -0.004 0.51
Relationship lending 8413 0.501 0.448 -0.053*** 4.129
Relative deal size 8413 0.332 0.340 0.008 -0.984
Deal maturity 8413 46.43 45.129 -1.301*** 2.618
Ln (Spread) 8413 4.907 4.939 0.032 -1.629
Observations 8413
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Table 4.4 – Baseline regressions: Effect of political uncertainty on debt con-
tracts
This table presents the results from the OLS regressions and the logistic regression of covenant
intensity, performance pricing on gubernatorial election (Gubernatorial election). Covenant inten-
sity is the number of financial covenants attached in a loan package. Performance pricing is an
indicator variable that takes value of one if a loan package contains performance-pricing provisions.
Variables are defined in Appendix 4.A. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes the coefficients are significantly different
from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
a – Panel A: Baseline regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial Performance Financial Performance
Covenant Pricing Covenant Pricing
Intensity Intensity
Gubernatorial Election 0.058*** 0.232*** 0.047** 0.204**
(0.017) (0.056) (0.023) (0.094)
Ln(assets) -0.073*** 0.413*** -0.069*** 0.429***
(0.017) (0.035) (0.017) (0.039)
MTB -0.005 0.005 -0.005 0.002
(0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.010)
ROA 0.779** 2.262*** 0.715** 2.119***
(0.302) (0.466) (0.300) (0.468)
Leverage 0.064 -0.543*** 0.042 -0.454**
(0.089) (0.190) (0.085) (0.200)
Tangibility -0.096 -0.870*** -0.119 -0.969***
(0.112) (0.295) (0.110) (0.307)
Z-score -0.007 0.005 -0.007 0.007
(0.012) (0.049) (0.011) (0.050)
Cash holding -0.154 -0.940*** -0.144 -0.965***
(0.171) (0.362) (0.182) (0.364)
Sales growth 0.112* -0.238** 0.169** -0.076
(0.064) (0.103) (0.066) (0.105)
Earnings volatility -0.497*** -1.650*** -0.490*** -1.747***
(0.120) (0.447) (0.116) (0.425)
Loss dummy -0.228*** -0.394*** -0.229*** -0.405***
(0.032) (0.092) (0.032) (0.096)
R&D -1.551*** -2.555*** -1.455*** -2.110**
(0.515) (0.933) (0.497) (0.938)
Unrated 0.170*** -0.029 0.178*** 0.006
(0.031) (0.097) (0.030) (0.096)
Revolver 0.099*** 0.662*** 0.102*** 0.654***
(0.035) (0.094) (0.035) (0.100)
Relationship lending 0.075*** -0.177** 0.081*** -0.112
(0.020) (0.076) (0.021) (0.078)
Relative deal size -0.019 0.674*** 0.001 0.731***
(0.057) (0.210) (0.053) (0.219)
Deal maturity 0.003*** 0.016*** 0.004*** 0.019***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Ln(Spread) 0.325*** -0.465*** 0.314*** -0.530***
(0.023) (0.059) (0.025) (0.062)
Real GDP growth 0.148 -4.535** -0.823 -0.478
(0.518) (1.889) (0.541) (1.814)
Ln(GDP per capita) -1.483*** -1.510*** 0.396 -0.530
(0.081) (0.254) (0.375) (0.904)
Unemployment rate -0.054*** -0.224*** -0.081** 0.009
(0.011) (0.026) (0.031) (0.115)
Constant 16.913*** 18.102*** -2.805 5.927
(0.849) (2.936) (4.005) (9.835)
Observations 8413 8413 8413 8413
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year No No Yes Yes
Method OLS Logit OLS Logit
Adjusted R2 0.304 0.315
Pseudo R2 0.184 0.201
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b – Panel B: Average marginal effects at mean
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial Performance Financial Performance
Covenant Pricing Covenant Pricing
Intensity Intensity
Gubernatorial Election 0.046*** 0.041**
(0.011) (0.019)
157
Table 4.5 – Effect of political uncertainty on types of covenants
This table presents the results from the OLS regressions of covenant package on guberna-
torial election (Gubernatorial election). Covenant intensity is the number of financial covenants
attached in a loan package. P-covenant is the number of performance-based covenants attached in
a loan package. C-covenant is the number of capital-based covenants attached in a loan package.
Variables are defined in Appendix 4.A. Regressions include state and industry fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *,




Gubernatorial Election 0.032** 0.026** -0.002
(0.016) (0.013) (0.005)
Ln(assets) 0.016 -0.089*** 0.014***
(0.017) (0.008) (0.005)
MTB 0.005 -0.010*** 0.004***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
ROA 1.438*** -0.660*** 0.0503***
(0.333) (0.148) (0.098)
Leverage 0.301*** -0.236*** 0.117***
(0.100) (0.060) (0.032)
Tangibility -0.448*** 0.352*** -0.158***
(0.083) (0.056) (0.024)
Z-score -0.046** 0.039*** -0.002***
(0.018) (0.013) (0.005)
Cash holding -0.117 -0.036 -0.005
(0.166) (0.096) (0.066)
Sales growth 0.048 0.065 -0.017
(0.048) (0.045) (0.015)
Earnings volatility -0.707*** 0.210* -0.134*
(0.151) (0.118) (0.077)
Loss dummy -0.042 -0.186*** 0.052***
(0.028) (0.022) (0.012)
R&D -2.536*** 0.984** -0.672*
(0.394) (0.438) (0.137)
Unrated 0.100*** 0.069*** 0.004
(0.033) (0.023) (0.012)
Revolver 0.044 0.056 -0.010
(0.043) (0.034) (0.017)
Relationship lending 0.042** 0.033* 0.005
(0.020) (0.018) (0.006)
Secured 0.089*** -0.092*** 0.046***
(0.026) (0.033) (0.010)
Relative deal size 0.201*** -0.219*** 0.056***
(0.037) (0.039) (0.006)
Deal maturity 0.008*** -0.005*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Ln(Spread) 0.360*** -0.034* 0.078***
(0.023) (0.019) (0.011)
Real GDP growth -1.274** 1.422*** -0.502***
(0.519) (0.377) (0.150)
Ln(GDP per capita) -0.010 -1.472*** 0.425***
(0.068) (0.071) (0.033)
Unemployment rate -0.068*** 0.014*** -0.007***
(0.010) (0.005) (0.003)
Constant -0.287 17.194*** -4.401***
(0.681) (0.729) (0.322)
Observations 8413 8413 8413
Adjusted R2 0.354 0.347 0.375
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4.6 – Effect of political uncertainty on types of pricing grids
This table presents the results from the logistic regressions of performance-pricing provi-
sions on gubernatorial election (Gubernatorial election). P-grid is an indicator variable that takes
value of one if a loan package has at least one performance-based (or profitability) grid attached
in a loan package. C-grid is an indicator value that takes value of one if a loan package has at
least one capital-based grid in a loan package. Rating-grid is an indicator variable that takes
value of one if there is at least one credit-rating grid in a loan package. Variables are defined in
Appendix 4.A. Regressions include state and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the state level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes the coefficients
are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
P-grid C-grid Rating grid
Gubernatorial Election 0.186*** 0.082 0.204**
(0.057) (0.142) (0.088)
Ln(assets) 0.031 0.235** 0.893***
(0.058) (0.110) (0.068)
MTB -0.006 -0.026 0.012
(0.008) (0.031) (0.021)
ROA 3.553*** -2.723** 2.048**
(0.431) (1.200) (0.915)
Leverage Totdebt 0.258 0.082 -0.501
(0.216) (0.549) (0.567)
Tangibility -0.895*** 1.772*** -0.025
(0.307) (0.550) (0.402)
Z-score -0.013 0.312*** 0.074
(0.046) (0.119) (0.091)
Cash holding -0.098 0.111 0.030
(0.361) (0.841) (0.857)
Sales growth 0.073 0.618 -0.674***
(0.149) (0.604) (0.245)
Earnings volatility -2.881*** -12.471*** -0.951
(0.642) (4.618) (0.697)
Loss dummy -0.252*** -0.565*** -0.038
(0.094) (0.195) (0.109)
R&D -3.294*** 3.022* -2.748
(0.999) (1.755) (2.387)
Unrated 0.926*** 1.435*** -2.832***
(0.136) (0.296) (0.125)
Revolver 1.072*** 0.461* 0.109
(0.137) (0.256) (0.161)
Relationship lending -0.063 -0.085 -0.220**
(0.064) (0.098) (0.099)
Secured 0.290*** -0.499* -1.849***
(0.081) (0.296) (0.175)
Relative deal size 0.273* -0.556** 0.501**
(0.158) (0.266) (0.210)
Deal maturity 0.028*** 0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.006) (0.003)
Ln(Spread) 0.521*** -0.235** -0.736***
(0.052) (0.118) (0.122)
Real GDP growth -1.812 -0.960 -3.414
(1.217) (3.528) (3.149)
Ln(GDP per capita) -0.260 -3.047*** -1.922***
(0.223) (0.630) (0.283)
Unemployment rate -0.193*** 0.010 -0.166***
(0.020) (0.058) (0.039)
Constant -0.584 27.659*** 17.644***
(2.451) (6.491) (2.929)
Observations 8401 7966 8344
Pseudo R2 0.250 0.192 0.589
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Table 4.7 – Economic mechanism: Election characteristics and the effect of
political uncertainty
This table presents the results from the OLS regressions and the logistic regression of covenant
intensity and performance pricing on gubernatorial election characteristics. Election margin, that
takes the value of one if election margin value is larger than median, and zero otherwise. Term
limit is a dummy variable which equals one if the incumbent state governor reaches term-limit
expiration. Covenant intensity is the number of financial covenants attached in a loan package.
Performance pricing is an indicator variable that takes value of one if a loan package contains
performance-pricing provisions. Variables are defined in Appendix 4.A. Regressions include state
and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes the coefficients are significantly different from zero at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
a – Regressions
(1) (2)
Financial Covenant Intensity Performance Pricing














Cash holding -0.025 -0.890**
(0.173) (0.372)
Sales growth 0.131* -0.193**
(0.070) (0.095)
Earnings volatility -0.441*** -1.584***
(0.131) (0.423)












Relative deal size -0.011 0.731***
(0.056) (0.205)




Real GDP growth 0.091 -4.166**
(0.460) (1.878)
Ln(GDP per capita) -1.531*** -1.362***
(0.116) (0.259)






Industry FE Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.193
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b – Average marginal effects at mean
(1) (2)




Table 4.8 – Economic mechanism: Adverse selection problem
This table presents the heterogeneity in the effects of gubernatorial election (Gubernatorial elec-
tion) on covenant intensity and performance pricing using the OLS regressions and the logistic
regression, based on whether borrowers has relationship lending with banks. Covenant intensity is
the number of financial covenants attached in a loan package. Performance pricing is an indicator
variable that takes value of one if a loan package contains performance-pricing provisions. Variables
are defined in Appendix 4.A. Regressions include state and industry fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the state level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes
the coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Without relationship lending With relationship lending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial Performance Financial Performance
Covenant Pricing Covenant Pricing
Intensity Intensity
Gubernatorial Election 0.064** 0.250*** 0.050 0.169
(0.030) (0.081) (0.030) (0.105)
Ln(assets) -0.040* 0.417*** -0.116*** 0.266***
(0.020) (0.033) (0.024) (0.055)
MTB -0.012** 0.010 0.002 0.003
(0.005) (0.014) (0.004) (0.013)
ROA 1.084*** 1.435*** 0.304 3.001***
(0.349) (0.547) (0.308) (0.732)
Leverage -0.018 -0.293 0.144 -0.488
(0.108) (0.234) (0.114) (0.330)
Tangibility -0.023 -0.957*** -0.175 -0.912***
(0.125) (0.369) (0.120) (0.300)
Z-score -0.023* 0.023 0.002 -0.012
(0.012) (0.057) (0.023) (0.063)
Cash holding -0.168 -1.041** -0.170 -0.638
(0.220) (0.490) (0.220) (0.577)
Sales growth 0.055 -0.337** 0.152 0.019
(0.063) (0.149) (0.091) (0.232)
Earnings volatility -0.525*** -1.482* -0.406** -1.461***
(0.188) (0.817) (0.160) (0.480)
Loss dummy -0.219*** -0.396*** -0.241*** -0.391***
(0.044) (0.100) (0.041) (0.120)
R&D -2.049*** -2.706* -0.671 -3.191***
(0.499) (1.565) (0.647) (1.067)
Unrated 0.203*** -0.059 0.124** -0.105
(0.034) (0.114) (0.048) (0.127)
Real GDP growth 0.355 -1.234 0.149 -6.986**
(0.642) (1.777) (0.749) (3.376)
Ln(GDP per capita) -1.467*** -0.967*** -1.459*** -1.723***
(0.124) (0.352) (0.108) (0.290)
Unemployment rate -0.052*** -0.143*** -0.056*** -0.365***
(0.012) (0.035) (0.014) (0.042)
Revolver 0.106** 0.951*** 0.088* 0.627***
(0.041) (0.126) (0.050) (0.121)
Secured 0.006 -0.870*** -0.007 -0.565***
(0.049) (0.124) (0.053) (0.129)
Relative deal size -0.029 1.002*** 0.019 0.288
(0.068) (0.188) (0.076) (0.245)
Deal maturity 0.002** 0.019*** 0.004*** 0.018***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Ln(Spread) 0.263*** -0.202** 0.357*** -0.340***
(0.033) (0.101) (0.027) (0.085)
Constant 16.889*** 10.829*** 16.890*** 20.204***
(1.236) (3.658) (1.081) (3.263)
Observations 4301 4285 4112 4088
Adjusted R2 0.250 0.377
Pseudo R2 0.212 0.212
H0: Without lending relationship = With lending relationship
F-test 1.11 0.25
Prob >F (0.292) (0.616)
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Table 4.9 – Robustness tests
This table reports various robustness checks on our baseline results on the effects of gubernato-
rial elections on covenant intensity and performance pricing. Panel A replaces main dependent
variable with a set of political uncertainty measures as in Baker et al. (2016). Panel B controls
for presidential elections. Panel C controls for financial reporting quality. Covenant intensity is
the number of financial covenants attached in a loan package. Performance pricing is an indicator
variable that takes value of one if a loan package contains performance-pricing provisions.Variables
are defined in Appendix 4.A. Regressions include state and industry fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the state level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes
the coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
a – Panel A: Economic policy uncertainty index
BBD index 3-month mean BBD index 12-month mean
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial Performance Financial Performance
Covenant Pricing Covenant Pricing
Intensity Intensity
BBD 0.020 -0.145 0.137*** -0.301
(0.036) (0.110) (0.049) (0.190)
Ln(assets) -0.073*** 0.360*** -0.075*** 0.362***
(0.018) (0.037) (0.018) (0.038)
MTB -0.005 0.005 -0.005 0.005
(0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.010)
ROA 0.767** 1.990*** 0.750** 2.014***
(0.298) (0.449) (0.295) (0.449)
Leverage 0.065 -0.410** 0.062 -0.402**
(0.088) (0.194) (0.087) (0.193)
Tangibility -0.097 -0.896*** -0.101 -0.892***
(0.112) (0.290) (0.110) (0.291)
Z-score -0.007 0.002 -0.008 0.004
(0.012) (0.050) (0.012) (0.051)
Cash holding -0.146 -0.857** -0.138 -0.868**
(0.174) (0.376) (0.175) (0.375)
Sales growth 0.104 -0.230** 0.105 -0.229**
(0.064) (0.098) (0.065) (0.098)
Earnings volatility -0.501*** -1.610*** -0.493*** -1.624***
(0.121) (0.425) (0.121) (0.424)
Loss dummy -0.229*** -0.367*** -0.229*** -0.365***
(0.031) (0.088) (0.032) (0.089)
R&D -1.543*** -2.764*** -1.551*** -2.756***
(0.521) (0.911) (0.520) (0.911)
Unrated 0.170*** -0.083 0.169*** -0.082
(0.031) (0.093) (0.031) (0.093)
Revolver 0.099*** 0.727*** 0.100*** 0.726***
(0.034) (0.095) (0.034) (0.094)
Relationship lending 0.074*** -0.180** 0.077*** -0.182**
(0.021) (0.076) (0.021) (0.076)
Secured -0.001 -0.705*** 0.003 -0.709***
(0.045) (0.114) (0.045) (0.112)
Relative deal size -0.016 0.729*** -0.013 0.724***
(0.057) (0.204) (0.056) (0.205)
Deal maturity 0.003*** 0.017*** 0.004*** 0.017***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Ln(Spread) 0.323*** -0.257*** 0.312*** -0.246***
(0.026) (0.074) (0.025) (0.071)
Real GDP growth 0.046 -5.174*** 0.171 -5.303***
(0.497) (1.948) (0.487) (2.009)
Ln(GDP per capita) -1.487*** -1.337*** -1.520*** -1.286***
(0.077) (0.244) (0.081) (0.230)
Unemployment rate -0.058*** -0.235*** -0.072*** -0.214***
(0.012) (0.026) (0.014) (0.032)
Constant 16.986*** 16.223*** 17.345*** 15.655***
(0.810) (2.809) (0.858) (2.625)
Observations 8413 8413 8413 8413
Adjusted R2 0.304 0.304
Pseudo R2 0.192 0.192
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b – Panel B: Accounting for presidential election years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial Performance Financial Performance
Covenant Pricing Covenant Pricing
Intensity Intensity
Gubernatorial Election 0.059*** 0.269*** 0.047** 0.231***
(0.018) (0.059) (0.021) (0.061)
Presidential election 0.003 0.147***
(0.016) (0.040)
Ln(assets) -0.073*** 0.357*** -0.060*** 0.353***
(0.018) (0.037) (0.020) (0.043)
MTB -0.005 0.004 -0.003 0.009
(0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.011)
ROA 0.778** 2.034*** 0.806** 2.226***
(0.300) (0.444) (0.349) (0.517)
Leverage 0.064 -0.413** 0.032 -0.534**
(0.088) (0.195) (0.091) (0.228)
Tangibility -0.097 -0.913*** -0.029 -0.553*
(0.111) (0.296) (0.128) (0.330)
Z-score -0.007 0.001 -0.013 -0.000
(0.012) (0.050) (0.015) (0.044)
Cash holding -0.153 -0.876** -0.113 -0.945**
(0.172) (0.371) (0.197) (0.407)
Sales growth 0.112* -0.202** 0.101* -0.139
(0.063) (0.095) (0.059) (0.103)
Earnings volatility -0.497*** -1.571*** -0.527*** -1.644***
(0.122) (0.422) (0.134) (0.498)
Loss dummy -0.228*** -0.354*** -0.205*** -0.381***
(0.032) (0.089) (0.031) (0.121)
R&D -1.553*** -2.858*** -1.722*** -1.748
(0.520) (0.909) (0.554) (1.163)
Unrated 0.169*** -0.089 0.166*** -0.127
(0.031) (0.094) (0.031) (0.080)
Revolver 0.100*** 0.732*** 0.129*** 0.873***
(0.034) (0.095) (0.040) (0.103)
Relationship lending 0.075*** -0.171** 0.079*** -0.202***
(0.020) (0.076) (0.025) (0.076)
Secured -0.003 -0.705*** 0.000 -0.723***
(0.045) (0.114) (0.049) (0.133)
Relative deal size -0.018 0.729*** 0.001 0.645***
(0.057) (0.204) (0.067) (0.210)
Deal maturity 0.003*** 0.017*** 0.003*** 0.018***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Ln(Spread) 0.326*** -0.268*** 0.322*** -0.252***
(0.025) (0.072) (0.032) (0.093)
Real GDP growth 0.150 -4.377** -0.177 -6.185***
(0.519) (1.875) (0.585) (1.829)
Ln(GDP per capita) -1.482*** -1.369*** -1.520*** -1.790***
(0.081) (0.251) (0.070) (0.252)
Unemployment rate -0.054*** -0.247*** -0.056*** -0.246***
(0.011) (0.026) (0.011) (0.031)
Constant 16.901*** 16.524*** 17.229*** 20.957***
(0.849) (2.880) (0.746) (3.102)
Observations 8413 8413 6237 6234
Adjusted R2 0.304 0.294
Pseudo R2 0.193 0.199
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c – Panel C: Controlling for financial reporting activities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial Performance Financial Performance
Covenant Pricing Covenant Pricing
Intensity Intensity
Gubernatorial Election 0.053*** 0.222*** 0.057*** 0.276***
(0.020) (0.071) (0.019) (0.071)
Ln(assets) -0.056*** 0.359*** -0.079*** 0.401***
(0.020) (0.045) (0.019) (0.047)
MTB -0.005 0.005 -0.019*** -0.011
(0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.010)
ROA 0.776** 2.099*** 0.891*** 2.818***
(0.294) (0.545) (0.331) (0.544)
Leverage 0.141 -0.151 0.329*** -0.050
(0.096) (0.241) (0.095) (0.266)
Tangibility -0.057 -0.861** -0.137 -0.829**
(0.122) (0.379) (0.117) (0.356)
Z-score -0.009 0.002 -0.016 -0.019
(0.012) (0.053) (0.014) (0.057)
Cash holding -0.152 -0.857** -0.071 -0.723*
(0.184) (0.400) (0.193) (0.388)
Sales growth 0.105 -0.223* 0.103* -0.206
(0.071) (0.123) (0.057) (0.127)
Earnings volatility -0.637*** -1.271*** -0.506*** -1.033**
(0.158) (0.402) (0.141) (0.457)
Loss dummy -0.219*** -0.336*** -0.231*** -0.310***
(0.035) (0.107) (0.033) (0.086)
R&D -1.370*** -2.958*** -1.142** -2.290**
(0.484) (0.930) (0.559) (0.918)
Unrated 0.173*** -0.037 0.171*** 0.052
(0.032) (0.105) (0.030) (0.097)
Revolver 0.136*** 0.810*** 0.098** 0.820***
(0.037) (0.102) (0.037) (0.099)
Relationship lending 0.062*** -0.170** 0.067*** -0.146*
(0.023) (0.081) (0.023) (0.078)
Secured 0.003 -0.722*** -0.008 -0.728***
(0.053) (0.125) (0.052) (0.110)
Relative deal size -0.011 0.637*** -0.019 0.645***
(0.054) (0.207) (0.057) (0.217)
Deal maturity 0.002** 0.018*** 0.003*** 0.019***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Ln(Spread) 0.340*** -0.241*** 0.321*** -0.271***
(0.031) (0.072) (0.029) (0.069)
Real GDP growth 0.185 -4.440** -0.007 -3.585*
(0.527) (1.729) (0.600) (1.858)
Ln(GDP per capita) -1.487*** -1.210*** -1.447*** -1.218***
(0.087) (0.255) (0.087) (0.243)
Unemployment rate -0.057*** -0.264*** -0.052*** -0.249***
(0.012) (0.023) (0.013) (0.026)
Earnings Management 0.016 -0.310
(0.108) (0.305)
Accounting Conservatism -0.172 1.636***
(0.140) (0.487)
Constant 16.810*** 14.237*** 16.656*** 14.051***
(0.903) (2.876) (0.896) (2.866)
Observations 7360 7360 7338 7338
Adjusted R2 0.275 0.278
Pseudo R2 0.193 0.193
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4.8 Appendices of Chapter 4
Appendix 4.A. Variable definitions
Variable Definition
Main explanatory variable
Gubernatorial election A dummy variable that equals one if a gubernatorial election
is held in a state in a given year.
Loan-related variables
Financial Covenant Intensity Number of financial covenants (the count of six types defined
in Table 4.1).
P-covenants Number of performance-covenants as in
Christensen and Nikolaev (2012)
C-covenants Number of capital-covenants as in
Christensen and Nikolaev (2012)
Dividend covenant Indicator for a restriction on dividend payments
Capex covenant Indicator for a restriction on capital expenditures
Sweep provision Indicator for a requirement to have cash proceeds from
asset sales or equity issuance or debt issuance to repay debt
Sweep provision as in Christensen and Nikolaev (2012)
Performance pricing Indicator for the use of a performance pricing provision
Rating-grid Indicator for the use of rating-based loan pricing
P-grid Indicator for using a loan pricing which is based on
performance indicators
C-grid Indicator for using a loan pricing which is based on
capital ratio-based indicators
Secured Indicator for a secured debt
Revolver Indicator for a revolving facility that exits in the deal package
Relationship lending Indicator for a borrower that borrows from the same bank
within the last five years
Relative deal size Deal amount scaled by borrower’s total assets
Debt maturity A weighted average of maturity for each facility in the deal
Spread A weighted average of the all-in-drawn spread for each facility
in the deal
Ln(Spread) Natural logarithm of Spread variable
Firm-related variables
Ln(assets) Natural logarithm of total assets for a firm in year t-1
Continued on next page
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Appendix 4.8– continued from previous page
Variable Definition
MTB Market-to-book value for a firm in year t-1
Leverage Total long-term and short-term debt in year t – 1
scaled by lagged total assets
Tangibility Net property, plant, and equipment divide total assets
in year t-1
Z-score Modified Altman (1968)’s Z-score in year t-1.
Z-score is calculated as (1.2 working capital + 1.4 retained
earnings + 3.3 EBIT + 0.999)/total assets. We use modified
Z-score as in Graham et al. (2008).
Cash holding Cash and short-term investment divided by total assets
in year t-1
Sales growth The difference in sales between year t-1 and t-2
scaled by total sales in year t-1
Earnings volatility The standard deviation of quarterly earnings in the last
three years before the loan year
Loss A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm has a
negative net income, and zero otherwise
R&D R&D expenses scaled by total assets in year t – 1.
Missing R&D expense is replaced with zeros
ROA Income before extraordinary items divided by total assets in
year t - 1
Unrated A dummy variable that takes the value of one if firms are
not rated by S&P ratings
State-related variables
Real GDP growth State real GDP growth
Ln(GDP per capita) Natural logarithm of state real GDP per capital
Unemployment rate Seasonally adjusted rate of unemployment
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Appendix 4.B. Correlation matrix
This table shows the correlation matrix between variables used in main regressions. All definitions of variables are reported in
Appendix A.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23)
(1) Financial Covenant Intensity 1.00
(2) Performance Pricing 0.14 1.00
(3) Ln(assets) -0.39 0.16 1.00
(4) MTB -0.03 0.07 0.04 1.00
(5) ROA 0.03 0.20 0.07 0.27 1.00
(6) Leverage Totdebt 0.02 -0.02 0.16 -0.08 -0.17 1.00
(7) Tangibility -0.05 -0.07 0.15 -0.07 -0.10 0.25 1.00
(8) Z-score 0.05 0.10 -0.12 0.11 0.54 -0.42 -0.28 1.00
(9) Cash holding -0.03 -0.06 -0.13 0.15 0.09 -0.36 -0.30 0.08 1.00
(10) Sales growth 0.11 0.05 -0.04 0.11 0.23 -0.03 -0.00 0.07 0.01 1.00
(11) Earnings volatility -0.23 -0.00 0.53 -0.00 -0.07 0.11 0.07 -0.18 -0.02 -0.11 1.00
(12) Loss dummy -0.02 -0.20 -0.13 -0.14 -0.54 0.22 0.00 -0.32 -0.02 -0.24 0.11 1.00
(13) R&D 0.00 -0.04 -0.14 0.13 -0.05 -0.22 -0.26 -0.08 0.37 -0.00 -0.02 0.08 1.00
(14) Unrated 0.27 -0.11 -0.67 0.00 -0.01 -0.35 -0.18 0.18 0.18 0.06 -0.32 0.03 0.16 1.00
(15) Revolver 0.12 0.07 -0.20 -0.06 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 0.05 0.02 0.00 -0.13 0.02 0.01 0.15 1.00
(16) Relationship lending -0.05 0.02 0.25 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.05 -0.00 -0.12 0.05 0.11 -0.06 -0.08 -0.18 -0.05 1.00
(17) Secured 0.20 -0.22 -0.39 -0.12 -0.24 0.17 -0.05 -0.17 0.02 -0.01 -0.13 0.27 -0.01 0.18 0.15 -0.09 1.00
(18) Relative deal size 0.22 0.04 -0.41 0.06 0.10 0.07 -0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.11 -0.22 -0.04 -0.03 0.25 0.18 -0.04 0.28 1.00
(19) Deal maturity 0.05 0.15 0.06 -0.01 0.09 0.10 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.07 -0.03 -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 0.31 0.03 0.14 0.27 1.00
(20) Ln(Spread) 0.18 -0.25 -0.33 -0.18 -0.32 0.21 -0.05 -0.23 0.04 -0.10 -0.07 0.33 -0.00 0.18 0.06 -0.12 0.59 0.19 0.07 1.00
(21) Real GDP growth 0.16 0.04 -0.16 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.03 -0.03 0.19 -0.10 -0.05 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.12 -0.01 -0.17 1.00
(22) Ln(GDP per capita) -0.29 -0.05 0.27 0.03 -0.00 -0.08 -0.16 -0.07 0.15 -0.10 0.15 -0.02 0.05 -0.09 -0.04 0.04 -0.00 -0.14 0.11 0.13 -0.32 1.00
(23) Unemployment rate -0.22 -0.12 0.22 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 0.11 -0.14 0.12 -0.03 -0.01 -0.08 0.07 0.04 -0.03 -0.09 0.19 0.18 -0.38 0.38 1.00
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Appendix 4.C. Regressions on term-loan contracts
This table presents the effects of gubernatorial election (Gubernatorial election) on loan
spread and deal maturity. Variables are defined in Appendix 4.A. Regressions include state and
industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes the coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2)
Ln(Spread) Deal maturity














Cash holding 0.138 -0.664
(0.086) (2.397)
Sales growth 0.054 1.309
(0.041) (0.978)
Earnings volatility 0.000*** -0.012***
(0.000) (0.003)


















Real GDP growth -0.150 -13.827
(0.387) (9.523)
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.198 -1.313
(0.200) (4.413)





Adjusted R2 0.600 0.356
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Research
5.1 Summary and Conclusion
The thesis examines the internal and external corporate governance mecha-
nisms that affect managers’ incentives and firms’ activities under uncertainty situ-
ations or extreme institutional environment. This starts by noting that governance
practices have changed significantly in response to political environment, economic
issues and uncertainty about the future. Chapter 2 then documents how the in-
ternal corporate governance approaches affect compensation structures of CEOs.
Particularly, we investigate whether the presence of bankers on the board affects
CEOs inside debt, which is known as a mechanism to align CEOs with debtholders,
reduce risks and myopic investment decisions for firms. Followed Chapter 2, I look
at how the media freedom affects corporate misconduct in Chapter 3. This is the
first empirical study that relates the exposure to foreign product markets with me-
dia restriction and corporate misconduct. In another external corporate governance
aspect, Chapter 4 investigates how private lenders design loan contracts during a
political uncertainty period. This is the first study that focuses on covenants and
state-contingent pricing by using an exogenous shock from gubernatorial elections.
In summary, this thesis adds to the literature on the corporate governance
mechanisms that could affect firms’ outcomes and be used to adapt to the growing
socio-economic risks and unprecedented long-term trends. Specifically, the contri-
171
butions of the thesis can be grouped into three separate areas based on the three
chapters shown in the thesis. Chapter 2 of this thesis adds to the literature on
the determinants of inside debt and on how the specific characteristics of board of
directors influence corporate outcomes and CEO incentives. Moreover, Chapter 3
contributes to the literature on the effect of media freedom and firm outcomes at the
firm-level. Moreover, this study also adds to the literature on the spill-over effect
of institutional characteristics of foreign product markets on firms headquartered.
Lastly, Chapter 4 contributes to research on how private lenders assess information
about borrowers and deal with transitory uncertainty related to elections. Further,
this chapter contributes to literature that studies the impact of political uncertainty
on private loans during the high uncertainty periods.
The results of this thesis are also attractive from a practical standpoint be-
cause they have important implications for policy makers. In particular, after the
implementation of the SEC Release No. 34-55009, there has been an increase in
the attractiveness of pensions and deferred compensations instead of stock options
because firms need to disclose the value of stock options grants in their summary
compensation tables. Hence, our findings in Chapter 2 offer economic insights into
how board of directors affects the debt-like compensations, in addition to the equity
of CEOs to reduce agency conflicts between debtholders and shareholders. Besides,
this chapter also shows an optimal compensation package to maximise benefits for
both parties of firms. Regarding external corporate governance approaches, the
findings that I report in Chapter 3 further show the influence of media freedom on
corporate misconduct. Moreover, these findings show empirical evidences that sup-
port for the concerns of practitioners about the increase of media restriction around
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the world. Finally, together with the results from Chapter 3, the results from Chap-
ter 4 confirm the impact of external corporate governance structures on corporate
outputs in the uncertainty environment and political factors.
5.2 Limitations and Recommendation for Future Research
Based on the analyses conducted in the three empirical chapters, there are
some shortcomings of the thesis that should be considered when designing future
research.
First, in Chapter 2, we focus on the presence of bankers on board instead
of the dynamic within the board. Specifically, in this chapter, we do not consider
whether members of compensation committees affect CEO inside debt. Further
research could verify whether these bankers on compensation committees affect CEO
inside debt. Moreover, in this chapter, we compare firms with banker-directors and
without banker-directors to identify the differences between these two types of firms.
Therefore, we do not take into account the percentage of banker-directors on the
board. Further tests on percentage of banker-directors on board would be interesting
to identify the impact of banker-directors at the board level.
Data limitation also poses some constraints to the analysis based on the sales-
weighted media restriction measure in Chapter 3. Whilst my dataset is extracted
from both COMPUSTAT data and manually checked by reading 10-K reports, it is
still important to see each country which accounts more than 10 percent of sales or
assets, instead of a group of countries as reported in many 10-K reports. Therefore,
if there is improvement in disclosing information from firms, a re-examine measure
would be helpful to confirm results of this thesis. Moreover, this chapter considers
173
the effect of exposure to foreign countries based on their media freedom. Therefore,
given the data constraints, I do not focus on media coverage of firms in the US.
Further tests on media coverage of US firms would be interesting and helpful.
Finally, there are some interesting issues to be examined further regarding the
research question in Chapter 4. There are still several possible economic channels
that can explain the main findings. For example, firms that rely more on government
would be more sensitive to political uncertainty periods. Therefore, future research
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